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INTRODUCTION
1. Poet and Philosopher
In this dissertation I have brought together the work
of Sophocles and Aristotle with a view to examining a variety
of topics in the area of moral philosophy and moral psychology.

This is the primary work of the thesis.

purpose of the dissertation,

which

is a

The second

corollary of the

first, is to demonstrate the importance of using both literature and philosophy in the education of the moral agent.

The

reason that I have chosen Sophocles and Aristotle for the work
of this dissertation is that they both share the same fundamental conception of human nature and human purpose.

They

understand a human being to be a complex of reason, emotion
and desire that are not intrinsically opposed to each other
but are capable of being integrated into a harmonious whole. 1

1

Interest in the relationship of the emotions to reason
appears to be something that pre-occupied much of Greek
culture, especially fifth century Athenian culture.
Thus,
Socrates was especially careful to affirm the dominance of
reason over the passions in the Protagoras. In Republic IV.13
Plato demonstrates an intimate and profound understanding of
the way in which the passions can be in opposition to the
dictates of reason in his story about Leontius, son of Aglaion
who gave in to his desire to gaze upon the bodies of criminals
being handled by an executioner. Plato, however, goes on to
show that although the passions are capable of opposing reason
they are equally capable, through moral education, of being
brought in line with the dictates of reason. Euripides,

2
This excellent integration of the various elements of the
human psyche is a major part of successful moral education and
is the fertile ground out of which excellent choice springs.
The integration of ourselves into psychological wholeness and
the

development

of

the

various

virtues

of

character

are

constitutive of human purpose, which is, as Aristotle put it,
eudaimonia or flourishing.

This will be constituted by a life

that is rich in virtuous activity which is performed both for
and with others.

In this way we see that friends are an

important part of the moral life as both the occasion of our
exercise of the virtues and as promoters of virtuous activity.
Thus,

both the poet and philosopher share a

similar conception of what

fundamentally

it means to be human and the

specific purpose that is ours, as human beings, to realize.
They understand that the development of the virtues (including
friendship,
various

which is a virtue)

elements

of

the

psyche

and the integration of the
are

a

necessary

part

of

fulfilling our nature and that this kind of realization of our
characteristically, portrays the emotions and reason in
irreconcilable opposition to each other which, inevitably,
leads to disaster.
In this regard, we have only to think of
Phaedra's passionate love for Hippolytus or Medea's allconsuming hatred for Jason that impels her, in opposition to
what she knows is right, to slaughter her children.
Sophocles, more in line with the Platonic and Aristotelian tradition, views reason and passion as not intrinsically opposed
but capable of being integrated into a harmonious whole. We
can see this in the figure of Neoptolemus in the Philoctetes
as well as the figures of Theseus and Oedipus himself in
Oedipus at Colonus. The latter, in fact, achieves a kind of
immortality through finally bringing about a reconciliation
of the formerly warring elements with himself. See Blundell,
Helping Friends, p. 272.
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nature is constitutive of human flourishing.
This conception of the moral person is rich and fully
appreciates the complexity of both the rational and emotional
aspects of being human.

Implicit in this conception of the

moral person is also an appreciation of the messiness of moral
action and, perhaps more importantly, the precariousness of
achieving moral virtue and living the good life.

We can see

this in the way that this conception of the moral life takes
into account the full spectrum of the elements of the human
psyche and understands that these parts must come to form a
well-integrated whole if we are to realize our nature.

This

is an enterprise that is fraught with risks because these
elements are viewed, at least potentially, as in opposition
to

each

other

and

it

is

the

delicate

business

education to bring them into a harmonious whole.

of

moral

But this,

as the philosopher and the tragedian see it, is the only path
to authentic human agency and the practice of virtue.

This

integration may, of course, not be realized and the individual
may come to live a frustrated rather than a fulfilled life.
Implicit in this conception of the moral agent is also the
recognition of the need for a good teacher who can instruct
us in the ways of virtue and flourishing.

In this conception

of the human person and human purpose there is a profound
appreciation of the crucial role that others play in our
growth in the moral life.
of the role

of

a

In their sense of the centrality

good teacher and good

friends

both the

4

tragedian and the philosopher realize the fundamentally social
character of our growth toward virtue or vice.
The anthropology which Sophocles and Aristotle fundamentally share and the conception of human life to which it gives
rise seems to me to be superior to certain of the dominant
modes of ethical thought in existence today.
Kantian

conception

of

morality,

According to the

everything which we

have

enumerated above (the role of the emotions, teacher, friends,
etc.) would be irrelevant to a proper study of ethics.

This

is so for Kant inasmuch as he holds that we do not need any
kind of anthropology or understanding of human purposes in
order

to

do

ethics.

Experience

is,

in

fact,

irrelevant

according to Kant's view since we need only concern ourselves
with the autonomy of the willing subject in fulfilling the
moral law.

Kant would be equally suspicious of the charac-

terization of moral philosophy as concerned with the messiness
and

contingeny

experience

is

of

everyday

immaterial

existence.

to

the

proper

Again,
study

for
of

Kant,
ethics

inasmuch as ethics should not be concerned at all with how
people actually act but with how they ought to act.
The conception of morality which Sophocles and Aristotle
espouse seems to me to be superior to the dominant voices in
ethical

thought

today because of

practical nature of ethics.

their emphasis upon the

In many ways, this comes down to

being centrally preoccupied with the issue of character.

The

tragedian and the philosopher both have a sense that ethics

5

is not about finding out what rule or rules one should follow 2
but about what sort of person one should become.

It is the

task of ethics, as they see it, not to construct a theory of
the good but actually to become good.

Thus ethics is under-

stood to be a much more dramatic enterprise in which we are
concerned with the making or breaking of lives and not simply
with arriving at a correct formulation of some abstract rule
such as the moral law or the principle of utility.
Their anthropology is preferable because they take into
account all aspects of the person, the rational, emotional and
desiderative and understand that these elements of the human
psyche must be brought into some kind of harmonious whole if
we are to bring our nature to its realization.

They do not

ignore important aspects of human experience with respect to
moral decision-making such as Kant does in his repudiation of
the role of the emotions.

Again,

their conception of the

human person involves the need for others
friends)

(as teachers or

in order for the specifically human purpose to be

fulfilled.

This social aspect of the moral life seems to me

to be much closer to reality than, for example, Kant's preoccupation with the autonomy of the will and its relation to
duty.
It is because of their richer anthropology and sense of
human purpose as well as their appreciation of the complexity
2

This is characteristic of utilitarianism also which is
preoccupied, primarily, with the attempt to enunciate the most
successful form of the principle of utility.
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and messiness of moral decision-making that I have suggested
that Sophocles and Aristotle are preferable to the dominant
modes of moral thinking today.

This fuller anthropology, I

would like to suggest, implies the need for appealing to both
literature as well as philosophy in our analysis of the moral
agent. 3

We need to appeal to literature for its ability to

present moral complexity through the depiction of full-bodied,
thinking and feeling characters who are in a
which a decision must be made.

situation in

In general, literature will

be relevant for its concreteness and its ability to assist us
in becoming effective moral agents by helping us to appreciate
the important role that the emotions play in excellent moral
agency.

It

does

this,

of

course,

by

eliciting

our

own

emotional response to the characters and situations that are
depicted in the drama.
moral

But if we are to take our cue from the

anthropology which Sophocles and Aristotle hold,

shall

need

more

than

simply

an

emotionally

we

charged

presentation of particulars in order to understand the nature
of the moral agent and the moral life.

We shall also need the

unifying and explanatory force that it is the peculiar part
of a logos to provide.
Aristotle.

3

It is for this that we have turned to

In this way then, it is a secondary aim of this

on the central importance of literary works in moral
philosophy see, Martha C. Nussbaum, "Consequences and Character in Sophocles' Philoctetes," Philosophy and Literature, 1
(1976-77), 25-29; Martha C. Nussbaum, The Fragility of
Goodness
(Cambridge, New York, Cambridge University Press,
1986).
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dissertation

to

show

that

we

need

the

accounts

of

both

literature and philosophy in order properly to understand the
nature of the moral agent and the moral life.

Thus, it will

be my aim to show that literature is needed for its emotional
power and its ability to present forcefully the phenomena of
human moral experience while philosophy is needed for its
explanatory power in bringing the diversity of the phenomena
into some unified whole.
This bringing together of philosophy and literature is
advantageous to the education of the moral agent
respects.
benefit

First,
to

a

in many

the use of literature will be of great

popular

audience

precisely

concreteness and its emotional power.

because

of

its

An individual uninit-

iated or uninterested in the subtleties of strictly philosophic discourse may still be drawn into an understanding of
the

various

moral

issues

under

consideration

literature's immediacy and emotional evocativeness.

because

of

Secondly,

even those who are well-versed in the various schools of
ethical thought will

be benefited by this

convocation of

philosophy and literature for seeing the important way in
which they can be played off of each other.

For example, it

will be of value for such an audience to perceive the various
strengths that are peculiar to each media and to come to
understand

that

both

philosophy

and

literature

shed

a

different light on our understanding of the moral agent and
the moral life.

While the use of literary technique is not

8

directly relevant to the professional activity of the moral
philosopher (e.g., writing a book about moral philosophy) it
may still be useful for him as a moral person.

Let us turn,

then, to a discussion of the major themes of this dissertation
in order to present a synoptic overview of the entire work.
2. Nature and Virtue
In

the

first

chapter we

see

the

tragedian

and the

philosopher's penchant for the concrete over the abstract in
their concern to determine the relationship of human nature
to virtue.

Again, they are not concerned with constructing

a sound moral theory after the manner of modern moral philosophy but with discerning the kind of being that a human being
is and what this might reveal with respect to the development
of

the

virtues.

They

show

their

appreciation

of

the

complexity of human nature and their willingness to include
all of the phenomena in the way that they recognize the entire
person in his rational, desiderative and emotional aspects.
They view the human person as a complex web of all of the
above

elements

harmonious

that

must

organization

be

if

brought

virtue

is

flourishing is to be made possible.

into
to

be

some

kind

achieved

of
and

According to Sophocles

and Aristotle this integration is not given to us by nature
but

requires

an

educator

who

formation of the individual.

will

assist

in

the

moral

In this way we see that the

ancients fully appreciated the concrete character of ethics,
the complex nature of a human being, the involved process of

9

moral formation and the social aspect of morality.
argue

that this ancient anthropology

is

I shall

superior to more

recent developments in the Kantian tradition in all of these
ways.

Modern moral philosophy after Kant is overly committed

to the abstract rather than the concrete in its pre-occupation
with the formulation of rules instead of the proper formation
of character.

In its single focus upon the role of reason it

does not show an appreciation of all aspects of the human
psyche

in

the

formation

of

the

moral

person.

This

is

particularly evident in its ignoring of the role that the
emotions play.

Finally,

moral

philosophy

in. the Kantian

tradition does not recognize the social character of morality
and the vital role that others, particularly teachers, play
in an individual's growth into moral personhood.

I begin our

discussion of Sophocles' and Aristotle's position by showing
how they took up their stance in opposition to the archaic
tradition that preceded them.
According

to

the

archaic

tradition

(whose

primary

spokesman is the poet, Pindar) 4 one's nature is determinative
of the quality of one's character.

In short, noble sons are

presumed to be born from noble fathers and the base or wicked
from

the

wicked.

Sophocles'

position

is

particularly

noteworthy in this regard because he is writing as a poet and
4

I have chosen to employ Pindar as representative of the
archaic tradition because he, more than anyone else, most
starkly contrasts the efficacy and sufficiency of nature for
virtue with the uselessness and inefficacy of education. See
below chapter 1, footnote 1.
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the poets

( including Homer)

espoused this view.

were

those who traditionally

It is my contention that, in this play,

Sophocles offers a direct challenge to the archaic notion that
nature

is

a

sufficient

accomplishes

this

by

unexpected downfall

guarantee

portraying

of

virtue.

the

sudden

of Neoptolemus,

Sophocles
and

rather

the son of the noble

Achilles, through both the young man's over-confident reliance
upon his inherited nobility to keep him on the path of virtue
and, more significantly, the pernicious influence of a wicked
teacher.

The centrality of education in the moral formation

of Neoptolemus is emphasized in the articles of Peter Rose and
Mary

Blundell. 5

Whitlock

Neoptolemus'

fall

deleterious

influence

dramatic form,
virtue.

Through

the

depiction

of

into the practice of villainy under the
of

Odysseus,

Sophocles

argues,

in

for the insufficiency of nature to achieve

We are shown that although Neoptolemus' noble nature

is a good starting point for the development of the virtues
this will not,

by itself,

be sufficient to attain virtue.

Neoptolemus is in need of the sort of teacher who will not
undermine him but will affirm his sense of justice and help
him live up to it.
crucial
virtues.
5

role

of
My

the

In this way,
educator

position with

in

Sophocles points to the
the

regard

development
to

the

of

character

the
of

see Peter Rose, "Sophocles' Philoctetes and the Teachings of the Sophists," Harvard Studies in Classical Philology.
80 (1976), 81-83, 89; Mary Whitlock Blundell, "The Phusis of
Neoptolemus in Sophocles' Philoctetes," Greece and Rome, 35
( 1988), 140-142.
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Neoptolemus

is

in marked contrast to the position of two

recent commentators on the play,
Gregory McNamee. 6

namely,

Albin Lesky and

According to both Lesky and McNamee the

figure of Neoptolemus does not undergo any real change in the
course of the drama but simply resumes the nature

(phusis)

which he had renounced at the beginning of the play.

Lesky,

in particular, emphasizes the relatively primitive conception
of human personality which existed in the pre-sophistic (i.e.
pre-Euripidean) presentation of human personality on the Attic
stage.

He contends that we ought to resist the temptation to

attribute any significant change to the character of Neoptolemus at the close of the play inasmuch as writers such as
Aeschylus and Sophocles understood human nature,
tally, as changeless and fixed.

fundamen-

I argue that this position

simply does not do justice to both the psychological complexity of Neoptolemus in his anguished deliberations as to
what to do nor the crucial moral guidance that Philoctetes
gives in the drama.

It is my contention that the tragedian

is showing us that nobility of nature is no guarantee of the
attainment of virtue and that, without the presence of some
kind

of

moral

example,

even

noble

natures

are

liable

to

permanent corruption.
While the tragedian makes his point through the medium
of dramatic portrayal, Aristotle discusses the issue of the
6

Albin Lesky, Greek Tragedy trans. by H. A. Frankfort
(London, New York, Harper and Row, 1978); Philoktetes trans.
by Gregory McNamee (Port Townsend, Copper Canyon, 1986).
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relationship of nature and virtue through a more conceptual
framework.

The philosopher, too, holds that untutored nature

is insufficient to achieve virtue.

According to Aristotle,

we neither grow into possession of the virtues by some sort
of natural process (like a tadpole becoming a frog) nor is the
engendering of the virtues contrary to our nature.

But we

are, by nature, capable of receiving and engendering them in
ourselves through the process of habituation.
Aristotle

indicates

that

he,

like

In this way,

Sophocles,

views

our

relationship to the virtues as a certain potentiality that is
realized

through practice or habituation.

chapter,

I

Thus,

in this

maintain that the philosopher and the tragedian

share a fundamentally similar anthropology in their view that
nature is insufficient for virtue and requires the augmentation of moral education.

This view is presented through the

emotionally charged and concrete medium of Sophocles' art as
well as argued for through the medium of philosophic discourse
in Aristotle.
3.· Moral Exemplar and Moral Standard
In chapter two I develop further the theme, touched upon
in the previous chapter, of the importance of a role model in
moral education.

I also address the broader question of the

ultimate standard of value for Sophocles and Aristotle.

Once

again we can see the emphasis upon the concrete in the ancient
conception of ethics in several ways.

First, we note that the

recognition for the need of a teacher stems directly from the

13

understanding that human nature is insufficient to achieve
virtue.

This is based upon an empirical judgment.

Secondly,

the remedy that is sought is not in terms of formulating some
kind of abstract principle which ought to be followed (as in
modern moral philosophy)

but is

in terms of a

particular

individual from the society who is well-equipped to instruct
the student and inculcate the habits of virtue in him.

Of

course the appeal to a concrete individual as a standard of
action would be, for a Kantian, utterly wrongheaded.

Again,

for Kant, experience is immaterial to the doing of ethics and
no number of excellent moral exemplars could ever add up to
the exceptionless rigor demanded by the moral law.

But, in

the ancient conception of the moral agent, such exceptionless
rigor is unrealistic and out of touch with the contingent
character of moral

action.

Thirdly,

we

can see here

an

implicit affirmation and recognition of the inherently social
character of the formation of the moral agent.

Again, it is

my contention that Sophocles and Aristotle share the same
fundamental moral anthropology and that this conception of the
moral agent is superior to more modern developments.

In the

spirit of this anthropology that takes into account the whole
person we see that Sophocles presents his position on the
moral agent through the concrete and more emotionally oriented
medium of poetry while Aristotle furnishes a more rational
account of the phenomena which are presented by the poet.
The tragedian dramatically portrays the central place

14

of the role model by showing both the devastating consequences
that a poor role model can have and the critical role that a
good moral example can play.

Sophocles shows us the depths

to which the influence of a bad teacher can reach in Neoptolemus' lying tale that he tells to Philoctetes as well as
his final commentary on the tale.
fiction

that he tells

I

argue that the gross

in which he has

lost his

fatherly

inheritance to Odysseus actually reflects his own condition
of having betrayed his moral

identity.

Sophocles further

signifies that the young man is in a truly perilous state when
Neoptolemus,
for

his

own

demonstrates

in Odyssean fashion,
wrongdoing
the central

to

attributes responsibility

someone

else.

importance of

The

tragedian

the role model

by

showing us how Philoctetes awakens in Neoptolemus the sense
of shame which he claimed he had thrown off under Odysseus'
influence and the way in which the broken hero helps Neoptolemus to honor and live up to his original moral principles.
Aristotle does not furnish us with a dramatic instance
of a particular, educational relationship as does Sophocles.
This is more the part of a poet.

He does,

however,

show

himself to be in sympathy with the tragedian when he argues
for the central importance of the educator and the lawmaker
in the moral formation of individuals and the citizen body.
The philosopher, thus, makes programmatic what is presented
as a particular relationship by the tragedian.
of the

educator and the

lawmaker,

It is the work

he affirms,

to instill

15

within the people of the polis certain excellences of character that will result in both individual flourishing and the
common good of the state.
In addition, I have argued that Sophocles and Aristotle
both share a fundamental sense that the ultimate standard by
which

things

in

the

assessed is divine.
appeal

to

the

human

realm

are

to

be measured

and

While they are in agreement in their

divine,

their

emphases

differ

somewhat.

Sophocles appears to stress human ignorance and the inadequacy
of human action and appeals to the divine as a response to the
tragic impasse to which the characters in the play have come
in the course of the drama. 7

Aristotle's God, on the other

hand, serves more as the ultimate horizon in terms of which
human beings are exhorted to model themselves.

This "modeling

ourselves"

after the divine is accomplished,

Aristotle,

through

example,

contemplative

activity

the practice of philosophy)

according to

{such

as,

for

in which the divine

element in human nature is recognized and allowed to flourish. 8

In this way it can be seen that both tragedian and

philosopher appeal to the divine as the final standard by
which the human realm is to be understood but each has a
7

For this interpretation of the theophany of Heracles see
Mary Whitlock Blundell, Helping Friends and Harming Enemies
{Cambridge, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1989);
Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? {Notre
Dame, Indiana, University of Notre Dame Press, 1988); Karl
Reinhardt, Sophocles {New York, Harper and Row, 1979).
8

see J. A. Stewart, Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics of
Aristotle, 2 {Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1892), pp. 442-444.
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somewhat different conception of how the divine and the human
are

related.

This

appeal

to

the di vine

as

the ultimate

standard was widely shared in ancient culture.

We see it

operative in the work of the lyric poets, the tragedians and
the philosophers.

It seems to me that the significance of

this appeal is that, for the ancients, the human good or any
system of goods is not self-validating or self-authenticating
but requires an appeal to the divine as the source or wellspring

of

their

goodness.

recognized that we,

In

this

way

they

implicitly

as human beings, do not create our own

nature but rather bring into realization some purpose that is
peculiarly ours to attain.

In this way we can also see that

the ancients attempted to secure the objectivity of values.
For, once again, human nature and human purpose is not seen
as something that is of our own making but is something that
we express well or poorly.

Thus, we see that the good which

Philoctetes and Neoptolemus seek, reconciliation, friendship
and heroic valor, is unattainable on the strictly human plane
and can only be achieved through the intervention of Heracles.
Similarly, Aristotle's analysis of the human good throughout
much of the Nicomachean Ethics can only find its completion
in contemplative activity of the divine.

The role of the

divine in the ancient conception of the moral agent tends to
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be de-emphasized in much modern moral philosophy. 9
4. The Emotions and Moral Education
In chapter three I argue that Sophocles and Aristotle
are in basic sympathy with each other in both their conception
of the nature of the emotions and the role which the emotions
play in living the moral life.
their

relationship

to

the

Interest in the emotions and

moral

agent

is

indicative

of

precisely this fuller, more robust anthropology which I have
been talking about.
the

role

of

the

Modern moral philosophy either ignores

emotions

in

the

moral

formation

of

individual or, as is the case in the Kantian tradition,
positively hostile to them.

the
is

The ancient anthropology which

Aristotle and Sophocles espouse takes full

account of the

entire person and sees that the affective side of the human
psyche has a crucial role to play in the process of moral
education.

As we have stated before this ancient anthropology

takes into account both the affective and the rational sides
of

the

human psyche.

It

is

appropriate,

then,

that the

tragedian present the emotional and more immediate aspects of

9

The fact of Aristotle's appeal to the divine as a final
standard which supersedes even the exemplarity of the phronimos has often been played down in recent literature.
In her
recent study The Fragility of Goodness, pp. 373-377, Martha
Nussbaum argues that Aristotle's discussion of the divine in
EN Xis absolutely irreconcilable with his analysis of the
human good and human flourishing in the bulk of the Nicomachean Ethics.
She even goes so far as to suggest that EN X.68, where Aristotle makes his most explicit appeals to the
divine as the ultimate horizon of human striving, may have
been a spurious insert by someone else.
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this anthropology and that the philosopher furnish us with an
explanatory logos of the phenomena that are presented by the
dramatist.
The tragedian and the philosopher, I contend, hold that
the emotions are not irrational drives or impulses, but are
cognitive in nature.

As such, they are capable of signifying

something about the general moral contours of a given situation

and

virtuous

directing
response.

the
In

individual
this

way,

to
the

an

appropriate

emotions

certain orientation or impetus to the good.

or

furnish

a

Once again we

shall see that both the poet and the philosopher make interesting and necessary contributions that enrich our understanding of the topic under consideration.
The tragedian presents, dramatically, the position on
the emotions for which I

am arguing through the figure of

Neoptolemus. ,o The poet shows us that Neoptolemus' experiences
of the emotions of shame, compassion and deep distress force
him to reconsider the justice of the course of action that he
has

chosen under pressure

from the

son of

experience of these powerful emotions

Laertes.

furnishes

a

The

certain

orientation to the good for Neoptolemus in which he realizes
that he is committing an injustice against Philoctetes and is,
10

a1undell, "The Phusis of Neoptolemus," 140, discusses
the importance that the emotions play in Neoptolemus' moral
education but does not show, as is my concern in this chapter,
how this reveals the tragedian's cognitive conception of the
nature of the emotions and how the emotions are capable of
orienting an individual to the good.
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in turn, doing violence to his very moral identity.
Aristotle provides us with a philosophical analysis in
which he

demonstrates

emotions

and

the precise

cognition

in

Book

connection between the

II

of

his

Rhetoric.

He

furnishes the logos for which Sophocles presents the dramatic
instance.

According to the Stagirite, it is the perception

of a certain state of affairs which is the efficient cause
(that on account of which)

of emotional response. 11

This

analysis accounts for the connection between the emotions and
cognition

in

terms

of

efficient

causality.

Aristotle's

insight also helps us to see how the emotions can orient us
to the good in such feelings as compassion,

where a sym-

pathetic response is evoked on account of the perception of
another's

undeserved

suffering,

or

in

a

feeling

such

as

righteous indignation (nemesis), where pain is felt on account
of another's undeserved good fortune.
I argue that Aristotle furnishes us with two additional,
excellent
provide
Politics

a

examples
certain
II

of

the way

impetus

or

in which the

emotions can

orientation to the good

and Nicomachean Ethics VIII. 12

In the

in

first

example from Politics II, Aristotle shows us that the emotions
11

My reading of Aristotle on the emotions is largely
indebted to the work of w. W. Fortenbaugh, Aristotle on
Emotion (New York, Harper and Row, 1975) and William M. A.
Grimaldie, s.J., Aristotle, Rhetoric II A Commentary (New
York, Fordham University Press, 1988).
12

see Harold Baillie, "Learning the Emotions," The New
Scholasticism, 62 {1988), 224-226. I am largely indebted to
Baillie's article for this discussion.
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cannot be ignored or suppressed in the way that they must be
if Plato's communism of wives and children is to be realized
in kallipolis.

Aristotle argues, here, that the emotions have

a prior claim to that of the unity of the state and actually
delineate the proper bounds of what can reasonably be proposed
by practical intelligence.

If the emotions are ignored, he

warns,

practical

then

vitiated.

the

Thus,

works

of

intelligence

will

be

the Stagirite maintains that Plato's kal-

lipolis will be rife with the very civil unrest that was
supposed to be eliminated through the political measure of
shared wives and children.

From this example we can see that

Aristotle views the emotions as furnishing a certain negative
or limiting function on the proposals of reason.

In our

second example we see that Aristotle understands the emotions
as capable of providing initial positive direction too.

In

Nicomachean Ethics VIII Aristotle affirms that the emotional,
"pre-ethical" bond that exists between a mother and her child
ought to serve as the paradigm for what the ethical relationship of friendship should be like.
is,

above all,

He asserts that friendship

characterized by a willingness to give love

rather than to receive it and that this willingness to give
love without expecting any return is most excellently illustrated in the emotional tie that mothers demonstrate toward
their children.
In this way I maintain that both tragedian and philosopher are

in fundamental agreement with respect to their
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conception of the human person.

They both see the emotions

as playing a crucial part in the formation of the moral agent.
aut they each express themselves through their own medium in
a way that sheds a new and different light on the issue.
5. Choice and Responsibility: Odysseus
In

chapter

four

I

explore the

issue

of

responsibility by way of an analysis of the
actions of the figure of Odysseus.

choice

and

language and

In the ancient conception

of ethics we are primarily concerned with the sort of person
one should become, not, as in modern moral philosophy, with
the explication of rules.

In the spirit of this more concrete

and dramatic approach to ethics, it is perfectly in keeping
to explore different kinds of human agents as they act in
concrete situations.
with

respect

to

This is important and relevant not only

the

issue

of

concreteness

but also with

respect to the role that we have seen the moral exemplar plays
in ancient moral anthropology.

For a Kantian the appeal to

various examples for instruction would be of no use inasmuch
as they cannot illuminate us with respect to what we ought to
do.

In accordance with this more ancient anthropology, the

ancients held that an

indi victual

can be beneficially

structed through the witnessing of good and
examples.

bad

In the case of Odysseus we are presented with an

inauthentic human agent
function

(as here)

in-

for

us

as

a

in action.

kind

of

Odysseus will,

anti-type.

It

is

thus,

through

witnessing the figure of Odysseus that we shall see how vice
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produces enmity and frustrates the possibility of friendship
among the three characters.

Second,

it will be seen how

Odysseus' deleterious influence is exercised upon Neoptolemus
when the son of Laertes teaches the young man in the ways of
injustice.

Third, we shall note that Odysseus' settled state

of vice distorts his ability to deliberate well as we witness
him attempting to achieve ignoble ends through ignoble means.
Finally, it will be seen, both through the language that he
employs

and through various other means that Odysseus

incapable

of

claiming

responsibility

for

his

actions

is
and

making an authentic choice.
An examination of Odysseus' language in the play reveals
that, when expressing necessity, Odysseus consistently prefers
the Greek dei over chre.

The former signifies the sort of

necessity that external circumstances impose upon one without
there being any contribution (e.g. deliberation, choice) on
the

part

of

the

agent.

The

latter,

on the

other hand,

signifies the sort of internal or subjective necessity that
an agent experiences in choosing a particular course of action
over another. 13

Odysseus'

preference of dei over chre,

I

argue, indicates his attempt to shun moral responsibility and
to attribute responsibility for his own actions to some force
or

set of

Through
13

circumstances

this

linguistic

to which he must
feature

of

the

simply

son

of

submit.
Laertes'

For this strategic linguistic distinction and its
function in the play see, Seth Benardete, "Chre and Dei in
Plato and Others," Glotta, 43 (1965), 297-298.
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language I submit that the tragedian is signifying Odysseus'
ignoble attempts at subterfuge and moral irresponsibility.
I maintain,

furthermore,

that Sophocles' view of the

character of Odysseus is that of a panourgos, namely, the sort
of person who is willing to do or say anything in order to
.
h'is own goa 1 s. 14
achieve

number of different ways.
dian

is

in

panourgos

basic

on

The tragedian indicates this in a
Philoctetes, with whom the trage-

sympathy,

several

characterizes

occasions.

In

this

Odysseus
way

as

a

Sophocles

identifies Odysseus with panourgia and demonstrates that he
is aware of the etymological meaning of the term in his drama.
Sophocles shows us that Odysseus is fully willing to manipulate

moral

terms

in

the

interests

expedient to achieve his own goals.

of

doing

whatever

is

This cynical, inconsis-

tent use of moral terms that are fashioned for the circumstances is characteristic of a panourgos.

Finally, I argue that

Sophocles shows us that Odysseus is actually motivated by
selfish goals and not (as his character asserts) the general
good of
14

the

community.

The

tragedian

indicates

this

by

In holding this view I support the position of Mary
Whitlock Blundell, "The Moral Character of Odysseus in
Philoctetes," Greek Roman and Byzantine Studies, 28 (1987),
321-329, over that of Martha c. Nussbaum, "Consequences and
Character in Sophocles' Philoctetes," Philosophy and Literature, 1 (1976-77), 29-39. Blundell believes that Odysseus is
motivated by selfish goals and that he is willing to do or say
anything in order to achieve them.
Nussbaum, on the other
hand, holds that Odysseus is motivated by serving the interests of the state under whose auspices he is willing to do or
say anything.
I find Blundell's arguments in favor of
Odysseus' basically selfish motivation to be more persuasive.
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revealing that Odysseus' primary motivations are victory under
any circumstances and the desire to be given the gift of honor
which, by right, should go to Philoctetes.
shows the hypocrisy of Odysseus'
concern

for

the

commonweal

He, furthermore,

claim to be motivated by

through

Philoctetes'

damning

disclosure that the son of Laertes initially refused to fight
at Troy and had to be tricked and forced to go.
In accord with the fundamentally similar anthropology
which Sophocles and Aristotle share it is appropriate that
Aristotle furnish us with a rational account of the emotionally charged phenomena which the dramatist has presented.

In

this way, the philosopher contributes to this chapter a philosophical analysis of the nature of villainy (panourgia).

We

have argued that Odysseus is a villain (panourgos) and it is
the

philosopher's

part,

here,

to

furnish

character of the panourgos and panourgia.

a

logos

of

the

Aristotle sees

panourgia as related to the indeterminate capacity which he
calls cleverness

(deinotes).

perform those steps

Cleverness is the ability to

(usually the most efficient) which are

conducive to a goal and to achieve that goal.
noble then cleverness deserves praise,

If the goal is

but if the goal is

wicked then cleverness is criminal or villainous (panourgia).
In this way we can see that, according to Aristotle, villainy
is a kind of cleverness gone awry.

The philosopher believes

that this is due to a failure of moral virtue where one's
admirable ability of determining the best means to a given end
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is skewed and directed to wicked ends.

The Stagirite,

in

addition, views villainy as a settled disposition (hexis) in
which an

individual habitually employs his talent to the

attainment of wicked ends.
Thus, I maintain that Aristotle provides an excellent
logos of the character of Odysseus in his discussion of the
nature of villainy.

Aristotle shows us that the figure of

Odysseus possesses an admirable trait which,

because of a

fundamental flaw in his character, is vitiated and employed
for dubious ends.

The philosopher's conception of villainy

as a characteristic disposition

(hexis)

is also helpful in

understanding the settled and incorrigible nature of Odysseus'
wickedness.
6. Choice and Responsibility: Neoptolemus
In chapter five I

consider the nature of choice and

responsibility through the emotional turmoil, deliberation and
choice which the figure of Neoptolemus makes in the play.

In

addition, I argue that the tragedian signifies Neoptolemus'
responsible and excellent human agency in the transition he
makes from using dei (characteristic of Odysseus) to employing
chre (indicating choice).

This is followed by Aristotle's

analysis of deliberate decision or choice

(prohairesis)

in

which I argue that the Stagirite's discussion of prohairesis
bears

many

striking

(and

philosophically

illuminating)

resemblances to the decision which Neoptolemus makes in the
play.
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In many ways, this chapter is the heart of the dissertation for many of the strands that are crucial to Sophocles'
and

Aristotle's

anthropology

come

together

here

and

are

expressed through the authentic human agency of Neoptolemus.
The advantages of this fuller ancient anthropology are most
evident here

because we

see the way

in which the entire

person, rational, emotional and desiderative are taken into
account through both the character of Neoptolemus and Aristotle's rich notion of prohairesis.

We not only see operative

all of the various elements of the human psyche but we see how
they can constitute a harmonious whole as they are exercised
by the virtuous person.
agent tends to be

The Kantian conception of the moral

indifferent to the achievement of such

psychological integration.

We can see this most especially

in Kant's own acquiescence to the view that morally right
actions

and

inclinations

will,

almost

inevitably,

be

in

conflict and that reason will need to overcome recalcitrant
emotions and desires in order that a moral agent may carry out
her duty.

The ancient conception of the moral agent does more

justice to the entire person by taking seriously the emotions
and desires
elements

of

(as well as reason)
the

human

unconflicted whole.

and requiring that all the

personality

be

integrated

into

an

In accord with this anthropology it is

the task of the poet to furnish us with the affective and
immediate aspects of this topic through his drama and the part
of the philosopher to furnish us with the logos that explains
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and unifies the phenomena of human experience.
Through the character of Neoptolemus, Sophocles provides
us with a moving portrayal of the young man's transition from
inauthentic to authentic human agency.

Initially, Neoptolemus

attempts to remove himself from responsibility for his own
actions.

This is evidenced by his consistent use of dei and

the way that he,

in Odyssean fashion,

describes the action

that he is taking as something to which he must,
submit.

simply,

During the course of the play, however, Sophocles

shows us that the son of Achilles experiences his deceitful
pose to be intolerable and chooses to defy Odysseus and undo
the damage that he has done to Philoctetes.

The tragedian

highlights the painful decision that Neoptolemus must make
through the young man's pathetic wish that he had never left
his home on Scyros and the way in which his choice is preceded
by a long and agonizing period of silence where he is at a
loss and is deliberating about what to do.
cates

Neoptolemus'

achievement

through his decision
language of

gn

of

Sophocles indi-

authentic

human

agency

in the transition he makes from the

to that of chre;

in the moral maturity he

displays when he is no longer intimidated by Odysseus; and,
finally,

in the way that he attains a new sense of his own

moral identity by becoming reconciled to himself.
It is, again, the philosopher's task to furnish us with
a

rational

account

of

the

disparate

tragedian presents in his drama.

phenomena

which

the

Aristotle does this through
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his discussion of the nature of choice or deliberate decision
(12.rohairesis} .
virtue.

15

Aristotle closely links choice with moral

Virtue is, he asserts, a determinate disposition to

make choices.

Making a choice entails moral maturity because

we claim responsibility for our own actions and understand
that we are becoming who we are through the choices that we
make.

Hence, making choices is an adult affair; it is not for

children.
of

Choice or deliberate decision requires some form

reflective deliberation

antecedent to the making of

a

decision because we are attempting to determine the course of
action which will best promote our own and the larger community's flourishing.

Finally, Aristotle understands excel-

lent choice to proceed from the sort of person whose emotions
and desires are in harmony with his reason.

Or, to put it in

another way, excellent choice is founded upon the integration
of the emotional and desiderative elements of the soul with
the rational part of the soul.
The above discussion of prohairesis furnishes us with
an excellent philosophical account of the decision which we
see Neoptolemus make in the play.

Through the medium of

philosophical discourse, the various elements of Neoptolemus'
decision-making process can be viewed as a coherent whole.
Thus,

we see that choice involves virtue,

15

assuming respon-

see Blundell,
"The Phusis of Neoptolemus," 141.
Blundell mentions that Neoptolemus' choice resembles an
Aristotelian prohairesis but does not spell out exactly how
his choice can justifiably be so designated.
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sibility for one's own actions, moral maturity and a fundamental integration of the emotional and desiderative parts of the
psyche with the rational part.

All of this Sophocles shows

to us through what the figure of Neoptolemus goes through on
stage.

What the tragedian contributes that cannot be captured

through rational discourse is the dramatic portrayal of the
anguish that is involved in the process of deliberation and
the struggle which is part of attempting to live the life of
The poet furnishes us with the concreteness and

virtue.
immediacy

of

experience

that

it

is

his

peculiar

part

to

provide.
7. Friendship and the Moral Life
In chapter six I argue that both Sophocles and Aristotle
see friendship as a central element in living the good life.
They do

not,

however,

view as

an

important

ingredient

in

living well simply any kind of association or relationship,
but only the sort of friendship where the person is loved for
who he is and the good is wished for him for his own sake.
Much modern moral philosophy, on the other hand, neglects the
role of friendship in the formation of the moral agent either
because of its Kantian character where the focus is on duty
and the autonomy of the willing subject or because it tends
to view morality as the crafting of an adequate procedure for
making decisions with respect to various moral quandaries.
In any case if, as we have been suggesting, morality has much
more to do with what sort of person I am to become and what

30

sort of life I am to live then the question of friendship
comes to be of central importance.

This is the case because

the issue of what sort of person I am to become and what sort
of life I am to lead is intimately bound up with the kinds of
people with whom I share my life and call my friends.

Friends

are an expression both of my own character and, in turn, help
shape my character for good or ill.
the issue of friendship,

It is in this way that

in the ancient conception of moral

education and the moral agent, comes to be of central concern.
For, given this understanding of moral anthropology, friends
will be a critical factor in whether I lead a fulfilled or
frustrated life.

Once again,

correlative to this fuller

ancient anthropology which includes the emotional and the
rational,

it is the part of the poet to furnish us with a

dramatic

and

emotionally

evocative

presentation

of

the

phenomena of human experience while the philosopher provides
us with a rational account that serves to explain and bring
some unity to the phenomena presented by the dramatist.
Sophocles discusses the issue of friendship by tracing
for

us

the moving course of

two

individuals who grow

friendship, namely, Neoptolemus and Philoctetes.

in

In addition,

the tragedian employs Philoctetes' bow as a central symbol
which serves as a kind of measure of the true status of their
relationship.

Heracles once gave the bow to Philoctetes as

a token of gratitude for the son of Poeas' generous and true
act of friendship.

It is this very bow which,

initially,
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Neoptolemus

seeks

to

obtain

friendship with Philoctetes.

under

the

guise

of

genuine

In this way Sophocles shows us

the shallow nature of Neoptolemus'

original stance toward

Philoctetes when the young man's interest in the suffering
hero is nothing more than a means to the end of getting his
bow.

An implicit comparison is made between Philoctetes'

genuine

friendship

with

Heracles

and

Neoptolemus'

sham

friendship when the son of Poeas entrusts Neoptolemus with
the bow because of the young man's compassion and nobility.
The bow serves,

here,

as an ironic symbol of condemnation

because it is being entrusted to someone who is in the process
of violating everything that it represents.

This does not,

of course, last very long because Neoptolemus soon finds Odysseus'

deceitful

scheme

intolerable

everything which he has done.

and

decides

to

undo

He determines to return the bow

to its rightful owner and to establish their relationship upon
a more genuine basis.
Sophocles signifies Neoptolemus' attempts to establish
a true friendship with Philoctetes by the young man's use of
persuasion in trying to get Philoctetes to come to Troy.
Deceit and force have both been tried and have been found
wanting and thus Sophocles points to the only thing which has
not been tried, the only thing, in fact, which respects the
person and will not

(in the end)

be found wanting.

Even

though Neoptolemus' attempts at persuading Philoctetes fail
Sophocles indicates to us that Neoptolemus is on the right
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track through the intervention of the god-friend, Heracles.
Heracles, in effect, sanctions the sort of friendship based
upon openness and concern for the character of the beloved
which Neoptolemus initiates, however unsuccessfully. 16 The god
comes, himself, as a friend in order (at last!) to persuade
philoctetes to go to Troy with Neoptolemus and to affirm the
central importance that their friendship will play in achieving

great

things.

By

thus

situating

the

fruitless

and

destructive nature of false friendship side by side with the
promise of a heroic destiny based upon a friendship of genuine
concern for the other, Sophocles points to the centrality of
the latter kind of friendship as a crucial element in the
achievement of heroic valour and virtue.

In this way the

tragedian shows us that the fruit of authentic friendship is
the performance of great and virtuous deeds.
Aristotle

furnishes

us

with

a

detailed,

analytical

discussion of the nature and character of friendship.

He

enumerates three kinds of friendship (those of use, pleasure
and character) which are differentiated by the various bases
upon which affection for the other rests.

Friendships that

are based upon utility or pleasure are inferior because they
are not grounded upon love of the person for who he is but
upon some kind of incidental consideration.

It is only in the

friendship of character that the other is loved for who he is
16

see Christopher Gill, "Bow, Oracle, and Epiphany in
Sophocles' Philoctetes," Greece and Rome 27 (1980), 143-144.
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and the good is wished for him for his own sake.

All three

forms of friendship are, according to Aristotle, necessary to
a flourishing life but the friendship of character, alone, is
both necessary and sufficient to a life lived well.

This is

so inasmuch as Aristotle holds that only friendship which is
grounded in the character of the beloved can serve as a stable
and reliable basis for the mutual pursuit of the virtuous
life.

It is here, alone, that friendship becomes a kind of

school of virtue in which friends make each other good through
their life together.

In this way we can see that Aristotle

understands that a flourishing life is mediated through such
friendships.
Thus, both philosopher and tragedian hold that friendship that is grounded in the character of the beloved is,
alone, a fully realized form of friendship and that it is only
this kind of friendship which is both a necessary and sufficient condition of a life lived well.
8. Tragic Catharsis and the Education of the Emotions
In this brief appendix I amplify my argument regarding
Aristotle's understanding of the emotions as cognitive

in

character through a consideration of the role of the emotions
and catharsis in the Poetics and Politics.

Aristotle argues

that the successful tragic poet must structure his plot and
develop his
terror

(the

characters
two

most

in such a
important

way that
tragic

compassion and
emotions)

intelligible responses to the events depicted on stage.

are
If
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these emotions are appropriately aroused they will lead to
what Aristotle argues is the peculiar pleasure of tragedy,
namely, catharsis.

The experience of catharsis, he argues,

is both an aligning of the emotions with the judgments of
reason as well as a release of emotional tension that will
make us better able to hit the mean in the expression of our
feelings in real life situations.

Chapter 1
THE INADEQUACY OF NATURE TO ATTAIN VIRTUE
IN SOPHOCLES AND ARISTOTLE

1.1 Introduction
For the ancients, ethics was perceived to be an eminently practical matter.

In this way they rightly perceived that

morality was

matter

not

a

of

constructing

a

sound moral

theory, as we see is the case in much modern moral philosophy,
but with becoming a particular kind of person and living a
certain kind of life.

Thus their point of departure is not

an attempt to discern and formulate an abstract and universal
principle (as we see, for example, with Kant} but an attempt
to understand human nature in all of its fullness and variety.
In the anthropology of Sophocles and Aristotle, a human being
is understood to be a complex of emotions, desires and reason
that must be brought into some kind of harmonious integration
if the individual is to feel, act and live well.

According

to the tragedian and philosopher this excellent integration
of the elements of the human psyche is not given to us by
nature but requires the assistance of a sound moral education.
Through this understanding of human nature, this anthropology,
we can see that Sophocles and Aristotle appreciated both the
complexity of moral agency and the contingent character of
35
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ethics itself.

They understood that the moral person was made

up of many parts that had to be integrated well and that such
integration would require education.

This is, of course, a

rather precarious business because the integration of these
elements of the soul is difficult to achieve and may,
course, end in failure.

of

Such a failure would constitute a

broken and frustrated life.

This conception of the moral

agent also implies the need for others.

The achievement of

sound moral agency is thus dependent, in a significant way,
upon

others

inasmuch

as

we

shall

need

good

instruct us in the ways of virtue and happiness.

teachers

to

In this way,

this ancient moral anthropology shows a profound appreciation
of the social character of becoming a moral person.
Moral philosophy in the Kantian tradition, would,

of

course, view the study of human nature as an irrelevant and
wrongheaded point of departure.

This is so because Kant holds

that everything empirical is unsuitable to contribute to the
principle of morality.

For Kant the point is not to under-

stand how people actually act but how they ought to act.
addition,

Kant

shows

no

appreciation

of

the

social

In
and

developmental character of becoming a moral agent because he
focuses solely upon the autonomy of the willing subject to the
exclusion of the role that others play in our burgeoning
awareness of what it means to become a moral person.
more,

moral

philosophy stemming

from Kant

Further-

tends to

focus

solely upon the role of reason and ignores or is positively
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hostile to the part that the emotions play in becoming a moral
agent.

Finally, Kant showed no appreciation of the worth of

the harmonious

integration of the various elements of the

psyche with respect to moral action.

As we have seen, such

a harmony was viewed by the ancients as the ground of excellent choice.

There is no moral worth to such integration of

the emotional and desiderative elements with the rational
element of the psyche in Kant's view.

In fact, Kant sees that

inner conflict between these various elements that results in
the victory of reason over the emotions or desires
greater moral worth than such

integration.

is of

The model

of

integration, it seems to me, is superior to the Kantian view
because it does not view emotions and desires as necessarily
threatening to rational choice and action or as contributing
nothing to an action's moral worth.
logy

emotions

and

desires

are

In the ancient anthropo-

potentially

disruptive

to

rational choice and action but they are intrinsically capable
of being educated and contributing to the moral development
and maturity of the person.

For the ancients, this integra-

tion was the conditio sine qua non of mature and moral agency.
We have noted how the ancient anthropology of Sophocles
and Aristole more fully appreciates the whole person in his
rational as well as emotional aspects.

We have also noted how

this ancient conception of ethics does greater justice than
modern ethics to appreciating the contingent character of
morality.

This stems, I would contend, from its greater sense
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of the concrete nature of ethics.

In keeping with this fuller

anthropology which appreciates the whole person in both her
rational and emotional aspects it seems entirely appropriate
to

include the work of

both the

literary artist and the

philosopher in our analysis of the moral agent.

We need to

appeal to literature in the way that it is capable of forcefully presenting the immediacy and concreteness of a situation.

It is also needed for

depict

thinking

and

feeling

emotionally speaking,

its ability dramatically to
characters

who

and thereby help us

to

draw

us

in,

become more

effective moral agents through the emotional identification
with a particular moral situation that drama provides.

The

ancients viewed this as a form of moral education because they
believed that we could be assisted in understanding how to
respond to actual life situations through our witnessing of
the various characters' actions and emotional responses on the
stage.
We shall also need to appeal to philosophy in order to
understand the nature of moral agency inasmuch as we need more
than simply an emotionally charged presentation of particulars
that we receive from the dramatist.

We also need the unifying

and explanatory powers that it is the peculiar part of the
philosopher to provide.

In this way we shall turn to the work

of Aristotle in order to receive a
presented by the poet.
require both accounts

Thus,

logos of the phenomena

it is my contention that we

in order properly to understand the
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nature of the moral agent and the moral life.

Literature is

needed for its emotional power and its capacity for presenting
the

particulars

of

human

experience

in

a

forceful

way.

Philosophy is needed for its explanatory powers in bringing
the diversity of the phenomena of human experience into some
unified whole.

Let us turn,

then,

to a more detailed con-

sideration of Sophocles' and Aristotle's position with respect
to the relationship of nature to virtue and how their view
constituted a break from the archaic tradition.
Sophocles challenges the archaic Greek conception of
nature as being sufficient for the achievement of virtue.
According to the archaic understanding one's inborn nature is
determinative of one's character. 1
1

A person is, as it were,

One of the clearest statements on nature as an inherited
excellence comes in the works of Pindar.
In his Pythian Ode
8 Pindar says that it is due to nature that the noble spirit
is made conspicuous from fathers to their children (Phua to
gennaion epiprepei ek pateron paisi lema, Pythian 8.44-45).
Pindar emphasizes here the importance of nature by placing it
first in the sentence.
Furthermore, he shows the centrality
of inherited nature through his use of the preposition ek with
the genitive pateron in juxtaposition with the dative paisi
in line 45. In this way he emphasizes the fact that nobility
of spirit and character (to gennaion lema) is directly passed
down from fathers to their children. In his Olympian Odes and
Nemean Odes Pindar makes a pointed comparison between that
which comes by nature and that which comes by teaching.
He
praises the former and disparages the latter. In Olympian 13
Pindar says that it is a hard struggle to hide one's inborn
nature ( amachon de krupsai to suggenes ethos, Olympian 13. 13) .
The idea seems to be that sooner or later this nature will
assert itself, perhaps even against one's conscious wish or
choice. The true poet, he says in Olympian 2, is the one who
knows many things by means of nature (sophos ho polla eidos
phua, Olympian 2.86), while those that have learned the art
of poetry (mathontes, Olympian 2.86) are blustering and intemperate of tongue like crows (labroi panglossia korakes hos
akranta, Olympia 2.87) chattering in vain against the god-like
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born into who he is and thus his nature predetermines the
quality of his character.

If a person, for example, is born

from a noble father then it would be expected that he or she
would turn out to be equally noble.

The base or wicked would,

likewise, be expected to be born from the wicked.

Sophocles

shows us the inadequacy of this conception of ethics when
Neoptolemus, the son of noble Achilles, is eventually induced
to carry out an elaborate, deceitful scheme that he himself
considers to be disgraceful.

Neoptolemus initially opposes

Odysseus but his rather naive and unreflective appeal to the
nobility of his father's nature is no match for the pressure
and rhetorical skill that the son of Laertes exerts on him.
bird of Zeus. Again, in Olympian 9 he asserts that everything
which is best comes from nature (to de phua kratiston hapan,
Olympian 9.100) but many men have striven to acquire renown
for virtue from mere teaching (polloi de didaktais anthropon
aretais kleos orousan aresthai, Olympian 9. 100-102) .
This
latter sort of fame, Pindar says, has no part in the gods and
thus is none the worse for being silenced (aneu de theou
sesigamenon ou skaioteron chrem' hekaston, Olympian 9.103104).
Finally, in Nemean Ode 3 he says that it is by means
of inborn valor that a man has great power (suggenei de tis
eudoxia mega brithei, Nemean 3.40) while the man who only has
learning lives in darkness, breathing changeful purposes which
go this way and that (psephenos aner allot' alla pneon ou pot'
atrekei, Nemean 3.41-42).
He never enters with a firm step
but tastes of countless forms of prowess with an undecided
mind (kateba podi murian d' aretan atelei noo geuetai, Nemean
3.43). From a brief consideration of these texts from Pindar
we can see the central place that nature has with respect to
excellence (arete).
Excellence in the form of physical
prowess and moral virtue is passed on in toto from father to
son and it is this kind of inborn power and strength that is
alone worth having.
The sort of excellence that comes from
learning or training is disparaged as being chimerical and
having no part in divine life.
See also Lesky, Greek Tragedy, pp. 125-126 ; Rose,
"Sophocles' Philoctetes and the Teachings of the Sophists,"
87-88, 97-98; Blundell, "The Phusis of Neoptolemus," 137-138.
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Through the swift and certain succumbing of the character of
Neoptolemus, Sophocles shows us in dramatic form the inadequacy of the archaic model with respect to its confidence in
the sufficiency of nature for the achievement of virtue.

In

this way, by implicitly calling attention to the inadequacy
of

nature

(phusis)

for

virtue,

Sophocles

highlights

the

importance of other factors necessary to the achievement of
virtue namely, moral education and a moral guide or exemplar.
Aristotle
presented

to

discusses

us

through

in
the

philosophic
medium

of

garb

tragic

what

is

poetry

in

Sophocles.

According to Aristotle we have a certain natural

proclivity

for

the

development

of

the

virtues

but

this

tendency needs to be augmented by the educative process of
moral habituation.

We are not born with the virtues through

some kind of inherited nobility (as the archaic model would
have it) nor are the virtues inculcated in us contrary to our
natural proclivities but we have,
certain

inborn potency to

virtues to perfection.

receive,

as Aristotle sees it,
develop and

a

bring the

The process of habituation is a kind

of training of the emotions and desires through activity in
such a way that we experience pleasure and pain at what we
ought.

This is, according to Aristotle, correct education and

it is the indispensable foundation for the acquirement of
complete virtue.
Thus in this chapter I argue that Sophocles and Aristotle are in accord with each other on the insufficiency of
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nature for the attainment of virtue.

Sophocles shows us this

insufficiency powerfully by actually presenting us with a
particular

case

of

an

individual

whose

noble

nature

is

overthrown by the bad influence of a wicked person, even if
only temporarily.

His great strength as a dramatic artist is

precisely this ability to "discuss" a

philosophical

issue

through the medium of a particular instance which has universal significance.

Through the vehicle of dramatic action and

characterization Sophocles is surely telling us that leaving
noble natures heedlessly under the tutelage of the corrupt
will inevitably spell disaster.
Aristotle does not present us with characters in a drama
because his medium is philosophical discourse.
of the case on the

His statement

insufficiency of nature for virtue is

therefore less vivid and immediate than that of Sophocles but
he furnishes a certain precision in vocabulary and conceptual
framework which is not the part of poetry to provide.
ways,

In some

he will bring into sharper focus the moral phenomena

that the dramatist presents so movingly through the medium of
tragedy.

It will

be my purpose then

in this chapter to

demonstrate that for both tragedian and philosopher nature
(phusis)

is

a

good

starting

point

or

development of the virtues but requires,
nurturing of a

potential

for

the

in addition,

the

sound moral education in which appropriate

feelings and actions are established through habituation.

Let

us turn then to a consideration of dramatist and philosopher.
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1 . 2 The Insufficiency of Nature for Virtue in Sophocles
When Neoptolemus hears Odysseus' scheme (sophisma} to
capture Philoctetes, he respectfully responds that he abhors
doing whatever he feels distressed at hearing (ego men hous
an ton logon algo kluon/ Laertiou pai tousde kai prassein
stugo, Phil. 86-87} because, he says, it is neither his own
nature nor that of his father's to do anything "by means of
wicked art" (ephun gar ouden ek technes prassein kakes
autos outh', hos phasin, houkphusas eme,

Phil.

states that he would rather fail acting nobly

88-89).

out'
He

(kales dron

examartein, Phil. 94-95} than succeed with wickedness (nikan
kakos, Phil. 94-95).

Unlike Odysseus for whom victory (nike}

is everything, Neoptolemus is sensitive to his heritage, to
the father whose reputation for nobility he wants to emulate
and to his own principle of not doing anything "by means of
wicked art."

His own moral intuitions are that it is always

better to act nobly and even to fail to achieve one's desired
goal than to come away with victory through wickedness (Phil.
88-89) .

This is, of course, unintelligible to Odysseus.

Through

a series of clever verbal maneuvers, Odysseus gets Neoptolemus
to accept the use of deceit (dolos) in order to make off with
Philoctetes'
carry off

bow.

the

He promises the young man that he will

twin gifts of

a

reputation

for

being wise

(sophos} and good (agathos) when he successfully accomplishes
his task

(.Ehi!.

119). Whatever hesitations that Neoptolemus
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may have had are now abandoned and he cries, "Let it go, I'll
do it, throwing off all sense of shame."
aischunen apheis, Phil. 120) . 2

(ito poeso. pasan

Morally speaking, Neoptolemus

has taken a significant step toward placing himself in the
hands of Odysseus.
M.

w.

It will not be a comfortable match.

B.

Knox has written that Odysseus and Neoptolemus "are

strange bedfellows.

113

Indeed,

the inexperienced and prin-

cipled young man coupled with the wily,

amoral man of the

world are an odd team and Neoptolemus will have to travel a
2

see The Philoctetes of Sophocles, ed. Sir Richard Jebb
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1954), p. 71.
Jebb
states here, "ito is a defiance of the possible consequences
('happen what may'): cp. Eur. Med. 819 (Medea, having taken
her resolve to kill the children) ito perissoi pantes oun meso
logoi." After much painful deliberation Medea determines to
kill her two children in order to make her revenge upon Jason
complete. Of course, in the passage from Euripides, there is
a kind of headlong ruefulness in Medea's use of the verb ito.
It is unclear just how we are to take this ito used by
Neoptolemus. We might imagine him uttering the word with the
same sense of desperation as Medea. He is, of course, not
about to embark upon as extreme an act as she but he is trying
to muster all the strength necessary to perform an act that
goes against his character. We might even take this utterance
as the pleased and excited release of a young man who is just
about to set out upon his first adventure and has high hopes
of renown and glory. He has, after all, just been promised the
highly prized epithets (though sophos certainly could be used
pejoratively) of "wise and good" man. At any rate, whichever
way we take this, as a pained or a pleased expression, this
utterance appears to mark Neoptolemus' consent to give himself
over to Odysseus (Phil. 84) and thus to abandon his former
moral identity.

3

Bernard M. W. Knox, The Heroic Temper: Studies in
Sophoclean Tragedy (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, University
of California Press, 1964), p. 121. The quotation continues:
"· . . in the prologue the cynical worldly wisdom of the older
man provides a brilliant contrast with the all-too-naive
idealism of the boy."
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iong

and

hard

road

in

order

to

discover

his

true

moral

identity.
In this opening scene, Sophocles shows us how a principled young man who is of excellent lineage abandons his
moral intuitions under the coaxing and cajoling of the wily
manipulator, Odysseus.
will

do

violence

to

He is now to embark upon a scheme that
his

character.

And

yet,

even

here

Odysseus has couched the results of carrying out the plan in
such a way (namely, that Neoptolemus will be renowned for his
wisdom and goodness) that it appears to be in accord with his
noble nature (phusis).

Odysseus is, in this way, playing as

much of a deceit upon Neoptolemus as he is requiring Neoptolemus to play on Philoctetes.

He knows that the young man's

expression of pain (Phil. 86-7) shows an attraction to what
is noble and good and a revulsion from the disgraceful.

Hence

he anticipates the need for masking the deed in terms of moral
approbation.
It is clear that Neoptolemus has good potential for the
development of the virtues.

We can see this in the pain and

hesitation he feels

(Phil.

86)

toward Odysseus'

Initially at least,

he prefers open violence

proposal. 4

(bia)

to the

underhanded approach of the son of Laertes (all' eim' hetoimos
4

The word that Neoptolemus employs here is algos. It is
a strong word signifying both mental and bodily suffering.
He uses the same word at 806 to express the distress that he
feels for Philoctetes' suffering.
Philoctetes in turn,
describes Neoptolemus as "bearing painfully" (algeinos pheron,
Phil. 1011) the witness of his own treatment at the hands of
Odysseus.
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R.ros bian ton andr'

agein/ kai me doloisin,

Phil.

90-91). 5

He demonstrates a proper sense of shame at telling such a
terrible lie {ouk aischron hege deta ta pseude legein;, Phil.
108) and does not know how he will muster the daring so boldly
to face the suffering hero {pos oun blepon tis tauta tolmesei
lakein;, Phil. 110).

But in the end, Sophocles shows us that

Neoptolemus relies too heavily upon his nature

(phusis)

as

something of a defensive shield which will protect him from
all wrongdoing.

He firmly believes that the nature which he

inherited from his father will prove to be a kind of inviolable

bulwark

against

{Phil. 88-89).

"doing

anything

from

wicked

design"

The naivete of his confidence in his inherited

nature makes him easy prey for the wiles of an Odysseus.
In this opening scene, with its constant references to
the nobility of Neoptolemus' nature {Phil. 51, 79, 88, 96,)
and his subsequent and swift downfall into the practice of
villainy {Phil.

120), Sophocles is critical of the archaic

notion that one's inherited nature is a sufficient guarantee
of excellence of character.

In the archaic conception of

things, one's nature was considered to be the core of qualities and characteristics which an individual inherited from his
parents, particularly from the father.
traits

was

character.

considered

inviolate

This core of character
and

determinative

One's nature was considered to be the script, as

it were, writ upon the soul.
5

of

see Blundell, "The Phusis of Neoptolemus, 138.
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1.3 Sophocles Responds to the Archaic Tradition

Sophocles constructs the opening scene of this play in
response to the
nature.

inadequacy of this archaic conception of

It is against this backdrop that he will seek to

articulate a more nuanced conception of the role of nature
with respect to moral excellence through the character of
Neoptolemus.
Sophocles shows us that while Neoptolemus' excellence
of lineage is surely a fine starting point, a good potential 6
for the development of virtue,
own.

it cannot stand firm on its

It must be bolstered by some form of correct education

and moral guidance or it will become victim to precisely the
sort of bold and shameless rhetoric that Odysseus employs
(Phil.

109,

potential

111) .

for

As we have said,

the development

of

Neoptolemus has good

the virtues.

He

feels

appropriate pain at the idea of practicing deceit, but his
emotional response is ridiculed by the son of Laertes (Phil.
96-99) and thus Neoptolemus has no friendly support for the
noble and honorable feelings that are the part of his nature.
In this way, then, Sophocles is showing us the insufficiency of the archaic model with respect to the achievement of
excellence.

Neoptolemus,

the

son

of

the

noble

warrior

Achilles, easily abandons his principles under the pressure
of an unscrupulous politician like Odysseus.
6

He appeals to

on phusis as a potential or capacity for the development
of moral excellence in the character of Neoptolemus see,
Blundell, "The Phusis of Neoptolemus," 145-147.

48

his father's nature and the kind of principles and actions
which that nature represents but all of these things are
easily subverted and disposed of by Odysseus.

What Sophocles

is showing us is that Neoptolemus lacks someone who might
teach him and act as an adequate moral example.

He has, after

all, been deprived of the role model of his father Achilles
from an early age because of the war at Troy.

It is rather

ironic that Sophocles has him appeal to the inborn excellence
which he has inherited from his father at the very time when
that excellence will prove to be insufficient.

Thus, we see

that nature, though a good beginning for virtue, needs to be
bolstered by excellent education, example and action, all of
which Odysseus cannot provide.
Two recent commentators on the play, Albin Lesky and
Gregory McNamee, give a different interpretation of this play
with respect to the question of the relationship of nature and
character. 7

Both Lesky and McNamee argue that Sophocles is

siding with the archaic conception of nature's sufficiency for
the

achievement

(according
essentially

to

of

the

moral
archaic

inviolable

core

virtue.

Inasmuch

understanding)
of

human

as

nature

constitutes

personality

that

the
is

inherited by birth Neoptolemus does not undergo, they argue,
any real change in the course of the play but only re-assumes
what he already had from the beginning.
in my opinion,
7

They do not grant,

sufficient scope to the crucial role that

Lesky, Greek Tragedy; McNamee, Philoktetes .
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sophocles has Philoctetes play as a moral guide and hence for
the importance of education with respect to Neoptolemus' moral
victory at the close of the play.
not re-assert itself unaided.

Neoptolemus' nature does

His excellent nature is, as we

have stated, a good starting point for the inculcation and
development of the virtues but, in the absence of the moral
guidance of Philoctetes, it would have stagnated and become
thoroughly corrupted by the deleterious influence of the son
of Laertes.
We shall quote briefly first from McNamee, then extensively from Lesky and follow up with our own discussion with
respect to Sophocles' views on the relationship of nature and
character.

McNamee briefly articulates Sophocles' agreement

with the archaic view concerning the centrality of nature in
the achievement of moral excellence in the introduction to his
excellent translation of the play:
In his drama Sophokles places himself squarely among those
who hold that one's character is determined not by
environment or custom but by inborn nature (phusis), and
that one's greatest dishonor is to act, for whatever end,
in ways not consonant with that essence.
Neoptolemus
learns through the course of the Philoktetes that he is
simply unable, by virtue of his noble birth, to obey the
roguish Odysseus' commands: his ancestry and the nature
it has given him do not permit him to act deceitfully, no
matter what profit might tempt him. 8
Lesky

develops

central category for

this

conception

of

ancestry

understanding the moral

Neoptolemus at much greater length.

8McNamee, Philoktetes, pp. 1-3.

as

the

character of

He argues that all Greek
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drama of the classical period (namely that of Aeschylus and
sophocles) lacks the psychological and moral complexity of the
drama of Euripides whose plays first presented the kind of
interior dialogue and strife that have become the hallmark of
contemporary drama.
of

character,

he

The decisive lack of any such complexity
argues,

is

due

to

the

pre-sophistic

understanding of human nature as changeless and inflexibly
determined:
In a modern character drama an individual and all the
different facets of his being are the centre of the
action, and the changes that take place in him are
frequently shown as well. Euripides--after a revolution
in ideas about human nature--was the first to incorporate
such changes in his dramatic representations.
They do
not occur in classical drama, in fact they are alien to
its spirit, in a significant way. We saw that the actions
of Neoptolemus, in different passages of the drama, were
contradictory, but we should misinterpret the play if we
ascribed this to a change in him as a person. A different
concept altogether is needed to interpret this figure.
When Odysseus explains his mission to him, he says
understandingly (79): 'I know, young man, it is not your
natural bent (phusis) to say such things nor to contrive
such mischief.'
With this word phusis we encounter the
notion of an inborn quality in a man, which at that time
was considered fundamental to human nature and which will
help us to understand this play.
Its psychological core
is not a change in Neoptolemus but the victorious
reassertion of his phusis against all temptation and after
he had disowned it, however grudgingly.
Neoptolemus
himself states, at a decisive moment in the drama (902),
one of the most profound truths of pre-sophistic Hellas
when he speaks of the distress in which man lands himself
if he disowns his phusis and does not act in harmony with
it.
And his greatest reward for the reassertion of his
self are the words of Philoctetes (1310): 'You have shown
your nature and true breeding, son of Achilles.'
This concept of phusis as man's permanent possession,
his inalienable, unchanging inheritance, contains a
fundamental trait of Sophoclean man.
Beyond it lies an
idea that was inherent in archaic Greek culture and
remained valid up to the end of the great classical
period: what man inherited through his descent determined
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his character once and for all. 9
Lesky makes the distinction between classical portrayals of
character and those of the post-sophistic type explicit in his
comparison of Sophocles' character Ajax with the character of
Euripides' Medea:
When the attendant comes back from the palace with the
boys and announces with joy that their sentence of
banishment has been lifted, he finds Medea in a state of
profound agitation. After he has left her we witness her
inner struggle in a speech which, although it refers to
the chorus once (1043) is essentially a monologue.
The
intensity with which inner experiences are portrayed here
is unequalled in Attic tragedy; it also reveals man's
tragic potentialities from a new angle. We are not shown,
as in the death of Sophocles' Ajax, a rigid predetermination rooted in his phusis, but a human being as a prey to
the contending play of forces which have their source in
his soul, and are struggling for mastery over it. 10
The interpretation of McNamee and Lesky does not do
justice to the moral

and psychological

character of Neoptolemus.
reassertion

of

his

play.

They both argue as if Neoptolemus'

nature

foregone conclusion.

complexity of the

is,

after

a

brief

struggle,

a

But this is far from the case in the

From the moment Neoptolemus asserts that he will take

part in Odysseus' scheme it is utterly unclear until the very
end of

the

play

recover the moral

(Phil.

1222ff.)

whether Neoptolemus will

intuitions with which he began the play

(Phil. 94-95) or be permanently corrupted by the influence of
Odysseus.

9

Sophocles never tires of pointing out that the

Lesky, Greek Tragedy, p. 125.

10

Ibid., p. 146.
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influence of a wicked teacher can sink very deep.
when

Neoptolemus,

in

Odyssean

fashion,

We see this

covertly

excuses

himself for his own wrongdoing by denying that Odysseus is
responsible

for having taken his

fatherly

inheritance and

places responsibility instead upon those in power (Phil. 385388).

Again, we witness this same distancing of himself from

personal

responsibility

(a

nefarious Odyssean trait)

when

Neoptolemus appeals to such abstractions as necessity (ananke,
Phil. 922) and the expedient (to sumpheron, Phil. 926) when
he seeks to justify the brutal way in which Philoctetes must
be treated if Odysseus' scheme is to be successful.

Sophocles

is surely pointing to the central importance of the role of
education and the potentially devastating influence of the
teacher
throws

in

the

himself,

simply masterful
almost

way

zealously,

in which Neoptolemus
into

deceiving Philoctetes (Phil. 343-390).

the

practice

of

The ancient audience

watching this for the first time must have wondered whether
the son of Achilles had, in fact, given himself over once and
for all to the son of Laertes (Phil. 84) !
Sophocles' Neoptolemus seems to me to have every bit of
the psychological and moral complexity that Lesky attributes
to Euripides' Medea.

His struggle is in many ways similar to

that of Medea inasmuch as he is the victim of the same kind
of interior conflicts and anguish that afflict her.

Medea has

her great soliloquy in which she agonizes whether actually to
go through with the killing of her children (Medea 1038-1080),
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but

Neoptolemus

division.

is

also

plagued

by

this

sort

of

inner

He is paralyzed by emotional confusion (aporia} and

remorse just at the point when Odysseus' scheme is going to
carry the day

(Phil.

895-899).

His use of the word algos

(grief, distress} highlights his mental suffering (Phil. 806,
cf. also 1011} and, like Medea, he is so divided that he cries
out at several points in the play, "What shall I do?" (Phil.
908,

969, 974).

The struggle and confusion that Sophocles

portrays through the character of Neoptolemus show us that for
the playwright the emergence of virtue is something tenuous
and difficult.

It comes in and through struggle and pain and

requires the assistance of a worthy role model if it is to
come to the light.

When the son of Achilles returns to the

stage

his

again

after

extraordinary

silence

we

are

not

witnessing the mere reassertion of his nature in a fashion
that is in some way rigidly predetermined, 11 but are seeing
what happens when a person, after much painful deliberation,
has opted fundamentally for one way of life over another.
Since the character of Neoptolemus is more complex than Lesky
and McNamee indicate,

since he is as it were,

three-dimen-

sional and not one-dimensional, we must take into consideration

other

factors

than

only

his

nature.

This

is

what

Sophocles is showing us with the character of Neoptolemus: a
promising nature is not sufficient for virtue as Pindar and
the archaic tradition would have it, but requires in addition
11

Lesky, p. 146
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the nourishment and guidance of correct education if it is to
attain the goal of excellence. 12
1.4 Nature and Virtue in Aristotle
Aristotle also maintains the insufficiency of nature
for virtue but develops his position through the medium of
philosophical discourse.

He renders explicit and thematic

the relationship of nature to the moral life that is presented
dramatically in Sophocles.

Because he is doing philosophy

Aristotle cannot show us in as moving a way as the tragedian
the struggle that is involved in the quest to achieve virtue.
This is the peculiar virtue that is part of the tragedian's
art to show.
through

But he does furnish a clearer conceptual schema

which

to

understand

the

action

that

Sophocles

presents.
For Aristotle,

we have a certain natural affinity or

orientation toward the good, but this natural predeliction is
clearly insufficient for the achievement of virtue
complete sense.

in the

Like Sophocles, then, Aristotle holds that

nature is a good starting point for the development of the
virtues but he makes it explicit that moral training is the

12

see Rose, "Sophocles' Philoctetes and the Teachings of
the Sophists," 89; Blundell, "The Phusis of Neoptolemus," 138,
145. Rose correctly points to the importance of education in
the character formation of Neoptolemus and Blundell rightly
perceives that Sophocles is emphasizing the potentiality of
Neoptolemus' phusis.
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condition sine qua non of the full realization of nature's
potentialities with respect to the question of excellence
(arete).

In the opening of his Nicomachean Ethics, he says

that every undertaking seems to aim at some good and so it has
been well said that the good is that at which all things aim
(dio kalos apephenanto tagathon hou pant' ephietai, EN 1094a23).

But natural proclivity must, according to Aristotle, be

united to education or training in the form of habituation
(ethos)

if

nature

is

ever

to

be

brought

to

completion. 13

Aristotle points out the philosophical implications of the
connection between character and habituation by indicating the
etymological similarity of the words ethos

(character)

and

ethos (habituation, custom or practice, EN 1103a17-19).

If

moral excellence is necessarily connected to ethos (habituation, practice), then, Aristotle asserts, none of the moral
virtues are engendered in us by nature (delon hoti oudemia ton
ethikon areton phusei hemin enginetai, EN 1103a19-20}.

If it

takes habituation to arrive at the moral virtues then we do
not

simply grow

into

them by nature

but we

acquire

them

through practice.
Aristotle states this negatively by asserting that if
the moral virtues are acquired by some kind of habituation
then they cannot be engendered by nature inasmuch as natural
properties cannot be altered by habit.
13

If we acquired our

see Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A study in Moral
Theory (Notre Dame, Indiana, University of Notre Dame Press,
1984), pp. 52-53.
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moral characters by nature then there would be no hope of our
ever altering them.
like

the

archaic

They would be fixed and inviolate much
conception

of

nature

that

Sophocles

is

challenging, and much like the stone to which Aristotle refers
that cannot be habituated to stay up no matter how many times
one throws it upward

(EN 1103a20-22).

The moral virtues,

Aristotle conludes, are engendered in us neither by nature nor
contrary to nature but we are capable, by nature, of receiving
or accepting them (out' ara phusei oute para phusin enginontai
hai

aretai

alla

pephukosi

men

hemin

dexasthai

autas

EN

1103a23-25) and bringing them to perfection through habituation (teleioumenois de dia tou ethous, EN 1103a25-26) . 14
The notion of practice as a way of developing, augmenting and completing our natural
Sophocles,
philosophy.

is

at

the

very

powers,

center

of

while

implicit

Aristotle's

in

moral

This is why such emphasis is placed upon action.

For Aristotle, activity is the road to becoming a particular
kind of person:
For the things which we have to learn before we can do
them we learn by doing: men become builders by building
houses, and harpists by playing the harp. Similarly, we
become just by the practice of just actions, self-con14

Aristotle indicates the general insufficiency of natural
capacities with a view to the acquirement of virtue in his
discussion of the relationship of practical wisdom (phronesis)
to moral virtue (ethike arete) in EN VI .12.
The natural
capacity (dunamis, EN 1144a23) of cleverness (deinotes)
requires the correct education of the passions in order to
become the virtue of practical wisdom.
Similarly, natural
virtue (phusike arete) can only become virtue in the full
sense (kurios arete) by the experienced and educated guidance
of practical wisdom.
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trolled by exercising self-control, and coura~eous
performing acts of courage. (EN 1103a32-1103b2.) 5

by

It is by action too that the education of our emotiorts takes
place:
It is by acting in the face of danger and by developing
the habit of feeling fear or confidence that some become
brave men and others cowards.
The same applies to the
appetites and feelings of anger: by reacting in one way
or in another to given circumstances some people become
self-controlled and gentle, and others self-indulgent and
short-tempered. (EN 1103b14-20.) 16
Aristotle

lays

particular

and

striking

emphasis

upon

the

necessity of persistent practice with a view to the acquisition of the virtues when he cautions us concerning the vast
difference between

practicing the virtues or merely talking

about them:
Thus our assertion that a man becomes just by performing
just acts and self-controlled by performing acts of selfcontrol is correct: without performing them, nobody could
even be on the way to becoming good (ek de tou me prattein
tauta oudeis an oude melleseie ginesthai agathos).
But
most people do not perform such acts, but by taking refuge
in argument (epi de ton logon katapheugontes) they think
that they are engaged in philosophy and that they will
become good in this way. In so doing, they act like sick
men who listen attentively to what the doctor says, but
fail to do any of the things he prescribes. That kind of
philosophical activity will not bring health to the soul
any more than this sort of treatment will produce a
heal thy body. ( EN 1105b5-18.) 17
Habituation is necessary with a view to bringing about the
proper response to pleasure and pain.

15

Aristotle contends that

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics trans. by Martin Ostwald
(New York, Macmillan Publishing Company, 1962), p. 34.
16

ostwald, p. 34

17

ostwald, pp. 39-40.
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the

entire matter

concerned

with

of

the

pleasure

study of

and

pain

ethics
inasmuch

is
as

necessarily
it

is

not

unimportant for our actions that we feel joy and pain in the
right or wrong way (dia tout' oun anankaion einai peri tauta
ten pasan pragmateian ou gar mikron eis tas praxeis eu e kakos
chairein kai lupeisthai,

EN 1105a5-7).

He reiterates this

same point when he states that a sign (semeion, EN 1104b5) of
our character disposition is furnished by the pleasure or pain
that accompanies our activities.

It is crucial, he says, that

we be brought up from our earliest days to delight and be
pained at what we ought (dio dei echthai pos euthus ek neon,
hos ho Platen phesin, hoste chairein te kai lupeisthai hois
dei, EN 1104b12-4).

This is what Aristotle, following Plato

calls correct education (orthe paideia, fill 1104b13) . 18
18

It is

In Republic III .12 ( 401e-402a) Plato talks about the
power of music to instill feelings of pleasure and pain at the
proper things in the young. Music is especially suitable to
the education of youth because rhythm and harmony "sink down
into the depths of the soul" (kataduetai eis to entos tes
psuches ho te ruthmos kai harmonia, Republic, 401d6-7) and
"take the strongest hold upon it, leading the soul to gracefullness and making it graceful" (kai erromenestata haptetai
autes pheronta ten euschemosunen kai poiei euschemona,
Republic 401d7-8).
He maintains that children need to be
emotionally attuned to what is disgraceful and noble from an
early age.
This emotional education he insists, must be
instilled even before the children are capable of understanding the reason why something is disgraceful or noble (ta men
kala epainoi kai chairon kai kata dechomenos eis ten psuchen
trephoit' an ap' auton kai gignoito kales te kagathos tad'
aischra psegoi t'an orthos kai misoi eti neos on prin logon
dunatos einai labein, Republic, 401e4-7). It is through this
emotional affinity with the beautiful and the good established
in their youth that children will be capable of recognizing
the reason or reasons why something is noble or disgraceful
later in their adult lives (elthontos de tou logou aspazoit'
an auton gnorizon di' oikeioteta malista ho houto trapheis;,
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the

indispensable foundation

for the development of moral

excellence.
1.5 Conclusion
I have argued that the ancient anthropology (and its
concomitant conception of the moral person and the moral life)
of Aristotle and Sophocles is superior to more modern conceptions of the moral agent for several reasons.

First, this

anthropology shows a much greater appreciation of the concrete
character of ethics in its concern for the question of human
nature.

The question of the development of the virtues was

the central concern of the ancients and they saw that this
issue was directly related to the sufficiency or insufficiency
of human nature to attain them.

In this way we can see that

Sophocles and Aristotle start with the empirical and make
important judgments with respect to the necessity or nonnecessity

of

moral

education

based

upon

a

human

being's

nature.

Moral philosophy in the Kantian tradition is much

more abstract because it holds that the question of human
nature and human experience in general is unimportant to the
formulation of the moral law.
Secondly,

we

have

seen

that

the

ancients

show

an

appreciation of the complexity of the moral agent that is
lacking in much modern moral philosophy which focuses solely
upon the rational to the exclusion of the role of the emo-

Republic 401a3-4).
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tions.

It is precisely this recognition and appreciation of

all of the elements of the human psyche, rational, emotional
and desiderative, and the need for their harmonious integration, that leads the ancients to the insight that this harmony
of parts is simply not given to us by nature.
and

Aristotle

understand

that

nature

is

Thus Sophocles
insufficient

achieve virtue and that moral education is necessary.

to

In this

way they also appreciate the developmental character of the
life of virtue and the social aspect of becoming a moral agent
that is decidedly lacking in the Kantian conception of moral
philosophy.
I have argued, in addition, that, given this anthropology,

it is entirely appropriate to appeal to or to include

literature as well as philosophy in order fully to appreciate
those elements that are a part of becoming a moral person.
Literature

is

evocativeness

needed
in

the

for

its

concreteness

formation

of

the

and

moral

emotional

agent while

philosophy is needed for its ability to furnish an explanatory
and

unifying

logos

of

the

phenomena

presented

by

the

dramatist.
The

philosopher

provides

the

conceptual

framework

through which we see that human nature is a potentiality to
receive the virtues only with the aid of educative habituation.

The tragedian shows us the insufficiency of unaided

nature to attain virtue through the dramatic portrayal of a
young nobleman's initial fall into villainy because of the
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influence of a wicked teacher and a naive over-reliance upon
his noble nature to keep him on the path of virtue.

It is the

peculiar virtue of poetry (especially tragic poetry) to show
graphically through action the struggle and the uncertainty
that is involved in attempting to live the life of virtue. 19
And

it

is

in

this

way

(by

portraying

the

struggle,

the

necessity of a good role model and the uncertainty of the
outcome) that Sophocles challenges the archaic conception of
achieving virtue through noble descent.

The son of Achilles

clearly has a certain affinity for virtue

(pos oikeion tes

aretes, EN 1179b30-31}, loving what is noble and hating what
is disgraceful (stergon to kalon kai discherainon to aischron,

fil! 1179b31-32}.
no

guarantee

Still, this is only a good beginning; it is

of

the

achievement

of

virtue.

It

is

like

preparing the soil in advance, Aristotle says, for the reception of the seed (EN 1179b26-27).

In order for the seed to

grow and become sturdy and strong, continuous activities in
accord with virtue are required in order that virtue may take
permanent root (EN llOSbl0-15).

Both Sophocles and Aristotle,

then, point to the notion that nature is a good potential or
starting point for virtue but that it requires the bolstering
and development that only habituation and education can give.
Neoptolemus

is

ripe

for

the reception of the virtues

(EN

1103a26} but much more will be required of him if he is to
find his way to moral maturity.
19

He will have to be educated

Macintyre, After Virtue, pp. 163-164.
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in the very human school of suffering, will have to discover
the true meaning of friendship and make a choice that will be
determinative of his character and fate.

Chapter 2
MORAL EXEMPLAR AND MORAL STANDARD IN SOPHOCLES AND ARISTOTLE
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter I develop further the theme,
upon in the previous chapter,

touched

of the importance of a role

model in the formation of the moral person.

I also address

the broader question of the ultimate standard of value for
Sophocles and Aristotle. Once again we can see the preference
for the concrete over the abstract in the ancient conception
of ethics in several ways.
tion

for

the

need

of

a

First, we note that the recogniteacher

stems

directly

from

the

understanding that human nature is insufficient to achieve
virtue.

This is based upon an empirical judgment.

Secondly,

the remedy that is sought to augment the deficiency of nature
is not

in terms of formulating some kind of abstract and

universal principle (the categorical imperative, the principle
of utility) but is in terms of a particular individual from
the community who is well-equipped to instruct the student and
inculcate the habits of virtue in him.

Of course, the appeal

to a concrete individual as a standard of action would be, for
a Kantian, utterly wrongheaded.

Again, for Kant, experience

is immaterial to the doing of ethics and no number of excellent moral exemplars could ever add up to the exceptionless
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rigor demanded by the moral law.

But, in the ancient concep-

tion of the moral agent, such exceptionless rigor is unrealistic and out of touch with the contingent character of moral
action.

Thirdly, we can see here an implicit recognition and

affirmation of the inherently social character of the formation of the moral agent.

We grow into moral goodness not by

gaining insight into the nature of our moral autonomy but in
and through watching others feel, choose and act well.

Again,

it is my contention that Sophocles and Aristotle share the
same basic moral anthropology and that this conception of the
moral agent is superior to more recent developments.

As a

corollary to this anthropology that takes into account the
whole person and enjoys a richer sense of the elements of the
moral life it is my contention that we,

as potential moral

agents, need the strengths of both poetry and philosophy.

We

need poetry for its immediacy and concreteness as well as its
ability to depict and evoke the emotions.

On the other hand

we need philosophy for its explanatory power and its ability
to furnish a logos that can serve to unify the more disparate
strands of human experience presented through the medium of
poetry.

Let us turn to a more detailed examination of the

contributions of Sophocles and Aristotle in this chapter.
In Sophocles we shall see how the elaborate lie that
Neoptolemus tells Philoctetes actually mirrors the young man's
own moral dilemma.

It is my contention that Sophocles is

showing us through Neoptolemus' fiction the dire consequences
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that ensue

for

the young and

guided by the morally wicked.

inexperienced when they are
The insufficiency of unaided

nature to achieve moral virtue is made devastatingly clear by
Sophocles when we chillingly witness Neoptolemus speak in very
Odyssean tones as he covertly excuses himself from any moral
responsibility for his actions (Phil. 385-388).

Contrariwise,

the figure of Philoctetes, in marked contrast to Odysseus, is
seen to be a much more adequate model for the son of Achilles. 1

It is Philoctetes who reawakens in the young man a

sense of his own moral identity when he encourages him to live
up to the legacy of his father and to the nature which was
bequeathed to him.

For example, he lavishly praises Neop-

tolemus for nobly enduring his sufferings with him (Phil. 869871, 874-876).

The good role model praises his student when

he acts well and censures him when he acts wickedly.

Philoc-

tetes roundly abuses Neoptolemus with his words when he finds
out that the son of Achilles has betrayed him to Odysseus.

1

It is my contention that Sophocles is in fundamental
sympathy with the character of Philoctetes and hence I shall
assume that he "approves" of the affect that the son of Poeas
has on Neoptolemus. His sympathy with the figure of Philoctetes is shown in the final routing of Odysseus from the stage
at the end of the play where Philoctetes gets the last word:
Know this much young man, that these supposed foremost of
the Achaeans are mere false and blustering heralds who are
bold with their words but cowards at the spear point
(Phil. 1305-1307).
Sophocles further shows his sympathy for Philoctetes in the
epiphany of Heracles who comes finally to vindicate him for
the injustice of his sufferings, to free him from his physical
pain and to reinstate him into human society.
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He forces the young man to feel the shame of what he has done
and it is precisely this sense of shame which, in part, leads
Neoptolemus to choose to abandon Odysseus'

scheme and to

pursue a more just course of action.
Aristotle

makes

programmatic

what

is

portrayed

by

Sophocles in the relationship between Philoctetes and Neoptolemus.

Sophocles shows us the way in which the older man

exercises a formative influence on the son of Achilles while
Aristotle

argues

for

the

importance

of

the

inculcating proper habits in the citizen body.
examine

1)

the

educational

relationship

lawgiver

in

Thus I shall

which

Sophocles

depicts in the play, 2) the role which Aristotle assigns to
the lawgiver in the moral formation of the citizen body and
3)

Aristotle's

(phronimos
question

or

of

notion

of

the

spoudaios) .
the

particular

person

This

will

moral

of

practical

direct

exemplar

us
to

wisdom

from
the

question of the ultimate standard of value itself.

the

wider

In this

regard it is my contention that Aristotle and Sophocles share
a fundamental sense that the ultimate standard by which we are
to make judgments regarding human existence is a divine one.
Both tragedian and philosopher share a basic sense that the
normative measure rests with or in God.
thought is interesting and noteworthy.

The parallel in their
Sophocles shows us

this when the impasse to which the play comes at the human
level

is

finally

resolved

epiphany of Heracles.

on

the

divine

level

with

the

Aristotle points to this same standard
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when he asserts that the sight (skopos) to which the person
of practical wisdom (phronimos)

looks in order to determine

the mean and general horizon of his pursuits is that which
will most promote the contemplation of God.
tragedian and philosopher show,

In this way both

by implication,

the insuf-

ficiency of making judgments by human standards alone and the
need

to

sphere.

introduce

a

standard

which

transcends

the

human

Let us turn then to a consideration of Neoptolemus'

fictional account of how he lost his father's inheritance.
2.2 The Absence Of A Role Model In Sophocles
Sophocles

brings

vividly

to

life

the

devastating

consequences of the lack of a role model in the elaborate lie
that Neoptolemus tells Philoctetes, a lie that is a kind of
mirror of his own moral situation.

In this gross fiction,

Neoptolemus says that Odysseus and his father's caretaker,
Phoenix, came for him because they said that, since his father
died, it was fit that no one else take the citadel of Troy but
he

(Phil.

(Phil.

347).

Allured by the promise of heroic renown

352-53), Neoptolemus sets off for Sigeion.

When he

lands, the entire army come out to greet him, surrounding him
and swearing that they see the great Achilles alive once again
(ekbanta pas espazet', omnuntes blepein/ton ouket' onta zont'
Achillea palin, Phil. 357-58).
Neoptolemus approaches Agamemnon and Menelaus in order
to lay claim to the weapons of his father, which are his inheritance by right.

The Atreidae inform him that he can have
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the rest of his
(Odysseus)

is

weapons.

father's

"master"

belongings but that another man

(kratunei,

Phil.

366)

of Achilles'

Neoptolemus is outraged and curses both Odysseus

and the Atreidae for their presumption.
roused to anger

Odysseus is in turn

(dechtheis pros haxekousen,

Phil.

378)

and

threatens Neoptolemus with never making it back to scyros with
the weapons of his father in his hand.

Neoptolemus says that

he sailed for home abused and deprived of his inheritance "by
that bastard, son of bastards, Odysseus" (Phil. 384).
Even

though

the

story

that

Neoptolemus

is

telling

Philoctetes is fiction, Sophocles is showing us here a great
deal about the kind of moral betrayal that the son of Achilles
is enacting by carrying out Odysseus' scheme.

There is a tag

at the end of Neoptolemus' account, a kind of commentary that
Sophocles puts into the mouth of the son of Achilles concerning Odysseus which is most revealing of all.

But we shall

simply concern ourselves with this fictional account first and
then turn to Neoptolemus' significant commentary on his own
story.
First of all, we note that the most significant symbol
of

his

warrior,
Through

father's
his
the

former

weapons,
loss

of

presence
have

this

been
highly

and

identity as

given

away

charged

to

symbol

a

noble

Odysseus.
it

seems

plausible to suggest that Sophocles is showing us Neoptolemus'
betrayal of his father's nature.

The story, then, signifies

that Neoptolemus has forsaken his nature and hence his own
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moral

identity

by

giving

himself

shameless actions {Phil. 83-5}.

over

to

Odysseus

for

By his actions, he is proving

to be more the son of Laertes (pai Laertou} than the son of
Achilles

(pai Achilleos} .

And yet this

is

indeed ironic

inasmuch as in the story that he tells, Neoptolemus appears
as the very image of his deceased father.

The entire army is

so taken with his resemblance that they surround him in their
greeting and swear that it is Achilles come back from the
dead.

There is something doubly ironic that the very son who

has just disowned his moral inheritance should appear in his
own lying tale as the spitting image of his father.

There

is, then, a great discrepancy between the Neoptolemus of the
fictional account who,

in righteous

indignation,

seeks to

claim his fatherly inheritance and the Neoptolemus who is, in
reality,

disowning his phusis and his very identity by his

actions.

In masterful fashion Sophocles communicates to his

audience

the moral

peril

that the son of Achilles

is

in

through the vehicle of the very lying tale that the latter
employs in order to deceive his father's old friend.
It is- through the close association that Neoptolemus
draws between himself and his father in his fictional account
that we can surmise that Neoptolemus is struggling with his
moral identity, between being a pai Laertou or a pai Achilleos.

In short, we might say that though he is denying his

nature through his actions, he is still very much his father's
son and still closely identifies himself with his father.

But
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the struggle is not over and has not been won by Neoptolemus
as we shall see in an examination of the closing lines of his
story to Philoctetes.
Sophocles brilliantly depicts the moral struggle that
is going on in the character of Neoptolemus in the closing
lines of his story where there is a strange and inexplicable
reversal of his sentiments toward Odysseus.

As we have seen,

Odysseus

was,

of

outrage.

His father's weapons had been given to Odysseus and

in

particular,

the

source

Neoptolemus'

the son of Laertes claimed that this had been justly done
(nai, pai, dedokas' endikos houtoi tade, Phil. 372) because
he was there to save both Achilles' weapons and his body from
marauders

(ego gar aut'

esosa kakeinon paron,

Phil.

373).

Odysseus, in turn, rather vaguely accuses Neoptolemus of not
being where he should have been in the battle (auk esth' hin'
hemeis, all' apesth' hin' ou s' edei, Phil. 379).
any rate, Odysseus whom Neoptolemus accuses,

It is, at

in the end, of

depriving him of what was rightfully his (pleo pros oikous,
ton emon tetomenos/pros tou kakistou kak kakon Odusseos, Phil.
383-84).

In

the

closing

lines

of

his

story,

however,

Neoptolemus lets Odysseus off the hook and says that he does
not lay the blame so much on him as those in power, namely,
the Atreidae (kouk aitiomai keinon hos taus en telei, Phil.
385).

This is the case, according to

Neoptolemus, because

the entire city and army is in the hands of its leaders (polis
gar esti pasa ton hegoumenon/stratos te sumpas, Phil. 386-87).
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Those who are unruly or out of control, he goes on to say,
become wicked by the words of their teachers (hoi d'akousmoun~es broton/didaskalon logoisi gignontai kakoi, Phil. 387-88).

rt seems quite clear that Neoptolemus is covertly defending
himself and his own actions by defending Odysseus. 2
making a kind of moral subterfuge.

He is

By his statement, here,

he seems to be more than ever pai Laertou.
As

we

have

seen

already,

it

is

characteristic

of

Odysseus to deny any responsibility for his actions and this
is exactly what we see Neoptolemus doing here.

Sophocles'

placing of these lines just here is a stroke of genius because
we catch a brief glimpse of Neoptolemus' pain and the urgent
need he has for justifying himself.

He is actually in league

with the very man whose villainy he is so desperately attempting to excuse.

Confused,

ashamed and internally divided,

Neoptolemus is forced to fool and console himself by telling
himself
Odysseus,

yet

another

namely,

fictitious

that he

story

in

the

is not responsible

manner
for his

of
own

actions but his wickedness and deceit must be laid at the feet
of his teacher, the son of Laertes.

Neoptolemus concludes by

saying that the whole story has been told. 3
2

see also Philoctetes ed. T.B.L Webster (Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 1970}, p. 95; The Philoctetes ed.
J. c. Kamerbeek (Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1980}, p. 77.
3

Neoptolemus says that the whole story has been spoken
(logos lelektai pas, Phil. 389} and these lines reverberate
at many levels of meaning and irony. Indeed, Neoptolemus has,
in one sense, told Philoctetes his entire tale. But the tale
is a lie and so in another sense he has not at all told him
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From this passage, Sophocles is showing us that Neoptolemus is in very grave danger of losing his moral identity.
with no one to guide him or to support the moral principles
with which he initially opposed Odysseus

(Phil.

86-95)

he

simply falls prey to Odysseus' rhetoric and ethic of expediency.
very

He loses a sense of who he is and what he stands for
quickly

by

engaging

violence to his character.

himself

in

a

scheme

that

does

What is so telling about Neop-

tolemus' commentary at the end of his lying tale is that he
is not only acting like Odysseus in carrying out this scheme
but he is even beginning to talk like Odysseus.

Indeed, we

may sense that there is hope for Neoptolemus because we see
that he painfully feels the need to justify himself.

But on

the other hand it is clear that Sophocles is showing to us
the perilous state that he is in because he is attempting, in
classic Odyssean fashion, to distance himself completely from
personal responsibility for his own actions.

He is trying to

the entire story.
In fact, Philoctetes is more than ever in
the dark after Neoptolemus tells him his entire story. This
business of having or not having, hearing or not hearing the
whole logos is played upon throughout the Philoctetes.
At
241, after just having answered Philoctetes' questions
evasively and with a minimum of information, Neoptolemus says
to Philoctetes, "You know everything."
When the tradesman
comes to muddy the waters further by relating yet another
deceit, he says to Neoptolemus and Philoctetes at the close
of his logos, "You heard everything" (Phil. 620). The entire
play is filled and fueled by a series of half-truths until the
very end.
In the end, Neoptolemus will tell Odysseus, "Know
it well, that you have heard the whole story" (eu nun episto
pant' akekoos logon, Phil. 1240) and, at last, we will know
the entire and real account--and it will be a story of reconciliation and fidelity to the demands of justice and
friendship.
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skirt the fundamental

issue of personal responsibility by

attributing his own wicked choice to his "teacher" Odysseus
(Phil. 388) .
It is a subtle and terribly ironic position that Neoptolemus is in, a worthy example of Sophocles' notorious use
of irony.

Odysseus is seen to be a poor moral exemplar and

yet he has instructed the young man well
deception. 4

We sense Neoptolemus'

in the wiles of

anxiety

in his closing

"explanation" of his lie and yet he is still ignoring that
feeling and acting as the instrument of Odysseus'

scheme.

Neoptolemus seems to "know" that something is wrong but is
unwilling to allow himself to know that he knows.

At any

rate, what Sophocles is pointing to here are the moral perils
to which a young person like Neoptolemus is subject when there
is

no

one who might

act

as

an

adequate

role model.

In

Neoptolemus' case we see not only what happens in the absence
of a moral exemplar but the potential for wickedness when
one's paedagogue is morally dubious.

It will be Neoptolemus'

task, as we shall see, to throw off the influence of Odysseus
and discover a sense of his own moral identity in and through
the test to which he will be subjected.

This Neoptolemus will

do in the relationship that he develops with Philoctetes who
4

Philoctetes says of Odysseus'
tetes later in the play:

'instruction' of Philoc-

Your wicked soul, always looking through the recesses [of
Neoptolemus) gradually taught him well to be clever in
wickedness even though it is unlike his nature and he was
unwilling to do this. (Phil. 1013-15.).
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acts as a kind of role model for him.
In a very real sense, Odysseus and Philoctetes compete
with each other to be the final and decisive moral influence
on the young man.

Neoptolemus will (as we shall see) even-

tually surpass even Philoctetes in moral maturity (see Phil.
1299-13 04) , 5 but the

initial guidance and support that he

receives from Philoctetes for the moral intuitions which were
ridiculed by Odysseus, the way that Neoptolemus strives to be
held in esteem by the older man, and the way in which Philoctetes forces Neoptolemus (through shame) to strive to live up
to his father's noble nature all contribute to the younger
man's profound choice at the end of the play.

Let us turn

then to a consideration of the passages relevant to these
matters in the drama.
2.3 Philoctetes As The Role Model In Sophocles
Philoctetes first confirms many of Neoptolemus' initial
feelings

and

intuitions

feelings

toward the wicked.

occupied

to

the point

by his

of

It

expression

of

appropriate

is true that he

obsession with

paying

is preback his

enemies for the wrong that he has suffered at their hands, but
he gives expression to certain moral categories of what is
praiseworthy and blameworthy which Neoptolemus has neglected
in his service to Odysseus.

When Philoctetes hears Neap-

tolemus'

lost

5

story

about

how

he

his

father's

armor

to

I shall discuss this in chapter 6 in my examination of
the relationship of friendship to the moral life.
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Odysseus, Philoctetes asserts that this sounds like the sort
of thing that Odysseus would do.

He goes on to say:

I know that he would touch any wicked story with his
tongue and be willing to do anything (panourgias, Phil.
408). He will commit every injustice to achieve his goal
(meden dikaion es telos melloi poein, Phil. 409).
In this way,

then,

Philoctetes has characterized Odysseus'

actions as those of a panourgos, one who is willing to do or
say anything to get what he wants.

They both agree that this

sort of person is utterly worthless and together lament that
warfare and the gods take only the good and leave people like
Odysseus and Thersites behind (Phil. 428-30, 446).
It appears that Philoctetes arouses Neoptolemus' former
sense of nobility and pride when the former ponders about the
injustice of the scheme of things:
How in the world are we to understand this, when these men
die and Odysseus is still here where it ought to be said
that he is a dead man instead of these (Phil. 428-430)?
Sophocles

shows

Neoptolemus'

solidarity

with

Philoctetes'

feelings of moral outrage and has him state rather cryptically, "That clever wrestler Odysseus . . . but even clever plans
are often tripped up" (Phil. 431-2) .

Al though it is not clear

just what Neoptolemus is saying it appears that the tragedian
is hinting that Neoptolemus himself may be the instrument of
the overthrow of Odysseus'

twisted scheme.

The young man

seems to have been awakened to his original reservations about
Odysseus by the sufferings and righteous indignation of the
outraged hero.

Sophocles does not come out and have Neop-

tolemus state explicitly that he will foil Odysseus' plans.
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He reveals things gradually, constructing his play in a way
that respects the fact that the son of Achilles has become
morally confused by his involvement with the wicked Odysseus
and that his discovery of who he is after the moral obfuscation that he has suffered will be gradual and emergent.

In

this way, then, Philoctetes helps bring Neoptolemus back to
the

original

moral

principles

which

pressure from Odysseus (Phil. 86-95).

he

abandoned

under

Sophocles shows us that

Philoctetes is a moral exemplar in that he shows the young man
the way back to a proper moral assessment of the situation.
Another way that Sophocles shows us that Philoctetes
acts as a moral exemplar to Neoptolemus is the manner in which
he encourages the young man to do what is morally noble and
in keeping with his father's nature.

He accomplishes this

simply by his manner of addressing the young man.

He often

calls attention to Neoptolemus' noble heritage by employing
his patronymic

(Phil.

260)

(gennaion, Phil. 799, 801).

and by calling him "noble one"
He challenges Neoptolemus to take

him on board his ship instructing him:
Truly, for those who are noble (toisi gennaioisi) the
disgraceful is hateful and what is good is glorious.
If
you fail to do this, reproach is disgraceful, but if you
do it, child, the prize is of great glory .
(Phil.
475-478).

In a remarkable parallel to what Odysseus said earlier when
trying to get the young man to give up his moral scruples
(Phil. 79-85), Philoctetes encourages Neoptolemus to take up
the challenge saying,

"The burden is truly not even for a
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whole day.

Take it upon yourself, dare to do it (hemeras toi

mochthos ouch holes mias. tolmeson, Phil. 480-481)! 6
through

this

parallel

that

Sophocles

makes

apparent

It is
that

Philoctetes is acting as a kind of moral counterpart to the
figure of Odysseus.

He invites Neoptolemus to do what is

noble and encourages him to live up to his nature,

while

Odysseus challenges the son of Achilles to throw off his
nature and engage in shameful actions.
Like any good teacher, Philoctetes rewards his pupil for
the excellent and praiseworthy behavior that he exhibits.
Philoctetes does this by offering Neoptolemus the chance to
handle his bow and even to be its keeper.

Philoctetes asserts

that Neoptolemus alone is able to boast that he has touched
and handled the bow.

And this boast is his,

because of his virtue (aretes hekati, Phil. 669).

he explains,
Philoctetes

says that he too acquired the bow because of a good deed that
6

0dysseus says to Neoptolemus:

I know, child, that it is not your nature to say such
things nor to scheme to do wicked things, but dare (tolma)
to grasp for some sweet portion of victory, and there will
be time later to look just. But now give yourself to me
for shamelessness for just a brief portion of the day .
(nun d' eis anaides hemeras meres brachu/dos moi
seauton, Phil. 79-84).
Just as Odysseus, the morally corrupt exemplar "dares"
Neoptolemus to overcome his phusis and commit injustice, so
Philoctetes "dares" the young man to do what is noble and in
keeping with those who are gennaioi.
The parallel between
line 480 and 83 is particularly striking.
Again, Odysseus
invites Neoptolemus to act shamelessly for "a brief part of
the day," while Philoctetes implores Neoptolemus to act nobly
and take upon himself a burden which will "not last for even
a whole day."
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he performed. 7
The converse of the good teacher's praise is his blame
and Philoctetes unleashes a torrent of abuse upon Neoptolemus
when he finds out that he has been grossly deceived by him.
philoctetes' harshness is understandable, however, because the
"pupil" who has betrayed him is also ( or at least has been
posing as) his friend.

When Neoptolemus informs Philoctetes

that he must sail to Troy and plunder it and then refuses to
return the bow which was entrusted to him, Philoctetes cries
out:
You fire and utter terror, you hateful masterwork in
terrible villainy (panourgias) ! What things you have done
to me, your suppliant! What ways you have deceived me! You
bastard, aren't you ashamed of looking at me? (Phil. 927930.)
It is important to note here how Sophocles has Philoctetes
identify Neoptolemus with the figure of Odysseus.

In this way

the tragedian points again to the severe consequences that a
wicked teacher can bring about and the need for a good role
model.

Philoctetes is saying that Neoptolemus is,

as Jebb

puts it, "a work of art in panourgia, a man in whom panourgia
assumes its subtlest form. " 8
407-409)
panourgia.

referred

Philoctetes had earlier (Phil.

specifically

to

Odysseus'

amoralism

as

He is now saying that Neoptolemus surpasses even

Odysseus in villainy, being himself the masterwork of panour-

7

He is speaking here, of course, of having lit the dying
Heracles' funeral pyre.
8

see Jebb, The Philoctetes of Sophocles, p. 163.
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Philoctetes awakens once again the shame that Neap-

g_ia.

tolemus asserted he threw off in order to carry out Odysseus'
scheme (Phil. 120).

The son of Achilles is unable to respond

to Philoctetes and can only turn his face away in shame (hod'
hara palin, Phil. 935) . 9

Philoctetes' severe castigation of

Neoptolemus sets him in the direction of the pain, grief and
pity that will ultimately lead the young man to discovering
his moral identity and to making a decisive choice against
Odyssean expediency.
has

the

figure

of

In this way again, we see that Sophocles
Philoctetes

act

as

a

moral

exemplar,

instructing Neoptolemus with respect to what it is appropriate
to feel and to do.
2.4 The Lawmaker And Educator As Role Model In Aristotle
Aristotle's

lawmaker

plays

much

the

same

role

with

respect to the citizen body that we see Philoctetes play with
Neoptolemus

in the play.

Just as Philoctetes guides

and

brings out the best in the son of Achilles so also Aristotle's
lawmaker is the one who knows how to formulate the sorts of
laws which will engender excellence of character among the
citizens.

rt is not the part of just anyone,

he says,

to

inculcate a good disposition in a person (hontina gar oun kai
ton protethenta diatheinai kales ouk esti tou tuchontos, EN
9

rt is interesting to note that Neoptolemus anticipated
the very shame that he was to feel toward Philoctetes when he
questioned Odysseus about lying to Philoctetes, "How then will
anyone take it upon himself to say these things and look him
in the face? 11 (pos oun blepon tis tau ta tolmesei lake in;,
Phil. 110.)
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1180b25-26} but only the part of one who knows (tou eidotos,

fil! 1180b27). ,o With respect to the inculcation of the virtues,
the one who knows for Aristotle is the lawmaker.

It is up to

the lawmakers to habituate the citizen body in such a way that
they become morally good

(hoi gar nomothetai tous politas

ethizontes poiousin agathous,

EN 1103b3-4).

This he says,

should be the will of every lawmaker (to men boulema pantos
nomothetou,

EN 1103b4-5).

Those who do not inculcate the

citizen body in the ways of moral excellence fail as lawmakers
(hosoi de me eu auto poiousin hamartanousin, EN 1103b5).

This

is the chief difference he claims, between a good constitution
and a worthless one (kai diapherei touto politeia politeias
agathe phaules, EN 1103b6).
tance

of

the

educative

role

Aristotle points to the imporof

laws

and the

lawmaker at

Nicomachean Ethics X when he states that it is difficult to
obtain a

correct rearing

( agog es orthes,

EN 1179 b31)

from

youth if one has not been brought up under the right laws.
Living with self-control and tenacity is not pleasant for the
majority of people (EN 1179b32-33, Pol. 1339a29}, especially
for

youth

and

so

regulated by laws.

their

upbringing

and

pursuits

must

be

Once this education has become a part of

the fabric of their characters (sunethe genomena, EN 1179b3536) it will no longer be painful.
In Politics VIII Aristotle explicitly states that the
10

Aristotle employs the predicate genitive of characteristic in both instances.
In this way he specifically emphasizes that which it is a particular person's power to do.
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education of the young requires the special attention of the
lawgiver (Pol. 1337al0-11).

Failure to do so on the part of

the lawgiver results in direct harm to the constitution (Pol.
1337al4).

Aristotle sets forth a general program of studies

for children within a system of public education.

The youth

are to be trained in both the "illiberal" (useful) and liberal
arts (Pol. 1337b5ff.).

Education by habit must come before

education by reason according to Aristotle,

inasmuch as the

emotions manifest themselves before reason (Pol. 1338b4-5) . 11
Of particular interest in this regard is the importance that
Aristotle accords to the place of music in the educational
curriculum of the young.

Music is the

ideal vehicle for

educating the youth because learning is a
(Pol.
most

painful process

1339a29) and music is, on the other hand, one of the
pleasant

Aristotle,

of

rhythms

things
and

(Pol.

1339b21). 12

melodies

contain

According

to

representations

(homoiomata, Pol. 1340a18, cf. also 1340a39-40} of emotions
such as anger and gentleness and character dispositions such

11

This is important with respect to the relationship of
Philoctetes to Neoptolemus. Philoctetes does not educate the
young man intellectually but morally. It is fundamentally an
education sentimentale that he receives from Philoctetes, one
in which he learns to feel pleasure and pain appropriately (EN
1104bll-14).
12

Plato also discusses the importance of music in the
education of the young in Republic III (40ld5-402a4).
Here
he states that the rhythms and harmonies of good music sink
down deep into children's souls and make them graceful
(euschemona, Republic 401d8), enabling them to discern (at the
emotional level) what is praiseworthy and what is disgraceful.
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as

courage

and

self-control

qualities (Pol. 1340a21-22).

as

well

as

all

other

moral

The point of exposing children

to these various rhythms and melodies is to habituate them to
feel

appropriate

pleasure

and

pain

with

respect

to

the

emotions and moral qualities that are represented by the music
(Pol.

1340a15-19).

Because of the nature of music and its

power, everyone is disposed to being thrown into a corresponding state of feeling when they hear that which it represents
(Pol. 1340a13-14).

Music assists in the educative process by

providing a pleasurable means of training individuals to feel
appropriate delight, love or hatred toward the various moral
qualities

(virtuous

or vicious)

that are

brought to

life

through the medium of rhythm and melody (tend' areten peri
to chairein orthos kai philein kai misein dei delon hoti
manthanein kai sunethizesthai methen houtos hos to krinein
orthos kai to chairein tois epieikesin ethesi, Pol. 1340a1518) .

Correct habituation in feeling appropriate pain and

delight

at

representations

is

close,

Aristotle

says,

to

expression of appropriate feeling with respect to actual life
situations (f.Ql. 1340a23-25).
Thus

far

we

have

shown

the

central

place

that

is

accorded to the role of the moral exemplar in the thought of
Sophocles and Aristotle.

Sophocles' moral position regarding

the role model is made clear in his depiction of the educational relationship of Neoptolemus and Philoctetes.

Philoc-

tetes acts as a moral guide to the young man in that he
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instructs Neoptolemus to feel pleasure and pain appropriately
with regard to the things that he has done.
dramatic

presentation of

this

It is through the

relationship

that

Sophocles

demonstrates the decisive part that a good role model can
play.

Through the medium of philosophical discourse Aris-

totle, for his part, discusses the role of the educator and
lawmaker with respect to the proper training of the youth and
education of the citizen body.

He is fundamentally dealing

with the same issues that the tragedian is but on a larger
scale, that is, within the context of the polis.

Thus, his

discourse is directed to the development of a kind of program
of education for the youth and the setting up of a system of
laws that will inculcate virtue in the citizen body.

For both

tragedian and philosopher, then, the crucial role of excellent
moral guidance is made apparent.
2.5 Sophocles And The Issue Of The Standard Of Value
Having thus considered the role of the exemplar as a
moral guide I would like to turn now to a consideration of the
notion of the exemplar in the broader sense of the term, that
is, to the issue of the ultimate standard or measure by which
moral

judgments

are

made.

Both

Sophocles

and

Aristotle

address themselves to this issue and it is my contention that
they have a certain affinity with each other in their appeal
to God as the standard or paradigm by which things in the
human realm are to be judged and understood.

Aristotle shows

us this in his assertion that the ultimate target with regard
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to which all other things are chosen and done by the phronimos
is the contemplation of God.

Sophocles, in similar fashion,

points to the inadequacy of human answers to the question of
justice and shows how this problem can only be brought to a
resolution through the intervention of the divine.

Let us

turn then to an examination of the play with respect to the
question of a standard of value.
The question concerning a standard of value is from the
very beginning of the play asked within a theological framework

in the drama.

It

is

placed side by side with the

question of the justice or injustice of the gods and their
presence or absence in human affairs.

When Neoptolemus tells

Philoctetes that the noble Ajax has died in the battle at
Troy, the son of Poeas responds:
My god, the poor wretch!
But of course not the son of
Tydeus, nor that bastard son palmed off on Laertes from
Sisyphus.
They don't die, even though men like these
shouldn't be alive. (Phil. 416-418.)
Philoctetes then asks about Nestor and Neoptolemus informs him
that Nestor is fairing badly since his son Antilochus died
(Phil. 425).

Philoctetes again responds:

Ah me!
You have mentioned two whose names I would least
want to hear among the dead. What are we to make of this
(ti deta dei skopein) when these men die and someone like
Odysseus remains among the living when it should be he who
is said to be a corpse instead of these? (Phil. 426-430.)
Finally, when Philoctetes inquires about a certain worthless
and

underhanded

Neoptolemus

man

responds

named
that

Philoctetes bursts out:

Thersites
he

heard

(Phil.
he

was

439-440)
still

and

alive,
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He would be!
No one wicked ever perishes, but the gods
wrap them up well and protect them.
They delight in
turning away from Hades those whose deeds are smooth and
utterly wicked (ta men panourga kai palintribe) and they
always send out of life those who do what is just and
good. How can we make sense of these things? How can we
speak in praise when wanting to praise the divine governance of things I discover that the gods are wicked?
(Phil. 446-452.)
In the above passages we can see that Philoctetes is struggling to understand why the gods permit the good and just to
die and the wicked to flourish.

He is bewildered by the

seeming absence of a divine standard in the world.

He knows

that human affairs should be governed by and conform to such
a standard but he is tormented by the apparent absence or
indifference of the gods. 13
a

standard

will

not

Sophocles drops a hint that such

long

remain

absent

in

Neoptolemus'

seemingly casual response to Philoctetes:
O offspring of your father from Oeta, for the future I
shall be on my guard against Troy and the sons of Atreus
by looking at them from afar. (Phil. 453-455.)
Neoptolemus'

lines

here

are

unremarkable

except

reference to Oeta in his address of Philoctetes.

for

the

Oeta is the

mountain of Malis where the apotheosis of Heracles took place

13

see Webster, Philoctetes p. 99: "skopein means almost
'what should one's philosophy be?': what sort of a looking
should one do, when the observed facts rule out looking
towards the gods" (es theous blepein, Ant. 922); Kamerbeek,
The Philoctetes p.80: "ti_.
. dei skopein: the nearest
parallel seems to me O.T. 964 pheu pheu ti det' an o gunai
skopoito tis/ten Puthomantin hestian, and the implied meaning
is: 'Where can we look for a divine power upholding the moral
order of the world.'"
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after Philoctetes consented to light his funeral pyre. 14

The

connection of Philoctetes, Heracles and Oeta is made explicit
throughout the course of the play (Phil. 479, 490, 664, 729,
1430).
of

The placing of this particular address in the mouth

Neoptolemus

directly

after

Philoctetes

has

expressed

despair concerning the gods' presence in human affairs is no
accident.

Sophocles is signaling to us the connection of

Philoctetes to Heracles and thereby foreshadowing the latter's
theophany as the response to the former's anguish.

It is only

with the in-breaking of the divine in the play that Philoctetes' questions are answered in any definitive way.

Neop-

tolemus attempts to provide a response to the injustices that
Philoctetes has suffered by consenting to take him home (Phil.
1402).

But while he is doing what is just we sense that his

compassionate

response

will

not

be

adequate

Philoctetes' wound will remain unhealed.
of Heracles

Sophocles provides

son

as

With the theophany

Philoctetes with a

understanding his former sufferings,
healed

inasmuch

way of

the opportunity to be

(fillil. 1424), a sound and lasting friendship with the

of Achilles

(Phil.

1434-1437),

and

the

honorably reinstated into the human community.

chance to

be

Through the

theophany of Heracles Sophocles brings to a kind of resolution
the

many

injustices

which

Philoctetes

has

suffered

by

providing the ultimate standard (albeit at times inscrutable)

14

see Kamerbeek, The Philoctetes p. 83.
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by which human affairs are to be judged and understood. 15

2.6 Aristotle And The Question Of The Standard Of Value
Aristotle like Sophocles is concerned with providing a
standard for both resolving conflicting interpretations with
respect to the best course of action and the best life to be
lived as a whole.

At the level of action he provides the

person of practical wisdom (phronimos or spoudaios, for all
intents

and purposes

interchangeable terms)

embodied ideal of practical intelligence.
definition of moral virtue

as

a

kind of

In the general

in Book II of his

Nicomachean

Ethics, Aristotle states that the mean is defined by reason
(horismene logo, EN 1107al) or however the person of practical
wisdom would determine it (hos an ho phronimos horiseien, EN
1107al-2).

The determination of the best or most appropriate

thing to be done in a given situation is the part of the
phronirnos whose peculiar excellence is logos in the service
of practical truth, that is, truth with respect to what should
be done (EN 1139a27-32).
applies

logos

to

exemplary fashion.

the

The person of practical wisdom thus
ever-varying

situations

of

life

in

In Book III of the Nicomachean Ethics

Aristotle states explicitly that the practically wise person
acts as a kind of standard and measure with respect to what
is to be done and pursued (hosper kanon kai metron auton on,
EN 1113a34-35).
15

The prudent person can play a normative role

See Blundell, Helping Friends, p. 224; MacIntyre, Whose
Justice?, pp. 62-63; Reinhardt, Sophocles, pp. 190-192.
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in this

way

because the

excellence

of his

character

and

practical judgment is such that the factual and normative
coincide

in

his

ethical

choices.

In

his

judgments

the

apparent good is co-terminous with the actual good inasmuch
as

his

judgments

1113a22-24,

are made according to

1103b31-33).

It is

right

reason

(EN

in his discussion of the

ultimate measure of the right reason (orthos logos) which a
prudent person employs that Aristotle appeals to the divine.
At the beginning of Nicomachean Ethics VI Aristotle
attempts to clarify the nature of the right reason which a
prudent person employs in determining the mean.

He states

that there is a target (skopos) which a rational person fixes
his gaze upon as he strains and relaxes his efforts to attain
it

( esti tis skopos pros on apoblepon ho ton logon echon

epiteinei kai aniesin, EN 1138b22-23).

Aristotle defined this

target in Nicomachean Ethics I as happiness (eudaimonia).
states

here

knowledge

that

of

the

happiness

is

nature

happiness will

archers who have a target
proper mark.

of

our highest

(skopon,

He

good and

that

equip

like

EN 1094a24)

us

to hit the

He goes on, however, in Book VI to assert that

there is also a standard (horos, EN 1138b23) that determines
the means which lie between excess and deficiency to which the
prudent person looks.

Aristotle confesses here the inadequacy

of

prudent

stating

that

the

person acts

as

right

reason

demands and asserts that he must define what right reason is
and what standard determines it (EN 1138b33-34).

Aristotle
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never follows through with his promise in Nicomachean Ethics
VI, 16 but it seems to me that he does provide us with just this
standard in the closing pages of his Eudemian Ethics.
In Eudemian Ethics VIII Aristotle states that a doctor
has a certain standard (tis horos, EE 1229a22) by reference
to which

he

judges health

or

its

lack

in

bodies

relation to which things which are done to the

and

in

body are

wholesome but if done less or more than the standard dictates
are unwholesome.

In this way the standard is normative of the
The prudent person (spoudaios,

medical art as a whole.
1249a25)

according

to

Aristotle,

must

also

have

such

EE
a

standard with respect to action and choice (EE 1249a25-b2).
The

standard which Aristotle proposes

is

the

service and

contemplation of God (ton theon therapeuein kai theorein, EE
1249b21).

This is the end and reference to which practical

wisdom issues her commands (hou heneka he phronesis epitattei,
EE 1249b14-15).

Whatever mode of choosing and of acquiring

things good by nature (bodily goods, wealth, friends or other
goods) will best promote the contemplation of God is the best
standard

(haute ariste kai

houtos ho horos

kallistos,

EE

1249b19) and conversely, whatever standard hinders us from the
contemplation and service of God is the worst {EE 1249b20-21).
This,

Aristotle asserts,

is his

statement of what

is the

standard of nobility (horos tes kalokagathias, EE 1249b24) and
16

see Whitney J. Oates, Aristotle and the Problem of Value
(Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1963), pp.
276-283.
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the aim of things that are intrinsically good (ho skopos ton
haplos agathon, EE 1249b25) . 17

In this way then, Aristotle

appeals to a standard that transcends strictly human horizons
in much the same way that Sophocles does through the theophany
of Heracles.

Thus both tragedian and philosopher are in

agreement that it is only by appeal to the divine that we
shall find an adequate standard with respect to the question
of value in the human realm.
2.7 The Significance Of The Appeal To The Divine As A Standard
As we have already seen, both poet and tragedian appeal
to the divine as the final court of appeal, as it were, by
which things in the human realm are to be judged and understood.

The poet and the philosopher have, however, somewhat

different emphases in their reference to the divine.

Both

surely furnish us with the sense of the inadequacy of a purely
human

perspective

but the

poet

seems

to

stress

more

the

fragmentary and partial nature of human understanding and
human action and the need for some kind of divine illumination.

The philosopher, on the other hand, appears to stress

the divine spark that exists within a human being and the
necessity of not frustrating that spark by defining the human
dimension
spheres.

solely

in

terms

of

the

ethical

and

political

Be that as it may, the central point that must be

understood, here, is that the ancients did not see the human

17

See Stewart, Notes, 2: pp. 8-9.
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good

or

any

required a

system

of

goods

as

self-authenticating

reference to the divine as

goodness of all human goods.

but

the source of the

Let us explore this in more

detail.
After Neoptolemus has returned Philoctetes' bow to him
the young man attempts to convince the ragged hero to come to
Troy, be healed by the sons of Asclepius and win immmortal
glory on the battlefield as was prophesied by Helenos (Phil.
1330ff.).

Philoctetes vacillates painfully and almost yields

to the young man's pleas

(Phil.

1350-1352).

In the end,

however, Neoptolemus is incapable of persuading Philoctetes
to

come

because

suspicion.

of

the

latter's

intractable

will

and

In his anguish, Neoptolemus cries out that it may

be best for him to stop trying to persuade Philoctetes to
yield and

for

the hero simply to

live without the final

salvation which was coming to him (Phil. 1396).

Neoptolemus

heroically offers to take Philoctetes home as he promised and
they are about to embark when Heracles appears.
Sophocles has quite clearly set this final scene up in
such a way that all of the proposed solutions are inadequate
and require some other form of resolution.
for

the

poet,

is

theophany.

That resolution,

Human understanding of

the

prophecy of Helenos has proved to be inadequate and partial
throughout the play (Phil. 603-619, 839-840, 989-990, 13371342) and we know that if the son of Achilles takes Philoctetes back home that the hero will never be freed from the
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wound that has tormented him for so long.

In this way, the

poet stresses the fragmentary nature of human understanding
and the tragic

inadequacy of human action to bring about

justice in the world.

A god is needed to help clarify the

situation for mortals who are all too often blind and to guide
them to more fruitful action.
What is unique here is that Sophocles has a god break
into the human scene as an act of friendship to a mortal.
Heracles tells Philoctetes that he has left the seat of heaven
and come for his sake (ten send' heko charin ouranias/hedras
prolipon, Phil. 1413-1414).
the god's

Philoctetes responds readily to

(and his former friend's)

longed for utterance"

words,

calling them "a

(oh pthegma potheinon,

Phil.

1445).

Sophocles is, in fact, at pains to show that the friendship
that is established between Philoctetes and Neoptolemus runs
parallel to the friendship that exists between Philoctetes and
Heracles

(Phil.

654-670).

In

this

way

then,

Sophocles

presents to us something of a divine condescension that is
motivated by friendship or love. 18

The poet shows us that a

god can intervene in human affairs in order to augment the
necessarily partial understanding and inadequate actions of
human beings.
telling us,

This intervention can also,

he seems to be

be motivated by a god's concern for the tragic

plight of an individual.

18

see MacIntyre,
Justice?, pp. 62-63.

After

Virtue,

pp.

157-158;

Whose
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Aristotle's appeal to God is as the telos or horizon for
humanity's own striving to model itself after the divine. 19
In the passage from EE VIII.3 cited above, the standard by
which practical wisdom issues her commands is said to be that
which promotes the service and contemplation of God.

In EN

x.7 we are essentially given the explanation as to why this
standard is the most appropriate one.

It is because,

as

Aristotle states, there is something divine in us:
But such a sort of life would be better than human for he
will live in this way [i.e., the contemplative life] not
inasmuch as he is human but inasmuch as there is something
divine in him (ou gar he anthropos estin houto biosetai
all; he theion ti en auto huparchei, EN 1177b27-28).
Aristotle does, of course, furnish other significant reasons
as to why the contemplative life is that which is the best for
human beings to live, namely, that contemplation is the most
unimpeded form of activity,

is the most pleasant, the most

self-sufficient and is the only one that is really done for
its own sake (EN 1177a20ff.).

But these are all ultimately

dependent upon what human beings are and that there is, as
Ar is tot le states,

something di vine in us that must not be

circumscribed within the boundaries of the ethical and the
political.

There is, to be sure, a certain tension between

the life of praxis and theoria as Aristotle delineates these
in the Nicomachean Ethics.

Throughout much of the Nicomachean

Ethics Aristotle appears to lay stress upon the good that can
19

See MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 158; Jonathan Lear,
Aristotle: The Desire to Understand (Cambridge, New York,
Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 299-302.
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be

achieved

by

human

beings

through

action.

Thus,

the

architectonic science of the good is said to be politics (EN
1094a27-28, 1095a17-18) and the virtues are to be developed
with a

view to the flourishing of the individual and the

community (EN 1103bff.).

These goals appear to be at variance

with a life devoted, ultimately, to contemplative activity.
There is,

furthermore,

a certain tension between the

self-sufficiency which Aristotle assigns to the contemplative
and his recognition that friendship is "most necessary for
life"

(anankaiotaton eis ton bion, EN 1155a4-5).

Aristotle

seems to recognize this himself when he admits that even the
wise person who is supremely self-sufficient (autarkestatos,
EN 1177bl) will, perhaps, be able to engage in contemplative
activity even better with colleagues (beltion d' isos sunergous echon, EN 1177a34).

Again, there is a certain tension

here, in Aristotle's thought, between the solitary and selfsufficient contemplative as exemplifying the ideal sort of
life and the life of the individual who is deeply involved in
and committed to others' lives in friendship, seeking, as they
must, to become as good as possible and to contribute mutually
to the making of the best political community.
Aristotle appears to be caught in this tension because
he, much like Plato, holds that a human being is metaxu, i.e.,
the sort of midling creature who,

metaphysically speaking,
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dwells "between" animals and gods. 20

In short, we as human

beings are the middle term, the bridge between the realm of
the world and the realm of God.

In this way, according to our

composite nature, the highest and best life to lead would be
that of the exercise of the virtues.
much of his time telling us
Ethics.

And Aristotle spends

just this

in the Nicomachean

But this is not the whole story inasmuch as there is

something
exercised.

divine

within

us

that

must

be

recognized

and

According to Aristotle, the practice of philosophy

is the quintessential way in which this divine element may be
actualized.
Philosophy, Aristotle maintains, begins with a sense of
wonder where an individual realizes that he does not know a
thing and desires to know it.

But, according to Aristotle,

our desire is not simply to know various facts about phenomena
but to know why the phenomena are as they are.

In this way,

our wonder and desire to know may only be satisfied through
understanding the cause or explanation which underlies the
disparate phenomena.

This is precisely what we are doing,

Aristotle

when

maintains,

we

are

engaged

in

philosophic

contemplation, that is, we are moving toward an understanding
of the principles and causes of the world. 21

For Aristotle,

the exercise of this kind of understanding is itself divine
because it is in this way that we participate,

in a human

20

see Symposium 203e-204a, 207d-208b.

21

see Lear, The Desire to Understand, pp. 6-8.
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mode,
and

in the way that God (who is himself a first principle

primary cause)

through

this

understands

understanding

of

the world.
primary

Hence,

causes

and

it

is

first

principles that we actually transcend our own nature.
It is because Aristotle holds that there is this divine
element within us which is realized through contemplation that
he assigns the happiness which stems from the active life of
virtue to a secondary status. 22

This is not to demean the

ethical and political spheres, it is only to place them within
their proper perspective given the reality of the divine that
is within us and which is our ultimate horizon.

In this way

then Aristotle appeals to a divine standard inasmuch as he
holds

that

there

is

something di vine

within us

and

that

through the emulation of God we should, ourselves, strive to
become immortal as far as that is possible (all' eph' hoson
endechetai athanatizein kai panta poiein pros to zen kata to
kratiston ton en hauto, EN 1177b33-34).
This appeal to the divine as the ultimate standard was
widely shared in ancient culture.

By making reference to a

standard that transcends the strictly human dimension the
ancients implicitly affirmed that the human good or, indeed,
any

system of goods

could not be understood to

be

self-

authenticating or self-validating inasmuch as those very goods
had their origin in the transcendent.

rt is in this way,

furthermore, that we see that the ancients attempted to secure
22

see Lear, The Desire to Understand, pp. 309-318.
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the objectivity of values.

For, by including this reference

to the divine, they implicitly recognized that human beings
do not create their own nature but rather attempt to bring
into realization a nature and purpose that is already given
and is peculiarly ours to attain.
transcendent

with

recognized today.

respect

to

the

The importance of the
moral

sphere

is

rarely

It is, at least in part, due to this loss

of the role of the transcendent that we have forgotten or lost
the sense that there is even such a thing as human nature.
This ignoring of the transcendent dimension and its consequences has given rise to many rootless conceptions of moral
agency in which the human person is seen as creating his or
her nature from the very foundations on up.

It seems to me

that such positions are doomed to failure because they are
bound to be either arbitrary or totalitarian in character.
Again, this would be so inasmuch as values would be seen as
created and not as discovered or detected in the very nature
of things.
2.8 Conclusion
In conclusion, then, I have shown in this chapter that
Sophocles and Aristotle share certain fundamental affinities
with respect to the

importance of the role model and the

broader question of the standard of value in general.

It has

been my contention that their recognition of the importance
of a

role model

stems from their shared anthropology and

general conception of the elements that are a part of the
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education of the moral agent.

We have noted that, in attempt-

ing to understand what constitutes the moral life, Sophocles
and Aristotle do not begin with abstractions but with human
nature and the insufficiency of human nature to attain virtue.
It

is

from

this

empirical

judgment

that

they

infer

the

necessity of the teacher if the individual is to be educated
in those virtues that are requisite to his flourishing.

Once

again we see the ancients' preference for the concrete over
the abstract in their appeal to a living person to serve as
a guide in the formation of the moral person.

This, as we

have stated, is in marked contrast to moral philosophy in the
Kantian tradition where the moral worth of examples is called
into question inasmuch as they cannot furnish us with the kind
of absoluteness required by the moral law.

Thirdly, I have

suggested that the ancient model is preferable to more modern
developments in the way that the ancient model appreciates
both the developmental
moral agent.

and social character of becoming a

This is the case because while modern moral

philosophies concentrate upon the formulation of a correct
principle as the foundation of proper moral education the
ancients

see

that moral

education takes

place,

first

and

foremost, through a particular relationship that the student
has with his teacher.

It is this relationship and its affect

upon the student that they saw as crucial and not the accuracy
of

a

certain

principle.

In

keeping

with

this

ancient

anthropology which takes into account the entire person I have
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relied upon Sophocles to furnish us with the particulars of
human experience through an emotionally charged medium which
elicits our own emotional response.

Aristotle, on the other

hand, I have employed in order to provide us with the logos
of the phenomena that Sophocles presents.

In this way, we

take into account both the diversity and unity of experience
as well as the emotional and rational aspects of the human
person.
Sophocles shows both the devastating consequences that
a poor role model can have and the crucial importance that the
moral exemplar plays.
former

through

The tragedian artfully depicts the

the vehicle of Neoptolemus'

Philoctetes as well as his
Sophocles

furnishes

final

lying tale to

commentary on the tale.

us we have argued,

through the gross

fiction that Neoptolemus tells, with a kind of mirror of his
own

condition

Sophocles,

of

having

furthermore,

betrayed

makes

his

Neoptolemus'

moral

identity.

perilous

state

shockingly clear in the brief commentary that the young man
gives at the close of his story where, in Odyssean fashion,
he lays responsibility for his own actions at someone else's
feet

(Phil.

6,

388) .

In this way Sophocles shows to us

graphically that the son of Achilles' moral degradation has
begun inasmuch as he is presented as imitating his wicked
teacher.

Sophocles demonstrates the crucial importance of the

moral exemplar in the way that Philoctetes awakens in the
young man the sense of shame that he said he would dismiss in
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order to carry out Odysseus' scheme and in the way that he
assists the son of Achilles in honoring his original moral
principles (Phil. 86-95).

Again, it is the distinct advantage

of poetry to present and analyze universal themes (the moral
perils to which youth and inexperience are vulnerable,
necessity

of

good

moral

guidance)

through

the

particulars.

Because of its immediacy and emotional evocativeness, poetry
is peculiarly suited to the moral education of the person.
Sophocles does this for us in his dramatic poetry through the
medium of characters in a play.
Aristotle's educator and lawmaker, I have argued, play
much the same role with respect to the individual and the
citizen body respectively as the tragedian depicts is the case
between
depict

Philoctetes
for

us

a

and

Neoptolemus.

Aristotle

particular relationship

medium of philosophical discourse,

but,

does

not

through the

argues for the central

importance of the educator and the lawmaker with a view to the
moral

formation of

individuals and the citizen body as a

whole.
I have, in addition, proposed that Sophocles and Aristotle

are

in

fundamental

agreement

with

respect

to

the

ultimate standard by which things in the human realm are to
be

judged.

It

is my contention that

both Sophocles and

Aristotle share a basic sense that the standard of value can
only be truly found by appeal to the divine.

In this way we

see that for both the tragedian and the philosopher we do not
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create our own good but actualize a purpose that is a part of
our nature.

The human good

is not self-creative and so,

according to this ancient conception, the divine is the ground
of the very possibility of the objectivity of values.
We have spoken in this chapter about the importance of
the role model and moral education.
to a

consideration of what

detail.

is

to

It is time now to turn
be educated

in greater

Both Sophocles and Aristotle focus to a significant

degree upon the emotions and the important role that they play
with respect to moral education.

Let us turn then to an

analysis of the role of the emotions in moral education in
Sophocles and Aristotle.

Chapter 3
THE EMOTIONS AND MORAL EDUCATION IN SOPHOCLES AND
ARISTOTLE
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter I

shall explore the role which the

emotions play with respect to moral education and virtue in
Sophocles and Aristotle.

Once again we can see that this

ancient anthropology demonstrates a

concern for the whole

This is the case because the poet and philosopher

person.

both take the affective side of the human psyche seriously and
appreciate that it has a crucial role to play in the process
of

the

formation

ancients,

of

the

moral

agent.

According

to

the

it is the emotions which need to be educated and

brought in line with the dictates of reason.

But the emotions

are not simply irrational drives or impulses that are uneducable.

Far from it.

They are, themselves, cognitive in

character and are capable of orienting us (however unthematically) toward the good that is to be done.

They can do this

by communicating to the individual who is experiencing them
certain things about his character or by revealing the general
contours of a moral situation.

In this way,

Sophocles and

Aristotle see emotional response as a mode of initiation into
the moral life.

As corollary to this more robust anthropol102
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0 gy,

I

shall employ the poet to explore the emotional and

concrete aspects of the moral life while the philosopher will
be employed to furnish us with an explanatory logos of the
phenomena that are presented by the dramatist.

In this way

we shall best be able to take into account both the diversity
and unity of experience as well as the emotional and rational
aspects of the human person.
Modern

moral

philosophy

stemming

from

Kant

either

ignores the role of the emotions in the moral formation of the
individual or is positively hostile to them.

It shows no

appreciation of the ways in which the emotions can assist us
in living the good life and can, in fact, actually start us
on our way to realizing that life.

In this way it is operat-

ing from only a partial and impoverished conception of the
moral person.
Sophocles will furnish us with a powerful example of the
way in which the emotions can disclose aspects of character
when he shows that Neoptolemus realizes what he is incapable
of doing at the risk of violating his moral identity through
the feelings of shame and compassion that Philoctetes arouses
in him.

By pointing to the cognitive nature of the emotions

(most especially evident in his Rhetoric) Aristotle shows that
the emotions are indeed capable of signifying something about
the nature of the given situation and to assist the individual
in the making of an appropriate or virtuous response.

The

philosopher's discourse on the nature of the emotions will
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help us to understand that it is the cognitive component of
the emotion which is the efficient cause of its arousal.

He

will show that the emotions cannot be ignored in the construction of the best polity and that they can furnish valuable
information as

to what

a

friendship

should be

like.

He

attempts in other words, to give an explanation of the nature
of the emotions rather than to portray a particular feeling,
what it may be like to feel it and what that feeling may do
to a person.

This sort of analysis is the chief strength of

philosophy and what it can do.
In order to know what it may be like to feel an emotion
or to see an emotion in action we must go to the poets.
poetry's

chief

virtue

is

the

concrete

and

For

dramatic

presentation of truth, in this case, a truth about the nature
of human emotion and its function in the moral life.

Thus,

Sophocles points to the same truth as Aristotle, namely, that
the emotions are capable of orienting us to the good, but he
does this by presenting us with a character who feels various
emotions which change him and lead him to take a different
course of action.

Both philosopher and tragedian point to the

cognitive ground of the emotions.

We see this in Aristotle's

focus upon the cognitive element of the emotion as that which
gives rise to emotional response and Sophocles' depiction of
Neoptolemus coming to know himself through his feelings for
Philoctetes and the gross injustice he has committed.
philosopher

and

tragedian maintain

that

the

emotions

Both
can
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furnish a. certain orientation to the good.

Aristotle shows

this in the way that the emotions furnish an intimation of
what real friendship should be like and Sophocles in the way
that

Neoptolemus'

feelings

transformation in him.

help

bring

about

a

moral

But each, working in his respective

media, has his own particular way of discussing the same issue
and shedding different facets on the same truth.
3.2 The Character of Neoptolemus
In order to demonstrate that Sophocles presents the view
of the emotions for which I am arguing I shall examine the
rather extensive scene which occurs about mid-way in the drama
just after Philoctetes suffers his attack of pain and the
aftermath of that attack when Neoptolemus confesses to his
role in Odysseus' scheme and Odysseus himself returns to the
stage.

I shall make references to other parts of the play but

the central focus will be this important scene and how it
shows that Neoptolemus' emotions provide the initial impetus
to his later moral transformation at the end of the play.
Philoctetes has just suffered an attack of excruciating
pain and will soon fall into unconsciousness.

He calls upon

death and wonders why it never comes to him (Phil. 797-798).
He then calls upon the son of Achilles and requests that he
burn him alive in the volcanic fire of Lemnos.
Neoptolemus

that

it

was

just

for

this

deed

He informs
(setting

the

funeral pyre ablaze for the suffering Heracles) that he won
the bow with which the young man has recently been entrusted
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(Phil. 801-803).

The generous parallel that Philoctetes has

drawn coupled with the request for suicide has clearly touched
Neoptolemus and he is thrown into a reflective silence in
which he is oblivious to Philoctetes' further questions:
Burn me, my noble one, in this so called Lemnian fire!
For I too deemed it worthy to do this to the child of Zeus
for these very weapons which you now hold safe for me.
What do you say child? Why are you silent? Where are you
child?
(Phil. 801-805.)
Sophocles

shows

us

that

Neoptolemus

has

been

touched

by

Philoctetes' words when he answers by expressing the pain that
has been in his heart for a long time over the sufferings of
his friend (algo palai de tapi soi stenon kaka, Phil. 806) . 1
Sophocles is showing us here that the young man's emotions are
telling him that he is treating Philoctetes unjustly and that
by doing so he is acting in violation of his very character.
His

grief

change.

for

Philoctetes

thus

directs

him

toward

moral

We see this even more powerfully depicted as the

scene progresses.
Philoctetes falls into a deep sleep from utter exhaustion and Neoptolemus,
tetes'

side.

true to his word,

remains by Philoc-

When the son of Poeas awakens he can hardly

believe his eyes and cries out:
I would never have hoped child that you would so compassionately (eleinos) take my sufferings upon yourself and
1

The verbal parallel here is noteworthy.
Neoptolemus
first employs the verb alqo when he expresses his distress
about participating in Odysseus' unjust scheme in the opening
of the play (Phil. 86). Sophocles' use of the verb here again
furnishes us with the first clear sign that the son of
Achilles is terribly shaken by his circumstances.
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remain and help me {Phil. 869-871.)
He continually refers to Neoptolemus' nobility of nature and
how he could never have expected such treatment from Odysseus
and

the Atreidae

(Phil.

872-875).

When Neoptolemus

bids

Philoctetes to lean against him and stand up Philoctetes tells
the young man to take heart because his usual manner will set
him upright once again (tharsei to toi sunethes orthosei m'
ethos, Phil. 894).

Sophocles shows himself to be master of

both drama and irony in Neoptolemus' response to this seemingly innocent remark of Philoctetes.

Neoptolemus cries out as

if he were stabbed, "Papait What should I do from here" (Phil.
895)?

But why should Philoctetes' simple statement set off

such an emotional response from Neoptolemus?

It seems that

it is because Sophocles, through Neoptolemus' reaction, means
us to catch the double entendre of the phrase.

The word that

has been translated above as "manner" (ethos) has a variety
of other meanings, among them being "custom, way or character."

Neoptolemus has thus far in the play betrayed his usual

character and it is to this that Sophocles is pointing in the
cry which Neoptolemus utters. 2

Neoptolemus is

led to ask

himself, "Will my customary character, my true moral identity
set me upright?"

This is the ultimate question for Neop-

tolemus and is the question with which Sophocles is centrally

2

see
Benardete,
"Chre
and
"Consequences and Character," 46.

Dei,"

297;

Nussbaum,
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concerned in the play. 3
Philoctetes is confused and concerned with Neoptolemus'
outburst and wonders what is wrong.

Neoptolemus expresses his

distressed confusion when he says that he does not know which
way to turn his powerless words (ouk oid' hopoi chre taporon
trepein epos,

Phil.

897)

and that he is right now in the

middle of an emotional perplexity which will not let him go
(all' enthad' ede toude tou pathous kuro, Phil. 899).

This

is, indeed, the emotional counterpart to Socratic aporia. 4
When Philoctetes asks Neoptolemus whether it is disgust with

3

What we have in this brief but significant scene is an
Aristotelian recognition (anagnorisis).
Aristotle tells us
that anagnorisis, as the name itself signifies, is a change
from ignorance to knowledge and so involves a change to either
friendship or enmity among those who are defined in their
relation to good fortune or bad fortune (ex agnoias eis gnosin
metabole, e eis philian e eis echthran, ton pros eutuchian e
dustuchian horismenon, Poet. 1452a30-2).
In this scene,
Neoptolemus goes from ignorance to some kind of knowledge.
He is painfully brought face to face again with himself and
the incongruity that exists between the ethos that constitutes
his moral identity and the ways that he has betrayed that
identity.
Furthermore, Neoptolemus' recognition brings him
to the point of decision as to whether to treat Philoctetes
as a friend or an enemy. Odysseus had taught Neoptolemus to
treat Philoctetes with suspicion and to pose deceitfully as
his friend. Now Neoptolemus is utterly perplexed (Phil. 896,
899) at which way to turn and how to precede in a scheme that
he can no longer morally countenance.
Neoptolemus' anagnorisis is accompanied by compassionate grief and terror
(Poet. 1452a38-bl) because we deeply sympathize with Neoptolernus' situation and we are anxious that he make the right
decision. We know that Neoptolemus has not heeded his moral
feelings and intuitions in the past (Phil. 120) and so we both
identify with him in his perplexity as well as hope that he
will follow the dictates of his conscience and that ethos
which will "set him straight."
4

See Blundell, "The Phusis of Neoptolemus," 140.
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his illness that is making him say these things (Phil. 900901)

the young man responds that everything is disgusting

(hapanta duschereia, Phil. 902) when one acts out of character
and does what is unseemly (Phil. 902-903).
emotional distress 5 which

It is shame and

leads Neoptolemus to confess to

Philoctetes the plot to take him to Troy (Phil. 906, 909, 912913).

The young man's confession, however, only leads him to

deeper feelings of shame at what he has done and greater
compassion for the broken man whom he has so wronged.

When

Philoctetes expresses his outrage at Neoptolemus, the son of
Achilles can only look away in silence and disgrace
935, 951).

(Phil.

He is paralyzed at this point, unable to act upon

the promptings of his feelings but equally unable to ignore
them.

He has not yet come to a decision and chosen what to

do. 6

Neoptolemus

confesses

that

a

terrible

feeling

of

compassion (oiktos deinos, Phil. 965; cf. also 1074) has come
over him for Philoctetes and he knows (and we know) that he
will be forced to come to terms with these feelings and be
reconciled to them or renounce them once and for all.
Of course we know that when Neoptolemus re-enters the
stage with Odysseus near the close of the play he has not
renounced

his

feelings

but has

become reconciled to them

5

Neoptolemus employs the verb signifying strong grief and
sorrow, aniaomai twice in a space of seven lines in this
scene.
6we shall take up the issue of choice in
development of Neoptolemus in the next chapter.

the moral
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(Phil. 1222-1263).
ings.

He has followed the lead of their prompt-

He proclaims to Odysseus that his former involvement

in the plot was a disgrace (Phil. 1234, 1248) thus confirming
the suspicions that his emotions had aroused.

In our examina-

tion of this scene of the play I have shown that Neoptolemus'
experiences of the emotions of shame, compassion and various
feelings of extreme distress guide him and provide the impetus
for a reconsideration of the justice of what he is doing.

His

emotions both check him and furnish a certain orientation to
the good which, in the end, he chooses not to ignore.

In this

way then I have demonstrated that Sophocles is presenting us,
through the central character of Neoptolemus, with the thesis
that the emotions can guide and provide a certain direction
to reasonable choice by orienting the individual to the good
that is to be done.

The emotions thus provide a kind of

initiation into the moral life by disclosing to an individual
who he is and what he is willing to do or unwilling to do at
the risk of doing violence to his moral identity.
3.3 Two Examples Of Emotion From The Politics And Nicomachean
Ethics
Aristotle like Sophocles showed sensitivity to the way
in which the emotions can set the individual in the direction
of leading the moral life.

Through the medium of philosophi-

cal analysis he attempts to demonstrate the connection that
exists between emotion and cognition.

In the first example

from Politics II Aristotle shows the way in which the emotions
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delineate the proper bounds of what can reasonably be done by
practical intelligence, thus indicating that the emotions can
perform

a

reason.

certain

limiting

function

on

the

proposals

of

In the second example from Nicomachean Ethics VIII

Aristotle shows that the emotions can also furnish positive
direction to practical reason by defining in general outline
the qualities or characteristics that should be part of the
make-up of a particular virtue,
.
d s h'1p. 7
fr1en

Aristotle

in this case, the virtue of

Interestingly enough, in both of these examples

points

to

the

primacy

of

familial

feeling

in

directing action or placing limits upon what reason asserts
should be done.

Let us turn to a

consideration of these

texts.
In

this

first

passage,

Aristotle criticizes Plato's

proposed communism of wives and children in Republic V:
But speaking generally such a law is bound to bring about
the opposite state of things to that which rightly enacted
laws ought properly to cause and on account of which
Socrates thinks it necessary to make these regulations
about the children and women.
For we think that
friendship is the greatest of good things for the poleis
(for it is in this way that there are the least political
factions and revolutions) and the unity of the state,
which Socrates praises most highly is that which he both
thinks and asserts is the work of friendship, just as we
know that Aristophanes in the discourses on love says that
when lovers desire each other because of their extreme
affection they want to be fused together and both become
one from being two. In such a union, however, both would
necessarily be destroyed or at least one, and in the polis
friendship would inevitably become watery because of such
7

see Harold Baillie, "Learning the Emotions," The New
Scholasticism, 62 (1988) 221-227. Both of these examples and
the issues surrounding them are deeply indebted to Professor
Baillie's analysis.
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an association, and [in such a polis] son could least of
all say "my father" and father "my son." For just as a
little sugar mixed in with a lot of water makes an
imperceptible mixture, so it also must come about that the
mutual relationship based on these names must become
imperceptible, since in such a sort of republic their will
be the least possible necessity for people to care for one
another as father for sons or son for father or brothers
for each other. For there are two things that most of all
cause human beings to care for and to love each other,
something being one's own and something being beloved to
one, neither of which are able to exist with those who are
so governed. (Politics 1262b3-25.) 8
In this passage we can see that Aristotle holds the view that
the nature of the emotional bonds which exist between kin
provides

an

extremely

important

clue

as

to

the

kind

political arrangement that can or cannot be established.

of
The

emotional ties which bind father to son, mother to daughter,
wife to husband can be ignored only at the cost of the very
stability of the polis.

Aristotle, like Plato, believes that

unity is crucial to the existence of the state but the kind
of unity which Plato seeks to establish in the Republic with
his communism of wives and children does violence to the basic
feelings that those who are akin have for each other.

For

Aristotle, these feelings have a prior claim to that of the
unity of the state and cannot be simply forced into a political blue-print that does not take them into account.
kallipolis
philian
toiauten,

8

so waters down

anankaion

hudare

friendship
ginesthai

Plato's

(en de te polei ten

dia

ten

koinonian

ten

Politics 1262b15-6} and the significant emotional

Aristotle, The Politics, translated by H. Rackham (New
York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1932), pp. 80-83, adapted.
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ties

that

bind

people

together

that

he

actually

ends

by

establishing the very conditions which make revolution and
political faction possible.
what Plato sought to avoid,

This is,
for he,

of course,

precisely

like Aristotle,

thinks

that friendship is one of the greatest goods for the city and
that it ensures that revolutions will be few (philian te gar
oiometha megiston einai ton agathon tais polesin houto gar an
hekista stasiazoien, Politics 1262b8-10).
In this way, then, we can see how Aristotle viewed the
emotions as being capable of providing initial direction and
guidance to reason.

In this particular example, the emotions

function more negatively, that is, they delineate the proper
limits

within

which

rationality

may

operate.

As

Harold

Baillie puts it:
In Aristotle's eyes, Plato's political reasoning, which
ought to be the highest expression of practical intelligence, has suggested 'something fine but impractical.'
That is, the program may appear rational, but is actually
irrational. No matter how artful its principles may be,
the position cannot succeed because it does not recognize
human emotional reality and it chooses means outside the
limits imposed on action by the emotions. ("Learning the
Emotions," The New Scholasticism, 62 (1988) 225.]
Aristotle saw the emotions as capable of providing initial
positive direction too.

We have just seen above that Aris-

totle asserts that there are two things that most of all
(malista) make people care for each other (kedesthai) and love
each other (philein), namely, something being one's own (to
idion)

and something being beloved

(to agapeton) .

In the

passage from the Nicomachean Ethics we see that these two

114

things come directly into play.

The example is rather unusual

inasmuch as Aristotle takes his cue from women (not a sphere
where he usually bothers to take much direction!) specifically, the relationship that mothers have with their children:
But it [friendship] seems to consist more in loving than
in being loved. A sign (semeion) of this is the way that
mothers rejoice in loving their children.
For some
mothers give their own children away to be nursed 9 and,
though knowing and loving them, do not seek to be loved
in return ( antiphileisthai d' ou zetousin) if both of
these things are not possible but it is enough for them
if they can only see them flourishing (eu prattontas);
they retain their own love for them even though their
children can give back (aponemosi) nothing of those things
that are befittin~ to a mother because of their ignorance.
(EN 1159a27-34.) 1
The relationship between mother and child is a natural one
while that of two friends is ethical inasmuch as it involves
choice

(prohairesis;

cf.

EN 1163a20f.) .

Still,

Aristotle

employs the natural and emotional bond between mother and
child as

the

"pre-ethical"

relationship of friendship.

paradigm of

the

later ethical

This natural, emotional bond of

mother and child furnishes initial, positive direction to the
character of the excellent friendship.

If friendship is to

be excellent, Aristotle is saying, then it should consist more
in a willingness to give love than to receive it and this
willingness is well-illustrated in the natural relation of
mother to child where the mother, though she cannot hope to
9

The verb here, trephesthai is somewhat ambiguous.
It
can either mean to nurse or rear a child. In either case the
mother is giving her child away to someone else to take care
of for a time.
10

ostwald, p. 229, adapted.
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be 1oved in return by her infant, is content only to know that
her child is flourishing.
From an examination of both of the above passages, then,
we see that Aristotle appreciates well the way in which the
emotions are capable of guiding practical

intelligence by

providing it with a general orientation to the good which is
to be done.

Aristotle shows that the emotions orient us to

the good by an analysis of specific emotions and the cause or
causes for which they arise in his Rhetoric.

Let us turn to

a consideration of three different emotions which Aristotle
discusses

in

order

to

see

once

again

how

the

Stagirite

connects emotional response to the good.
3.4 An Analysis of Emotions In Aristotle's Rhetoric
In this section we shall consider the emotions of shame,
compassion and righteous indignation.
best

to

examine

inasmuch

as

they most

These three are the
clearly

show that

Aristotle holds that emotional response is oriented to the
good.

Before

we

analyze

these

emotions

in

their

par-

ticularity, however, it will be helpful to set forth briefly
the immediate background to Aristotle's discussion as well as
his general understanding of the nature of rhetoric in its
relationship to emotional response.
The immediate background to Aristotle's discussion of
rhetoric and the emotions is Plato's analysis of the nature
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of rhetoric in the Gorgias. 11

In this dialogue (often affirmed

to be part of Plato's "middle period") Socrates asserts that
rhetoric is a species of flattery (kolakeias men oun egoge
eipon morion,

Gorgias 466al).

According to Socrates there

are four genuine arts that are concerned with the real care
(therapeia) of the body and the soul.
and gymnastic,

These four are medicine

justice and legislation respectively.

The

"art" of flattery divides herself into four and insinuating
herself into each of these parts, pretends to be that genuine
art

into

whose

guise

she

has

slipped

(tetracha

heauten

dianeimasa hupodusa hupo hekaston ton morion prospoieitai
einai touto hoper hupedu,

Gorgias 464c8-10}.

Thus cookery

assumes the form of medicine, cosmetics the form of gymnastic,
sophistry

the

form

of

legislation

and

justice.

Each genuine art then has

rhetoric

that

of

its sham counterpart

(antistrophon, Gorgias 465d8) which stems from the "art" of
flattery

(he

kolakeutike,

Gorgias

464c7).

In

this

way,

Socrates argues that rhetoric is a mere semblance of a part
of politics (politikes moriou eidolon, Gorgias 463d2) which
shamefully aims not at what
pleasant

(hoti tou hedeos

is best but only at what is

stochazetai aneu tou beltistou,

Gorgias 465al-2, see also 462c8, 462el}.

It is the counter-

part of cookery in the soul, acting in the soul as the latter
does on the body (antistrophon opsopoiias en psuche hos ekeino

11

The Gorgias is subtitled "Or On Rhetoric; Refutative"
(e peri retorikes anatreptikos.)
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~

somati, Gorgias 465d8-9).

genuine art (techne)

He denies that rhetoric is a

since he holds that it cannot give an

account of the real nature of the things it applies and thus
is incapable of telling the cause of any of them
465alf.).

(Gorgias

He refuses, he says, to call anything a genuine art

(techne) which is fundamentally irrational (ego de technen ou
kalo ho an e alogon pragma, Gorgias 465a6-7).
In the Gorgias then, Plato's verdict is that rhetoric
(at least as practiced by his contemporaries) is nothing but
a shameful and ignorant knack (empeiria, Gorgias 465a4) which,
by pandering to the emotions and desires of an audience, aims
only at their gratification and not at what is truly best for
them (Gorgias 502e3ff.).

There is, clearly, for Plato such

a thing as a legitimate form of rhetoric (Gorgias 503d6ff.).
But it appears to be only practiced by Socrates and not by any
of his contemporaries (Gorgias 521d6ff.).

Socrates practices

this true form of rhetoric because he does not aim at emotional or psychological gratification but only at the inculcation
of justice and the removal of injustice from the souls of his
fellow citizens. 12
12

In the peroration of his defence Socrates makes known
to the jury his deliberate refusal to appeal to crying and
bringing up his children to the bench in order that he might
move the jury to take pity on him (hina hoti malista
eleetheie, Apology of Socrates 34c4). For a defendant to seek
acquittal by appealing to such "pitiful dramatics" (ta eleina
tauta dramata, Apology of Socrates 35b7) is, according to
Socrates, an invitation to the jury to perjure themselves
(oukoun chre oute hemas ethizein humas epiorkein outh' humas
ethizesthai, Apology of Socrates 35c5-6). In similar fashion,
Socrates rejects appeal to the emotions in his parting words
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In

response

to

Plato's

rather

damning

critique

of

rhetoric (or at least the rhetorical practice of his generation) Aristotle attempts something of a rehabilitation.

For

my purposes, I shall focus upon the way in which Aristotle
attempts this rehabilitation through a brief consideration of
his understanding of the nature of rhetoric and especially the
view of the emotions which emerges
discussion.

It

will

be

my

in the course of his

contention

that

the

role

of

cognition in emotional response which Aristotle delineates in
Rhetoric II skirts the Platonic critique of rhetoric in the
Gorgias as an art which appeals only to the irrational part
of the human soul.

It is precisely because Aristotle presup-

poses this cognitive element present in the emotions that he
holds that rhetorical appeal to the emotions is not an appeal
to the irrational but is founded upon an apprehension of the
good latent in emotional response which can legitimately be
elicited by the rhetorician in his audience.

Again,

such

elicitation of emotions in an audience is not base pandering
to the irrational inasmuch as Aristotle maintains that the
emotions are connected, however unthematically, with the real.
Aristotle makes known his opposition to the Platonic
to the jury when he asserts that he was convicted because of
his refusal to say what would have been most sweet for them
to hear (tou me ethelein legein pros humas toiauta hoi' an
humin men hedista en akouein, Apology of Socrates 38d7-8),
namely, his lamentations and wailing (threnountos te mou kai
oduromenou, Apology of Socrates 38d9). These are things, he
says, which they have become accustomed to hear from others
but he refuses to do it and considers it unworthy of him
(anaxia emou, Apology of Socrates 38el).
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critique in the very opening lines of his Rhetoric where he
echoes the Gorgias: rhetoric is no longer the "counterpart of
cookery"

( antistrophos

"counterpart

of

opsopoiias,

dialectic"

Gorgias

(antistrophos

465d8}
te

but the

dialektike,

Rhetoric 1354al-2}; again, it is no longer a "part of flattery"

(kolakeias

morion,

Gorgias

466al}

but

a

"part

of

dialectic" (morion ti tes dialektikes, Rhetoric 1356a31} which
legitimately "slips into the guise of politics"
hupo

to

schema

1356a27ff.). 13

to

with

politikes

he

retorike,

Rhetoric

Rhetoric is a part or counterpart to dialectic

inasmuch as rhetoric,
deals

tes

(hupoduetai

the

like dialectic, is not a science that

nature

of

any definite

subject

but,

like

dialectic, is a certain faculty for furnishing arguments (peri
oudenos gar horismenou oudetera auton estin episteme pos echei
alla dunameis tines tou porisai logous, Rhetoric 1356a37-39).
It furnishes
making

arguments to those who are

judgments

(Rhetoric 139lblff.}

in a

position of

with respect to the

contingent and changing world of human existence. 14

In short,

it is the art of rational discourse which seeks to find in the
subject matter that which is possibly persuasive

(Rhetoric

1355b10-ll} to those who are in the process of deliberating
with

a

view

to

choosing

a

particular

course

of

13

action.

Note Aristotle's echo of Plato's use of the verb hupoduo
in Gorgias 464c-d. See William M.A. Grimaldi, S.J., Studies
in the Philosophy of Aristotle's Rhetoric (Wiesbaden, Franz
Steiner Verlag GMBH, 1972), pp. 85-86.
14

see Grimaldie, Aristotle's Rhetoric, pp. 26-27.
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Grimaldie puts the matter well:
[Aristotle] points out that the ultimate goal of rhetorical activity is the effort to perceive in a given
subject, or problem, or situation, those elements in it
which may effect persuasion.
The act of rhetoric seeks
out those factors which lead a reasonable mind to accept
the subject or the problem (A 2, 55b8-14).
This is the
proper activity of rhetoric and there it rests.
It does
not effect persuasion as some of the technographers said
(A 1, 55b 10; Topics 101b5-10), nor does it, as far as
Aristotle is concerned, make persuasion in the same sense
as the artist makes his object.
Rather it creates an
attitude in another's mind, a sense of the reasonableness
of the position proposed, whereby the auditor may make his
own decision. The art, or technique, of rhetoric is the
ability to perceive and to present evidence which makes
decision, and a definite decision, possible; but to stop
with the presentation. 15
There are two things to note thus far: rhetoric is an affair
of the "logistic" part of the soul inasmuch as it deals with
the contingent (EN 1139alff.) and more importantly, for our
purposes, it addresses itself to those who are in the process
of deliberating with
(prohairesis),

a

view to making a

according to Aristotle,

choice.

Choice

is an activity that

involves both reason and appetition inasmuch as he defines it
as

a

kind

of

1113all, cf.

deliberative

desire

also 1139a32-33)

(bouleutike

orexis,

EN

and thus choice is connected

with that part of the soul which has to do with our desires
and emotions.
According to Aristotle, rhetoric can legitimately appeal
to the desiderative and emotional part of the human psyche
inasmuch as this is the part of the soul which brings about
personal conviction and motivates action for,
15

Grimaldie, Aristotle's Rhetoric, p. 27.

as he states,
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reason by itself will not cause action (EN 1139a35-36).

But

this appeal to the desires and emotions is not a mere stirring
up of irrational drives and forces which impel individuals to
act but is based, as Aristotle sees it, upon some apprehension
or cognition that is latent in emotional response. 16

It is my

contention

emotions

that

this

cognitive

component

of

the

orients the individual to the good that is to be done either
for himself or for another.

Let us take a closer look at how

Aristotle views the emotions and how emotional response can
orient an individual to the good.
Aristotle gives his general definition of the emotions
at the beginning of Rhetoric II:
The emotions (ta pathe) are all those feelings on account
of which men undergoing a change (di' hosa metaballontes),
differ (diapherousi) with respect to their judgments (pros
tas kriseis), and are accompanied by pain and pleasure,
for example, anger, compassion, fear and as many other
sorts of feelngs that there are as well as the opposite
of these feelings. (Rhetoric 1378a24-27.) 17
The central thing to note in this definition is the cognitive
character of emotional response.

The emotions are not simply

"blind promptings and urgings that merely happen to us,

1118

16

see Grimaldie, commentary, p. 16: "I agree with Fortenbaugh' s thesis on the role of cognition in these Aristotelian
emotions (see his Aristotle on Emotion) , and view it as
further confirmation that in the Rhetoric A. is analyzing the
fundamental nature of human discourse as reasoned and reasonable."
17

Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric, trans. by John Henry
Freese (New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1926) p. 173, adapted.
18

see Nancy Sherman, The Fabric of Character
Clarendon Press, 1989), p. 169.

(Oxford,
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inasmuch as their arousal

implies some kind of cognitive

perception however indistinct or unthematic.

The cognitive

component of the emotion is the efficient cause of its arousal
and serves also to delineate the essential features of each
,
19
emo t ion.
For example, in Rhetoric II.2 Aristotle defines
anger as a desire (orexis) for revenge that is accompanied by
pain

(meta

lupes)

on

account of

an

apparent

slight

phainomenen oligorian) 20 to oneself or one's own,
slight is unjustified (me prosekontos).

(dia

when the

We see the cognitive

19

on the cognitive element of emotion as efficient cause
see Fortenbaugh, Aristotle on Emotion, pp. 10-16.
See also
Grimaldie, Commentary p. 17: "When A. decides to study the
emotions
he is engaged with the causality of the
emotions and with varying aspects of the four causes.
For
example, when he considers the disposition of the person
experiencing the emotion, he is in effect taking up an
analysis which can be specific only by way of determining in
this particular instance material, efficient, formal, and
final causes of the emotion.
In the same way, when he
considers the persons toward whom one experiences the emotion,
he is coping with efficient and final causes, and again with
efficient causes when he takes up the things which bring about
the emotion."
20

Note how Aristotle employs the preposition dia here to
express causal efficacy in exactly the same way that he does
in his general definition of the emotions given above.
Fortenbaugh, Aristotle on Emotion, pp. 10-12, points out that
Aristotle is in part, engaged in an attempt to clarify Plato's
efforts at showing the relationship between emotion and
cognition in his Philebus. Fortenbaugh argues that Plato did
indeed see their connection but employed the unhappy preposition "with" (meta, Philebus 37e10) to express their relationship instead of "on account of" or "because" (dia) .
The
former signifies according to Fortenbaugh, a misleading sense
of "simple concurrence" in which emotion just happens to
accompany a thought or opinion rather than the causal efficacy
that is signified by the preposition dia.
It is because
Aristotle was the first to employ the preposition dia to
express the causal nexus of emotion and cognition that
Fortenbaugh credits the Stagirite with making an advance on
Plato's discussion.
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element present in Aristotle's conception of the emotion of
anger in that it is the perception of being slighted which is
the efficient cause of the emotion arising.

The same struc-

ture will be implicitly operative in Aristotle's analysis of
the emotions of shame, compassion and righteous indignation.
Aristotle defines shame as a kind of pain or disturbance
(lupe

tis

misdeeds,

e

tarache,

Rhetoric

1383bl5)

with

whether of past, present or future,

bring dishonor.

respect

to

that tend to

He states that if this definition of shame

is correct then we ought to feel shame as a result of misdeeds
which bring disgrace to ourselves or to those for whom we care
(ei de estin aischune he horistheisa ananke aischunesthai epi
tois toioutois ton kakon hosa aischra dokei
hon phrontizei, Rhetoric 1383b18-21).

einai e auto e

Aristotle then proceeds

to catalogue an impressive variety of situations and scenarios
in which a feeling of shame would predictably arise.

He is

aware that these situations will not induce shame in everyone.
The shameless will not experience this disturbance or pain
because,

as

Aristotle

contends,

it

is

characteristic

of

shamelessness to feel contempt or indifference when engaging
in such disgraceful deeds (oligoria tis kai apatheia peri ta
auta tauta, Rhetoric 1383bl7-18).

But for Aristotle, when one

is involved in actions such as the following,

one ought to

feel the uneasiness and pain of shame.
Thus, deserting one's fellows in battle by taking flight
warrants feeling shame because it stems from cowardice (apo
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g_eilias

gar,

deposit,

for

Rhetoric
this

is

1383b23};
due

to

similarly

injustice

withholding

{ap'

adikias

a

gar,

Rhetoric 1383b24); making a profit out of the poor or the
dead, because this shows base love of gain and stinginess (apo
aischrokerdeias gar kai aneleutherias, Rhetoric 1383b29-30};
overpraising a person's good qualities and playing down his
bad,

for this is a sign of flattery

(kolakeias gar semeia,

Rhetoric 1383b39-40}; speaking at great length about oneself,
making all kinds of professions and taking the credit for what
another has done, because this is a sign of boastful charlatanery (alazoneias gar, Rhetoric 1384a7).

Feelings of shame

or disgrace arise as a result of involvement in such scenarios
as are depicted above.

Shame alerts the

individual to a

certain range of vices having to do with misdeeds which bring
dishonor and thus assists in directing the individual away
from such vices and toward the good.

In this way then the

emotion of shame orients the individual toward the good by
preventing him from engaging in vicious acts with psychological impunity.

Shame, which would normally accompany such

acts, goads the individual to change her ways and act more in
accord with what is good or just.
The

emotions

of

compassion

(eleos)

and

righteous

indignation (nemesis) are also oriented to the good though in
a different fashion from the emotion of shame.

While shame

serves to check someone who is engaged in something disgraceful these two emotions alert the individual to the good by
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sympathetic identification with another's sufferings.

Thus

Aristotle defines compassion as a kind of pain that is excited
by the sight of evil,
someone who does

deadly or painful, which happens to

not deserve

Rhetoric 1385b16).

it

(tou anaxiou tunchanein,

Significant for our purposes is the fact

that this feeling is aroused as a sympathetic response to
someone suffering undeservedly.

In this way compassion has

a moral dimension inasmuch as implicit in feeling this emotion
is a judgment that an individual is suffering something which
they ought not to be suffering.

The efficient cause of the

feeling is precisely this perception of another's undeserved
suffering.

Righteous

indignation,

in similar fashion,

is

being pained at the undeserved good fortune of another (to gar
lupeisthai epi tais anaxiais kakopragiais, Rhetoric 1386bll12).
and

According to Aristotle, both of these emotions (eleos
nemesis)

show

good

character

(ampho

ta

pathe

ethous

chrestou, Rhetoric 1386b14-15) and they imply each other, for
if we sympathize with and feel compassion for those who suffer
undeservedly then we ought to be indignant with those who
prosper undeservedly (dei gar epi men tois anaxios prattousi
kakos sunachthesthai kai eleein tois de eu nemesan, Rhetoric
1386b15-16).
From this brief analysis of Aristotle's discussion of
the

emotions

supports

the

depicted

in

in

the

view

Rhetoric

of

Sophocles'

the

we

can

emotions

drama,

see

that

namely,

that
is

that

Aristotle

dramatically
the

emotions
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provide a kind of initial direction or orientation to the
good.

We have seen this to be the case in the emotions that

we have considered.

Our analysis of shame shows that this

emotion directs the individual to the good by the experience
of

pain

and

uneasiness

disgraceful.

which

accompanies

acts

which

are

The emotional distress of shame points to an

individual's engagement in actions and situations which ought
to be avoided.

Compassion and righteous

indignation also

furnish this initial orientation to the good by sensitizing
a person to the injustice of undeserved suffering as well as
the injustice of undeserved prosperity.

In this way then we

can see how for Aristotle the emotions are capable of orienting the individual to the general moral contours of a given
state of affairs.
emotions

And thus, the rhetorician's appeal to the

in his audience are not,

as Plato claims

in the

Gorgias, a pandering to the irrational, but an appeal to the
whole person

(as

reasoning,

desiring and

feeling)

as

she

deliberates with a view to choosing a course of action.
3 .. s Conclusion
In this chapter we have seen that the fuller anthropology of Aristotle and Sophocles has allowed them to recognize
and appreciate the role of the emotions in the process of
becoming a moral person.

According to this ancient anthropol-

ogy the emotions are not simply non-rational impulses but are,
as

we

have

seen,

cognitive

in

character

furnishing a certain impetus to the good.

and

capable

of

They are educable
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and able to be informed in such a way that they come to be
aligned with the rational element.

In this way we have seen

that the emotions are capable of initiating us into leading
the good

life by the orientation to the good which they

provide.

We have also seen how this anthropology and concern

for the whole person is in marked contrast with more modern
developments,

especially
For

tradition.

Kant,

those

the

stemming

emotions

play

from
no

the

Kantian

role

in

the

constitution of the moral agent or the moral worth of actions.
If the emotions play any role at all, it is only as needing
to be suppressed or overcome by reason in the interests of
carrying out one's duty.

In this way it has been my claim

that Kant's conception of the moral agent is truncated and
impoverished when seen in the light of this more robust and
fuller anthropology which takes into account a wider range of
the elements of the human psyche.
As

a

corollary

to

this

fuller

anthropology

I

maintained that, given the nature of the poet's art,

have
it is

appropriate to appeal to the poet to present human experience
in its more immediate and emotionally evocative aspects.
again,

given the nature of the philosopher's art,

I

And
have

contended that it is appropriate to appeal to the philosopher
to furnish us with a logos that explains and provides some
kind of unity to the multiplicity of the phenomena that are
presented by the dramatist.
The tragedian presents his position on the emotions
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dramatically through the character of Neoptolemus and the way

in which his feelings communicate to him the violence that he
is doing to his moral identity as well as the injustice of his
involvement in Odysseus'

scheme to steal Philoctetes'

bow.

The medium of dramatic poetry is ideally suited to the task
of an exploration of the emotions inasmuch as it is capable
of presenting a character on stage who experiences various
emotions

and

who

is

in

a

situation which

invites

us

to

identify with him and feel with him the emotions that are
portrayed.

There is thus an immediacy that poetry furnishes

that cannot be found in philosophical discourse.
most

especially

employs

the

full

force

of

his

Sophocles
medium

in

setting forth his thesis on the orientation of the emotions
to

the

good

in

the

brilliant

"recognition"

scene

Neoptolemus echoes Philoctetes' former screams of pain.

where
This

scene is particularly noteworthy in the way that Sophocles so
skillfully links Neoptolemus'

feelings of anguish with the

question of whether he will discover his true moral identity
through the surprising and memorable vehicle of parallelism
and double entendre.
For Aristotle, too, the emotions have a cognitive aspect
and manifest a certain orientation to the good.

Philosophical

discourse is not as suitable a medium for a discussion of the
emotions as poetry inasmuch as philosophical analysis does not
help us to feel the emotions as poetry does.

And it may very

well be the case that the only way to understand the nature

129

of the emotions and emotional response is to feel them the way
that a tragedian can make us feel them through the depiction
of characters in a concrete situation.

Still, Aristotle's

analysis has its place in our discussion of the nature of the
emotions.

What

we

philosopher's

work

cognition

emotion,

and

come

is

to

the

understand

precise

namely,

that

through

relationship
the

the

between

perception

of

a

certain state of affairs (e.g. outrage) is the efficient cause
of emotional response (anger).

This insight helps us to see

how the emotions can be oriented to the good in such feelings
as

compassion where a

sympathetic response

is aroused on

account of the perception of another's undeserved suffering
or in a feeling like righteous indignation where pain is felt
on account of another's undeserved good fortune.
helps

us

to understand the

Aristotle

relationship of cognition and

emotion by showing their connection in terms of efficient
causality.

Aristotle also helpfully points to the way in

which the emotions can put a limit on the proposals of reason
(as in his critique of Plato's kallipolis) and to the way in
which they can furnish positive direction to the character of
what a virtue such as friendship should be.

In this way too

he shows that the emotions provide this impetus or orientation
to the good for which I have argued in this chapter.

In the

next chapter we shall focus on choice and responsibility and
examine the relationship of the emotions to reason in order
to

understand

how

their

integration

is

related

to

moral
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maturity and the making of a choice.

Chapter 4
CHOICE AND RESPONSIBILITY IN SOPHOCLES AND ARISTOTLE:
THE CHARACTER OF ODYSSEUS
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter I

shall attempt to assess the moral

character of Odysseus through a consideration of the nature
of choice and responsibility with respect to both tragedian
and philosopher.

The performing of these two tasks is related

inasmuch as I shall employ the notions of choice and responsibility as

a

way of revealing the kind of character that

Odysseus is.

Our analysis of the character of Odysseus is in

keeping with this ancient anthropology that we are attempting
to

flesh

out.

For

the

ancients

ethics

was

a

practical

discipline in which the central question was the concrete
issue of character and not, as in more recent developments,
the

construction

formulation

of

character was

an

of

a

correct

abstract,

seen as

of

decision-procedure

exceptionless

central

law.

importance,

the

or

the

Because
use

of

examples, both good and corrupt, were also seen as playing a
central role in the moral formation of the individual. 1

1

This

Even Plato, who chastises the poets in the Republic for
presenting corrupt characters to Athenian audiences, filled
his dialogues with such fools as Euthyphro and Meno and such
cynics as Polus, Callicles and Thrasymachus.
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ancient appreciation of the vital importance that role models
or examples play in the education of the moral agent has been
devalued or forgotten.

It seems that this phenomenon

in

modern moral philosophy could very well be traced back to the
influence of Kant inasmuch as he argued that examples were
useless as far as contributing to our understanding of the
moral law.

Again this was the case for Kant because he held

that nothing empirical could contribute to the principle of
morality.
Our consideration of the character of Odysseus will
serve as a kind of anti-type.

We shall be witnessing vice in

action and shall note a number of things about it.

First, we

shall see how vice produces enmity and disrupts the establishment

of

Second,

genuine
Odysseus'

friendship

among

the

characters.

corrupting influence upon the young and

impressionable Neoptolemus will be noted.
teaches

three

Neoptolemus

in the ways

of

The son of Laertes

injustice and deceit.

Thirdly, we shall see that Odysseus practices moral subterfuge
through the various ways in which he attempts to eschew moral
responsibility and choice.

Fourthly,

it will be seen that

Odysseus' vicious character distorts his ability to deliberate
soundly inasmuch as we shall see that his ends are ignoble and
the means

that he

sees

as

appropriate to those

ends

are

skewed.
As a corollary to the ancient anthropology of Sophocles
and Aristotle we shall appeal to the tragedian to present the
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emotionally
perience.

evocative

and

immediate

aspects

of

human

ex-

The philosopher will be appealed to in order to

provide us with an explanatory discourse on the phenomena that
are presented by the poet.

In this way we shall best be able

to take into account the diversity and unity of experience as
well as the emotional and rational elements of the human
person.
It will be most instructive,
Odysseus,

to

turn

in our analysis of the

character

of

to an

examination

of his

language.

Sophocles furnishes us with an important clue with

respect to Odysseus' eschewing of personal responsibility and
agency in his consistent use of the Greek dei as well as other
adjectives signifying "external" or "objective" necessity.
Noteworthy in this regard also is the interesting fact that
Philoctetes,

Neoptolemus

and the man sent

in disguise

by

Odysseus as a tradesman all refer to the son of Laertes as
force

(bia) .

Since

Odysseus

continuously

eschews

moral

responsibility through his appeal to what must be done in the
circumstances it is particularly appropriate that Sophocles
has his characters refer to him as a kind of abstract force.
Continuing with our analysis of Odysseus'

language I

shall show that the son of Laertes employs moral language in
an utterly inconsistent way.
whatever

he

needs

Philoctetes' bow.

to

say

Time and again we see him saying
in

the

interests

of

obtaining

Although it can be quite easily shown that

Odysseus manipulates moral language in the play,

Sophocles
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makes Odysseus' final goals more ambiguous and more difficult
to discern.

Is he acting as an instrument of the state in

whose service he is willing so "selflessly" to compromise
himself as to practice deceit and manipulate moral language
or is he an utterly selfish individual who sees the entire
situation as an opportunity for personal aggrandizement?

I

shall contend that Sophocles is showing us that Odysseus'
overriding

goals

are

selfish

and

that

he

is

not

placing

himself in the service of the general good but is attempting
to exploit a situation for his own prestige and honor.

In

this way I shall argue that the son of Laertes is precisely
what Philoctetes says he is in the play, a panourgos, namely
someone who is willing to do anything in order to achieve his
own objectives.

Odysseus is capable of acting justly and

piously if this happens to be in line with his own goals but
has absolutely no scruples in abandoning the norms of conventional morality if such norms will conflict with his own aims
and purposes. 1

The incongruity of Odysseus' moral language

seems to go hand in hand with his shunning of personal responsibility and lack of moral identity inasmuch as his own course
of action (and indeed identity) is determined by what is most
expedient and will bring success (Phil. 81, 109 and especially
1049-1052).
Aristotle

has

his

Nicomachean Ethics VI.12.
1

own

discussion

of

panourgia

in

He juxtaposes his discussion of

see Blundell, "Odysseus in Philoctetes," 320-321.
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this kind of criminal activity with the nature of cleverness
and practical wisdom.

Aristotle's analysis of panourgia will

make a philosophical contribution to our understanding the
kind of character which Sophocles is presenting in his play.
Through the philosopher's analysis,
Odysseus

has

the

meritorious

it will be shown that

capacity

of

being

able

to

determine the most efficient means to a given end but that he
abuses and twists his ability by directing his efforts toward
consistently wicked ends.

Let us turn then to a consideration

of the character of Odysseus.
4.2 Necessity And The Denial Of Responsibility
In an excellent article which examines the distinction
between two common Greek verbs which express necessity Seth
Benardete writes:
In Sophocles' Philoctetes we can observe how an entire
play can find its action reflected in the opposition of
chre and dei. 2
Benardete's statement will be born out in this chapter as I
employ the distinction between chre and dei as an interpretive
tool

for

demonstrating

that

Odysseus'

language

shows

his

hostility to assuming responsibility for his actions.
Dei essentially expresses the necessity that external
circumstances impose upon an agent without there being any
contribution on the part of the agent to the matter at hand.
Chre,

on the other hand,

2

signifies a

Benardete, "Chre and Dei," 297.

certain

internal or
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subjective necessity that an agent experiences for choosing
a particular course of action over another. 3

In short, chre

implies choice and the participation of the agent in determining his or her own destiny while dei implies simple submission
to circumstances that do not admit of the possibility of
choice.

It will

be my underlying

claim throughout

this

analysis that Sophocles has the character of Odysseus consistently employ this term expressing external necessity (dei,
as well as other impersonal verbs of necessity) as a way of
signifying his denial of personal responsibility through the
strategy of describing situations in such a way that he simply
must submit to them.
From the very outset of the play we witness Odysseus'
attempts

at

removing

himself

actions which he performs.

from

responsibility

for

the

In his opening lines he informs

Neoptolemus that he deserted the son of Poeas on the shores
of Lemnos because he was ordered to do this by his superiors
(tachtheis tod' erdein ton anassonton hupo, Phil. 6).
may in turn,

This

be a subtle hint to the son of Achilles to do

likewise because he soon orders the young man to carry out his
commands in a similar, unquestioning fashion.

The consistency

with which Odysseus employs g.!ti. and other verbs expressing
external necessity throughout the play is striking.

He makes

it clear to Neoptolemus that he is present as a subordinate
officer (hos huperetes parei, Phil. 53) and that he must (dei,
3

Ibid., 285.
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£jlil. 50) be noble in the purpose for which he has come even
if he hears that he must carry out things that are strange and
new (kainon, Phil. 52).

This latter, of course, is a euphem-

ism for the deceitful plan to steal Philoctetes' bow which he
will soon reveal.
54)

Philoctetes, he asserts, must (dei, Phil.

be taken by deception and duped with underhanded words

(Phil. 55); the bow must be stolen (tad' ouchi klepteon, Phil.
57); the scheme must be carried out (dei sophisthenai, Phil.
77)

in order that Neoptolemus can become the thief of the

invincible weapon.

Odysseus teaches the son of Achilles how

to be irresponsible also.
power"

(Phil.

invites

6)

Just as he deferred to "those in

as responsible for what he did so he also

Neoptolemus to give himself over to him

(dos moi

seauton, Phil. 84) for shamelessness for the brief part of a
day. 4
According

to

the

prophecy

of

Helenos

( at

least

as

reported by the tradesman) Philoctetes was to be persuaded to
leave his island abode and to come to Troy willingly (ei me
tonde peisantes logo/agointo nesou tesd'
nun, Phil. 612-613).
4

eph'

hes naiei ta

But Odysseus completely disregards the

It is interesting to note that the tradesman ( one of
Odysseus' men) whom the son of Laertes sends to further the
progress of the scheme speaks in Odyssean fashion when he
asserts that he will hold Neoptolemus responsible for the
outcome of disclosing information that he thinks should remain
hidden (se thesomai tend' aition, Phil. 590). Neoptolemus too
(as we shall see) removes himself from responsibility for his
actions (Phil. 385-388) in exactly the same way that Odysseus
does at the very opening of the play (Phil. 6).
Sophocles
appears to be showing us that everyone connected with Odysseus
is engaged in eschewing personal responsibility.
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prophecy

and

employs

this

same

necessity with Philoctetes. 5

impersonal

language

of

When Neoptolemus has gained

possession of Philoctetes' bow and Philoctetes is imploring
the son of Laertes to return it to him Odysseus bursts onto
the scene and declares that the young man will never return
it even if he wants to.

He proceeds to taunt Philoctetes

saying that he must go with his men or they will escort him
by force (alla kai se dei/steichein ham' autois e bia stelousi
~, Phil. 982-983); Philoctetes must take Troy and raze it to
the ground by force (Troian s' helein dei kai kataskapsai bia,
Phil. 998); the son of Poeas must take this path (he d' hodos
poreutea, Phil. 993); he must submit and obey (peisteon tade,
Phil.

994) .

Again,

clarity Odysseus'

Sophocles

shows

us

with

devastating

flight from responsibility by the way in

which the latter describes every situation where there is a
critical choice to be made as one in which the individual must
simply
5

submit

to

an

anonymous

force

that

is

larger

than

When Odysseus finally lays hold of Philoctetes' bow
later in the play we see that he gives up on Philoctetes (and
the prophecy) all together.
He will assert that the bow is
all that is needed (Phil. 1047ff). This is what he, in fact,
hints at with Neoptolemus when he first describes the scheme
to him at the beginning of the play. When the son of Achilles
asks what profit it is to him that Philoctetes goes to Troy,
Odysseus answers that the bow alone will capture the city
(hairei ta toxa tauta ten Troian mona, Phil. 113). It seems
somehow appropriate that Odysseus focuses, in the end, on the
prized object rather than the man since he constantly employs
impersonal verbs which appeal only to the necessity that a
certain state of affairs be brought into being and not that
an individual meaningfully participate (for example, through
cooperation, negotiation or persuasion) in the bringing about
of such a state of affairs.
See Nussbaum, "Consequences and
Character," 32.
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himself.

Swift and unthinking subordination

appropriate response when the

is the only

reality of choice has

been

denied.
Sophocles further confirms Odysseus as an individual in
flight from moral responsibility by having three different
characters refer to him as force (bia) during the course of
the play.

Philoctetes refers to Odysseus as force (bia) when

he angrily recounts to Neoptolemus how he has suffered at the
hands of the Atreidae and Odysseus for the past ten years
(Phil. 314).

Neoptolemus, confirming Philoctetes' account,

again calls Odysseus bia (Phil. 321).
by

Odysseus

in

the

guise

of

a

Finally, the spy sent

tradesman

also

refers

to

Odysseus as bia when he tells Neoptolemus that he and his men
are coming to take Philoctetes back to Troy (Phil. 592).

We

have already seen the way in which Odysseus refers to impersonal necessity and other forms of expediency in order to
justify his actions.

Sophocles, in a sense, indicates to us

what the ultimate moral implications of Odysseus'

position

would be by having other characters in his play refer to the
son of Laertes as an abstract force.

Again, these references

to Odysseus as force are in keeping with his own response to
and description of moral situations,

namely,

that personal

commitments and choices do not exist because submission to
forces which dictate what one must do is the only reality.
This is either what Odysseus actually believes or what he
wants others to hold in the interests of justifying the kinds
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of actions that he wants to take.

The references to him as

bia are perfectly in keeping with his character inasmuch as

~

they point to the way in which Odysseus shuns responsibility
for

his

own

actions. 6

By

means

of

these

references

to

Odysseus as an abstract force scattered throughout the play
sophocles subtly acknowledges Odysseus' own appeal to force
as a central category of his moral thought.
The passage which best sums up Odysseus'

own moral

position comes near the close of the play when Odysseus has
won possession of the bow and realizes that he will not be
able to persuade Philoctetes to sail to Troy.

Sophocles has

Odysseus reveal his identity (or lack thereof) in what he says
here:
I could say many things in response to Philoctetes here
if he would permit me, but as it is now, I am master of
one argument (logou). For where a certain kind of man is
6

odysseus'
denial
of
personal
responsibility
is
interestingly illustrated near the close of the play in his
heated exchange with Neoptolemus.
When it becomes clear to
Odysseus that Neoptolemus intends to return Philoctetes' bow,
Odysseus tells the son of Achilles that there is someone who
will prevent him from doing this (estin tis estin hos se
kolusei to dran, Phil. 1241).
When Neoptolemus asks who it
is that will prevent him, Odysseus says that the entire unruly
mob of Achaeans will, and that he is among them (xumpas
Achaion laos en de tois ego, Phil. 1243). He reiterates his
threat to Neoptolemus by referring to the army and the
vengeance that they will exact for this betrayal (Phil. 1250,
1257).
Sophocles shows us that even when Odysseus finds
himself in a situation where personal and direct action can
be taken he hides behind a collectivity.
His reference to
himself at 1243 is only as one among a threatening and
impersonal mob ready to impose its collective will.
In this
way the tragedian indicates that Odysseus is the sort of
individual who is incapable of seeing himself as a personal
agent with the power of carrying out actions which he chooses.
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required I filn that kind of man (hou gar toiouton dei
toioutos eim' ego) and where there is the judgment of just
and good men you couldn't find anyone more reverent than
I.
I am the sort whose nature it is to want to win in
everything (nikan ge mentoi pantachou chrezon ephun, Phil.
1047-1052).
In this passage we see that Odysseus describes himself as a
kind of moral cipher who, because he is without character or
moral scruples, is capable of becoming whatever kind of person
is

required

(dei)

by

Odysseus enunciates a

the

given

situation.

In

this

position of radical moral

way

irrespon-

sibility as is evidenced by his use of the objective dei that
we explored above.
4.3 Manipulation And Villainy
In addition to removing himself from responsibility for
his own actions the son of Laertes twists and manipulates
moral language to suit his own ends or to get others to do
what he wants them to do.
tain,

that

this

kind

of

Sophocles is showing us, I mainmanipulation

betrays

Odysseus'

cynicism regarding moral terms and simply being ethical at
all. 7

We see the son of Laertes freely re-define moral terms

or frankly place morally incompatible terms side by side in
a completely irresponsible and cynical fashion.

Again such

disregard, I contend, is all in the service of his own questionable ends,

7

because for Odysseus the end justifies any

see Blundell, "Odysseus in Philoctetes," 321.
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means to that end. 8
Odysseus'

A passage which is central for revealing

willingness

to

employ his

formidable

rhetorical

powers in the service of his ends comes at the beginning of
the play in one of his avuncular lectures to Neoptolemus:
Child of a noble father, even I myself, when I was once
young, used to have a quiet tongue and a hand ready for
action (glossan men argon cheira d' eichon ergatin) but
now, having gone out into the testing ground of the real
world (eis elenchon exion), 9 I see that it is the tongue,
not deeds that governs all things (panth' hegoumenen,
Phil. 96-99).
Sophocles is revealing to us here Odysseus' general mode of
operation throughout the play.

Odysseus proves time and again

(at least initially) that it is the tongue which governs all
things. 10

Sophocles

thus

portrays

for

us

the

terrible

8

I shall explore the questionableness of Odysseus' ends
later in this chapter.
9

See Jebb, Philoctetes, p. 68 for an excellent commentary
on this particular phrase.
10

In his emphasis on the transforming possibilities of the
tongue Odysseus calls to mind the well-known Sophist, Gorgias.
In the only complete work which has come down to us, the
Encomium of Helen, Gorgias notoriously defends Helen on the
ground that if she was persuaded to go with Paris she ought
to be excused because the power of the word (logos dunastes
megas estin, Encomium 8) is so great as to compel the soul to
obey and approve of whatever is done (logos gar psuchen ho
peisas hen epeisen enankase kai peithesthai tois legomenois
kai sunainesai tois poioumenois, Encomium 12) . Logoi he says,
can drug and bewitch (exepharmakeusan kai egoeteusan, Encomium
14) the souls of its hearers.
In Plato's Gorgias, Gorgias, like Odysseus, praises the
powers of the tongue (via rhetoric) to recast and manipulate
reality. Gorgias contends that if a doctor and a rhetorician
were to engage in a verbal bout with each other on the subject
of who should be appointed physician, it would be the rhetorician who would be appointed over the medical doctor because
of the former' s facility with words (Gorgias 456b7-cl). There
is, Gorgias asserts, no subject on which the rhetorician would
fail to speak more persuasively than the very professional who
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incoherence that moral language is liable to undergo when a
character like Odysseus employs his considerable rhetorical
powers for questionable purposes.

I shall focus primarily on

the beginning of the play where Odysseus employs moral terms
inconsistently in order to get Neoptolemus to play a part in
his scheme to steal Philoctetes' bow.
The
(gennaios).

first

passage

concerns

the

moral

term

noble

Odysseus tells Neoptolemus that he must be noble

(gennaion, Phil. 51) not only in physical prowess (me monon
to somati,

Phil.

51)

but in the purpose for which he has

come (eph' hois eleluthas, Phil. 50).

Neoptolemus is the son

of Achilles and is thus by birth of noble physical powers.
But Odysseus is hinting at something else here which he will
not come out and simply state.

The sort of "nobility" which

Odysseus is getting at seems to involve two things: a willingness unquestioningly to subordinate himself to the "something
new" (ti kainon, Phil. 52) which Odysseus will soon reveal to
be his scheme and to carry out that scheme successfully.

In

this way then Odysseus aligns nobility with subservience (all'
en

ti

kainon

hon

huperetes parei,

prin

fhil.

ouk

akekoas/klues

hupourgein

hos

52-53) and with successfully executing

has expert knowledge of that subject (Gorgias 456c4-6).
Gorgias is quick to point out, however, that the teacher of
rhetoric cannot be blamed if his art is put to bad use because
he imparted the skill to be used justly {Gorgias 457b8-cl).
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a

clever

and

deceitful

plan

( sophisma) . 11

It

is

not my

contention that Odysseus himself believes that nobility is
compatible with these things but he needs to cover over his
own deeds with a word like gennaios in order to get the son
of a noble father to cooperate with his designs. 12

In short,

Odysseus does not really care about the substance of moral
discourse unless

it

is useful to him. 13

Having initially

couched the deed to be done in terms of nobility, Odysseus
proceeds quickly to talk of the necessity of deceiving the
soul of Philoctetes by means of words (Phil. 54-57).

Neop-

tolemus is to play the part of a kind of surrogate Odysseus
in that he too is to manipulate others by means of manipulating language.
We see this same kind of inconsistency in the use of
moral terms and masking of wicked deeds in the language of
nobility in what follows.

Neoptolemus is to become a thief

(klopeus, Phil. 77); to contrive evil deeds (technasthai kaka,
Phil. 80) which are shameless (anaides, Phil. 83) and deceitful (dolo, Phil. 101) and is to be known through his involve11

see Knox, The Heroic Temper, p. 125.

12

odysseus demonstrates that he himself knows the true
meaning of the word gennaios when he orders a remorseful
Neoptolemus to go and because he is noble (gennaios) not to
look at Philoctetes any longer lest he destroy their good
fortune (Phil. 1068-1069).
Odysseus is, of course, worried
that because of Neoptolemus' noble nature (and the compassion
that is part of such nobility) the young man will so regret
the deceit that he has practiced that he will attempt to undo
what he has wrought.
13

see Blundell, "Odysseus in Philoctetes," 320.
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ment in such an affair as just

(dikaioi,

Phil.

82) , most

revered of mortals (eusebestatos broton, Phil. 85), wise and
good

(sophos kagathos,

Phil.

119).

Again,

contention that Odysseus believes that
moral

terms

compatible.

as

shamelessness

He does not.

and

it

is not my

such contradictory

reverence

are

in

fact

What he does know with devastating

clarity is that if one needs someone of noble character to
carry out a deed of questionable moral integrity then one must
couch the deed to be done in terms that are morally acceptable
and even attractive to that individual.
Odysseus

doing

above.

Sophocles

This is what we see

shows

us

that

Odysseus

manipulates the son of Achilles in the very same way that the
latter will soon take advantage of Philoctetes.

The tragedian

also portrays the moral cynicism of Odysseus who cares nothing
for the substance of moral terms except as they may be useful
to him in the achievement of his own goals.
As was mentioned in the introduction, it is not clear
what Odysseus' final goals are.

He claims to be the servant

of Zeus and simply to be carrying out the god's will (Phil.
989-990).
Greeks

He appears to have the general welfare of the

in mind when he

says

that

Neoptolemus will

cause

suffering for all of the Greeks if he fails to carry out the
scheme

successfully

(ei

d'

ergase/me

Argeiois baleis, Phil. 66-67).

tauta

lupen

pasin

The Chorus defend Odysseus on

these same grounds when they claim that the son of Laertes was
given

a

command

"as

one

from

many"

(keinos

d'

heis

apo
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pollon/tachtheis,
achieved

a

Phil.

common

1143-1144)

benefit

for

and

at

his

their

mandate

friends

(tout'

ephemosuna/koinan enusen es philous arogan, Phil. 1144-1145) . 14
It is my opinion that Odysseus is not a selfless servant of
the

state

but

is

driven

fundamentally

by the desire

for

personal honor, success and power and that he is willing to
do or say anything in order to secure these things.

In this

way, then, he is the panourgos (criminal, "one who will do or
say anything") that Philoctetes says that he is.
Odysseus' assertion that he is the servant of Zeus is
but a convenient ploy for claiming that he has divine sanction
for pursuing his own goals.

Sophocles makes this quite clear

in his depiction of Odysseus' utter willingness to disregard
the

prophecy of

14

Helenus

once

Philoctetes'

bow

is

in his

see Nussbaum, "Consequences and Character," 29-39.
Nussbaum argues that Odysseus is a kind of selfless
utilitarian who disregarding his own scruples, acts in the
interests of the larger community. He is someone who "accords
ultimate value to states of affairs," specifically that state
of affairs which is "the greatest possible good of all
citizens."
Nussbaum further argues that it is Sophocles'
purpose in the play to show the "initial attractiveness" of
such a position and "its ultimate defectiveness."
The
ultimate defectiveness of Odysseus' position, according to
Nussbaum, lies in the fact that his fixation on bringing about
certain states of affairs leads him to accord no value to such
things as friendship, justice and personal integrity.
I do not disagree with Nussbaum in her judgment that
Sophocles shows us the moral bankruptcy of Odysseus' position
but I disagree with her on the issue of Odysseus' ultimate
motivation for his actions.
It seems to me that Sophocles
leaves us with enough evidence that Odysseus' real goal in
getting Philoctetes' bow is the personal prestige and power
that this will afford him among his peers and not, as Nussbaum
would have it, bringing about the "greatest good for the
greatest number" of those Greeks fighting at Troy.
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possession (Phil. 1054-1062).

The prophecy was that the bow

and its owner Philoctetes would take Troy.

But Sophocles

shows us an Odysseus who is indifferent to the message of
zeus' prophets and hence as someone who cannot be viewed as
seriously committed to his commands.

In this way

it

is

doubtful that Odysseus is doing anything but appropriating
divine sanction for his own purposes.
Sophocles provides us with ample evidence that the son
of Laertes is pursuing private and selfish goals even though
in the play

Odysseus portrays himself as an individual who

is looking out for the general welfare.
appear to be his overriding ends.

Victory and honor

It is for the sake of

grasping a "sweet portion" of victory that Odysseus first bids
Neoptolemus

to

throw

off

involved in the scheme

his

(Phil.

sense
80-82).

of

shame

and

become

The attainment of

victory he says, will later make them appear just (Phil. 82).
Before Neoptolemus sets off to find Philoctetes,

Odysseus

prays to Hermes, the sender of guile and to Athena Victory
who, he claims, "always saves me" (Phil. 133-134).

Sophocles

shows us that indeed, Victory is Odysseus' salvation (Phil.
109) and final goal when later in the play, he declares that
he is,

by nature,

the sort of man who wants to win in all

circumstances (nikan ge mentoi pantachou chrezon ephun, Phil.
1052).

This winning is defined both in terms of the success

of his deceitful scheme and his aim to appropriate the honor
that was due to Philoctetes in the battle at Troy.

When
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odysseus has finally secured the bow through the assistance
of Neoptolemus he declares that Philoctetes is now superfluous
and

that

the gift

of honor

apportioned to him

from

(hemeis d'

geras/timen emoi neimeien,

the Greeks

iomen kai

Phil.

will

tach'

1061-1062).

now be

an to

son

Contrary to

Neoptolemus who declares that he would rather fail acting
nobly

than

declares

win

acting

that he must

wickedly
win

in

(Phil.

any

94-95),

and every

Odysseus

circumstance

whether it be by wicked or noble means.
It is very unlikely,

it seems to me that Odysseus is

really a public servant at all.

Sophocles has Philoctetes

reveal the damning evidence that Odysseus was unwilling to
serve the Greeks at all by going to fight in their behalf at
Troy. 15

Philoctetes bitterly expresses his outrage at having

been dishonorably abandoned

(atimon ebalon,

Phil.

1028)

by

Odysseus and the Atreidae when he freely volunteered to fight
and Odysseus had to be tricked and forced to go

(klope te

kananke zugeis/epleis ham' autois, Phil. 1025-1026). 16 In this
way Sophocles shows us the hypocrisy of Odysseus who claims
to be only serving the public interest through his scheme
when, in fact, he was himself forced by deceit and necessity
to go to Troy.

Truly it was Philoctetes who was the public

servant not Odysseus.

The tragedian, furthermore, points to

15

According to legend Odysseus attempts to skirt fighting
at Troy by feigning madness.
16

See Rose, "Philoctetes and the Sophists," 93-94.
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the irony of Odysseus' continual appeals to necessity and the
use of deceit in order to secure Philoctetes' bow when it was
precisely these two things which had to be used on Odysseus
in order to get him to carry out his public duty to the
Greeks.

In this way I contend, Odysseus' pretensions to being

a faithful, public servant appear to be dubious.
It is my opinion that Sophocles intends for us to view
the

son of

Laertes

willing to do

as

panourgos,

and say whatever

achieve his own goals. 17
revealed

a

through the

an

individual who

is necessary

is

in order to

The true character of Odysseus is

figure

of Philoctetes with whom the

tragedian is in fundamental sympathy. 18

Upon hearing Neop-

17

See Knox, The Heroic Temper, pp. 124-125; H. D. F.
Kitto, Form and Meaning in Drama {London, Methuen and Co.
Ltd., 1956), pp. 108-109.
18

It seems to me that it is possible to assert that the
tragedian is in basic sympathy with the character of Philoctetes for a number of reasons. First, Sophocles shows us that
it is Philoctetes who awakens the son of Achilles to a sense
of his real moral identity by acting as a role model for the
young man ( see chapter 2) .
Second, Sophocles assigns to
Philoctetes the final and devastating statement on the
character of Odysseus when the latter is ignominiously run off
the stage:
You must know this much at any rate: these so-called
foremost of the army are the Greeks' false heralds. They
are bold with their words but cowards at the spear point
(kakous/ontas pros aichmen en de tois logois thraseis,
f.hil. 1306-1307).
Once again, in this way Sophocles alludes to Odysseus' belief
in and commitment to the power of words over deeds which the
son of Laertes stated earlier (Phil. 96-99).
Finally,
Philoctetes' healing and reinstatement into society, in spite
of his wildness (Phil. 1321) and unyielding nature (Phil.
1321-1323, 1343, 1352, 1386, 1388, 1392, 1393-1396) show
Sophocles' fundamental sympathy with the suffering hero.
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tolemus' tale, 19 Philoctetes proclaims:
Yes, I know that he would attempt every wicked argument
with his tongue and any form of criminality (panourgias)
in which he would be willing to do everything unjust in
order to attain his end (meden dikaion es telos melloi
poein, Phil. 407-409).
Philoctetes gives voice to the very expediency which we have
seen

Odysseus

exercise

in

the

course

of

our

discussion.

According to Philoctetes, Odysseus is the sort of man for whom
the end will justify any means to its attainment.

Sophocles

has

the word

Philoctetes

point to

the

very

etymology

of

panourgia in his mention of Odysseus' willingness to both do
and say anything.
more

This etymological reference is made in even

explicit terms

in a

later passage where

Philoctetes

describes Odysseus as, "the one who says all things and dares
all things"

(all' est' ekeino panta lekta panta de/tolmeta,

633-634) . zo

Phil.

Finally,

connection between Odysseus
unleashes

a

torrent

of

Sophocles

indicates

a

close

and villainy when Philoctetes

abuse upon Neoptolemus

for

having

19

Philoctetes' mention of Odysseus' villainy and injustice is strategically placed here by Sophocles as a response
to Neoptolemus' own lying tale about how he lost his patrimony
to Odysseus. Thus, Philoctetes is making his statement to one
who is actually in the grip of the very one being condemned.
Sophocles' notorious irony is again at work.
But the irony
carries a point because it is this very panourgia (which
Neoptolemus is practicing on Philoctetes through his lying
tale) that will soon come down on the young man's own head in
the form of harsh condemnation from Philoctetes (Phil. 927).
~See Blundell,
"Odysseus in Philoctetes," 315-316.
Blundell refers to the excellent passage (38d-39a) in Plato's
Apology further to illustrate the meaning of panourgia.
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deceived him.

When Philoctetes begs Neoptolemus to give him

his bow back and the young man refuses based upon a very
odyssean appeal to impersonal expediency and having to listen
to "those in power," (Phil. 925-926) Philoctetes cries out,
"You

utter

fire

and

terrible villainy"
Phil.

927-928)!

terror,

you

hateful

master

(panourgias/deines technem'

work

of

echthiston,

Philoctetes is condemning Neoptolemus for

surpassing even Odysseus in his willingness to do or say
anything in order to achieve his goal.
In summary then, I have argued in this section that the
term which best suits Odysseus is panourgos inasmuch as he is
willing to say or do anything in the interests of achieving
his own goals.

I have argued that the tragedian indicates

that we are to understand Odysseus in this fashion in a number
of different ways.

First of all, Odysseus is characterized

by this term on several occasions by Philoctetes with whom,
I have argued,

Sophocles is in fundamental sympathy.

The

tragedian identifies Odysseus with the works of a panourgos
and shows that he is aware of the etymological meaning of the
term in his drama.

Second,

Sophocles indicates Odysseus'

basic irresponsibility through his consistent employment of
the Greek

ruu

which,

as I have argued, signifies Odysseus'

attempt to remove himself from moral responsibility through
the subterfuge of appealing to impersonal necessities which
simply dictate what he must do.
which

Odysseus

seeks

to

Again, this is a strategy by

accord himself

free

reign

to

do
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whatever he wants to do.

Third, Odysseus' inconsistent use

of moral terms is indicative of a moral cynicism that points
in the end, to panourgia.

Finally, it has been my contention

that the son of Laertes is driven fundamentally by selfish
goals and not the general good of the community.

This is

shown by the way in which the tragedian reveals that Odysseus
is really after victory (in any circumstance) and the desire
to be given the gift of honor from the Greeks that should be
given

to

Philoctetes.

furnishes

us

with

motivated

by

serving

Philoctetes'

I

further

damning

the

have

indicated

evidence
needs

revelation

of

that
the

that

that

Sophocles

Odysseus
community

the

son

of

is

not

through
Laertes

refused to go to Troy and had to be tricked and forced to go.
In all

of

these ways then Sophocles presents us with an

example of impoverished and defective human agency.
4.4 Aristotle On Cleverness, Practical Wisdom And Villainy
In this section I shall set forth Aristotle's own very
brief discussion of villainy (panourgia) in Nicomachean Ethics
vr.12.

Aristotle's discussion of villainy is placed within

a larger analysis of the nature of cleverness and practical
wisdom.

The distinctions that Aristotle draws between these

three things will help us to understand philosophically the
nature

of

villainy.

Through his

philosophical

analysis,

Aristotle will help us to understand two things about the
character of Odysseus: first, that he employs a potentially
good trait (i.e. the ability to determine and execute the most

153
efficient means to a given end) in the service of wicked goals
and second that villainy is the sort of thing that is an
habitual disposition.

According to Aristotle, then, there is

a certain incorrigibility that is attached to the notion of
panourgia.

Both of these aspects of Odysseus' character are

brought out,

in fact,

in the play but the medium of philo-

sophical discourse is more peculiarly suited to the analysis
of these particular aspects of the character of Odysseus.
At Nicomachean Ethics VI.12 Aristotle talks of moral
virtue and practical wisdom in terms of means and ends.

He

asserts that virtue makes the target correct (he men gar arete
ton skopon poiei orthon,

EN 1144a7-8)

and practical wisdom

makes us use the right means (he de phronesis ta pros touton,
EN 1144a8-9}.

It is the presence of virtue, Aristotle says,

which makes a person's choice right (EN 1144a20}, but it is
part of a different capacity to determine the steps which must
be taken in order to implement that choice (EN 1144a22).
is at this

point that Aristotle

It

introduces his notion of

cleverness, simultaneously defining and distinguishing it from
practical

wisdom

(phronesis)

and

villainy

(panourgia).

Cleverness (deinotes) is an indeterminate capacity (dunamis) 21
to perform those steps which are conducive to a

proposed

target or goal and to attain that goal (haute d' esti toiaute
hoste ta pros ton hupotethenta skopon sunteinonta dunasthai

21

As opposed to a determinate disposition (hexis, cf. EN
II.5) which is achieved through habituation.
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~µta

prattein kai

tunchanein autou,

EN

1144a24-26) .

indeterminate it is a capacity or ability of oppposites. 22

As
If

the target is noble, cleverness deserves praise (epainete, EN
1144a26), but if the target is worthless or base (phaulos, EN
1144a26)

then cleverness

(panourgia,
practical

EN

is utter villainy or criminality

1144a26).

wisdom

It

resemble

is

each

because

other

(in

cleverness

and

that

are

both

concerned with determining and implementing the most effective
means for achieving chosen ends) that Aristotle says that the
practically wise are called clever and knavish (deinous kai
panourgous,

EN 1144a27-28). 23

Practical wisdom is not this

capacity which he terms cleverness but it is also not without
this capacity (EN 1144a28-29).
the soul"

(deinotes)

It is only when this "eye of

is coupled with virtue that it becomes

the determinate disposition of practical wisdom (he d' hexis
to

ommati

touto

1144a29-30) . 24

ginetai

tes

psuches

ouk

aneu

aretes,

EN

If deinotes is, on the other hand, coupled with

viciousness it becomes villainy or that willingness to do
anything which is panourgia.

In this way Aristotle argues

that the end which is best, whatever that may be, appears only
to the good person (epeide toionde to telos kai to ariston
hotidepote on touto d'

ei me to agatho ou phainetai,

22

see J. A. Stewart, Notes, 2:214.

23

Plato uses the term playfully in Meno 80b7.

24

EN

see Pierre Aubenque, La Prudence Chez Aristote (Paris,
Presses Universitaires de France, 1963), pp. 61-63.
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1144a32-34).

For it is she who,

with the requisite moral

virtues, is attracted to those ends which contribute to her
own (and the wider community's) flourishing.

Wickedness on

the other hand, (mochtheria, EN 1144a35) twists and causes one
to be utterly deceived about the first principles of action
(diastrephei gar he mochtheria kai diapseudesthai poiei peri
tas praktikas archas, EN 1144a34-36).

In this way, Aristotle

affirms that a character distorted by vice is incapable of
rightly

discerning

and

according to Aristotle,

acting

for

his

own

good.

Thus,

it is impossible to be practically

wise unless one is good.
From Aristotle's discussion thus far we can see that
villainy or criminality is a kind of cleverness
gone bad.

This conception of villainy

(deinotes)

(panourgia)

is

in

accord with Sophocles' depiction of the character of Odysseus.
One of the traits that is actually admirable in him as a
character is precisely his ability to be able to determine the
most effective means to attaining his goal.

His focus on

efficiency is well displayed in the scheme which he devises
to obtain Philoctetes' bow.

He displays then, in some sense,

what Aristotle calls cleverness

(deinotes) .

But this ad-

mirable trait is invariably employed with a view to wicked
ends and
panourgia.

it is this which Aristotle

(and Sophocles)

term

Ultimately, Aristotle would understand Odysseus'

practice of panourgia as a failure of moral virtue.

His own

wickedness distorts his perception concerning the fundamental
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principles of action and so his admirable ability with respect
to determining means to ends (what Aristotle calls the "eye
of the soul" in EN 1144a30) is skewed and directed to ends of
dubious moral rectitude.
While cleverness is an indeterminate capacity which can
be used for good or evil, Aristotle sees practical wisdom and
villainy as a determinate disposition which has come into
being through repeated use. 25

Stewart puts the matter well:

Cleverness is the power of discovering and employing the
means which lead to any end which happens to be in view,
no account being taken, so far as the notion of deinotes
is concerned, of the morality of the end.
Deinotes, of
course, operates largely in non-moral fields, where it
undergoes no transformation: but in the moral field, when
it is habitually enlisted in the cause of a good end, it
becomes the hexis of phronesis; when habitually enlisted
in the cause of a bad end, the hexis of panourgia. 26
In this way then Aristotle sees villainy as a settled disposition (hexis) in which an individual characteristically employs
his talent with a view to vicious ends.
25

Sophocles does not

The notion that certain traits develop in a person
through repeated action is, of course, in accord with
Aristotle's general understanding of the nature of moral
virtue. He states this most succintly in Nicomachean Ethics
II.1 where he says: "The same holds true of the virtues: in
our transactions with other men it is by action that some
become just and others unjust, and it is by acting in the face
of danger and by developing the habit of feeling fear or
confidence that some become brave men and others cowards. The
same applies to the appetites and feelings of anger: by
reacting in one way or in another to given circumstances some
people become self-controlled and gentle, and others selfindulgent and short-tempered.
In a word, characteristics
(hexeis) develop from corresponding activities.
For that
reason, we must see to it that our activities are of a certain
kind, since any variations in them will be reflected in our
characteristics." (EN 1103b13-23, Ostwald, p. 34).
26

stewart, Notes, 2 : 1 o1.
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furnish us with a technical term such as Aristotle's hexis for
signifying the perduring nature of Odysseus' vice.
more part of the task of philosophy.

This is

But he confirms the

incorrigible nature of panourgia in his drama through the
character of Philoctetes.

Sophocles calls attention to the

fact that Odysseus has reached a settled disposition of moral
viciousness

when

Philoctetes

excuses

Neoptolemus

for

his

involvement in Odysseus' scheme and blames the young man's
behavior on the nefarious influence of the son of Laertes
(Phil. 961f., 984, 1369).
of

the

likes

of

Odysseus

Neoptolemus, he says, is unworthy
(because of

the

former's

moral

superiority) and, since he did not know any better, he played
the part of a kind of screen or front (problema, Phil. 1008)
for Odysseus.

Odysseus' wicked soul, he continues, was always

peering through the recesses of the young man's mind in order
to see how he could teach Neoptolemus to be clever at wickedness (en kakois einai sophon, Phil. 1015).
shows us,

Thus, Sophocles

through the character of Philoctetes, that he is

aware of the distinction between a wicked act

(which Neop-

tolemus has committed) and a warped disposition in which the
individual is characteristically involved in deeds that are
morally reprehensible.
of

the

nature

of

Sophocles shows us his understanding

moral

virtue

through

his

depiction

of

Philoctetes' sensitivity to the moral significance of the pain
that the young man feels from being involved in Odysseus'
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scheme.

27

S'ince th'is pain
' an d remorse are present, Philoctetes
'

cannot unqualifiedly label Neoptolemus wicked (kakos) the way
that he does Odysseus and the Atreidae (Phil. 984, 1369).
his discussion of the nature of panourgia,

then,

In

Aristotle

confirms the perduring nature of the character flaw of the
villain (panourgos)
the term hexis.

by designating his moral condition with

In this way, he confirms what Sophocles is

saying about the character of Odysseus when the son of Laertes
is called panourgos during the course of the drama.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter I have maintained that the figure of
Odysseus acts as a kind of anti-type and that, according to
the ancient anthropology of Sophocles and Aristotle, there is
a crucial place for the use of such examples in the positive
formation of the moral agent.

For the ancients, the witness-

ing of such a negative exemplar was viewed as an education in
how one ought not to act and the kind of person that one ought
not to become .

I

have also maintained that modern moral

philosophy, stemming from Kant, has lost sight of the critical
educational role that the exemplar plays in the moral education of the individual.

This is, indeed, something that the

ancients have to teach us.
I have argued in a number of ways that the character of
Odysseus is basically that of a villain.

I have explored his

Vsee Blundell, "The Phusis of Neoptolemus," 141.
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villainy mostly by way of an analysis of his refusal to accept
responsibility for his own acts and his basic denial of the
reality of choice.

I

have shown these things through an

examination of his language (his consistent preference for dei
over

chre,

his

manipulation

of

moral

terms)

and

through

arguing that he is not motivated by a concern for the larger
community in his pursuit of Philoctetes' bow, but for selfaggrandizement.

Sophocles not only has Odysseus be called a

panourgos

in the course of the drama but demonstrates an

awareness

of

the

etymological

roots

of

application to the character of Odysseus.

the

term

in

its

In this way, the

tragedian confirms the argument which I have been attempting
to make with respect to Odysseus, namely, that he is the sort
of person who is willing to do or say anything in order to
achieve his own goals.

Aristotle contributes to this chapter

through his further analysis and illumination of the meaning
of panourgia in philosophical terms.

Aristotle helps us to

see that Odysseus has a potentially valuable ability (i.e.,
that of being capable of determining the most efficient means
to a

given end and attaining it),

fundamental

but that because of a

flaw in his character his otherwise excellent

capacity is vitiated by being put to the service of wicked
ends.

In his discussion of the nature of panourgia, Aristotle

also furnishes us with the philosophical term hexis which well
describes the settled state of Odysseus'
depicted in the drama.

character defect

In this way Aristotle confirms the
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incorrigible nature of the character of Odysseus whom the
tragedian

depicts

as

invariably

powers with a view to wicked ends.

employing

his

formidable

We shall see then that we

must look to the son of Achilles for an example of a richer
and more authentic paradigm of what it means to make a choice,
take responsibility for that choice and exercise authentic
human agency.

CHAPTER 5
CHOICE AND RESPONSIBILITY IN SOPHOCLES AND ARISTOTLE:
THE CHARACTER OF NEOPTOLEMUS
5.1 Introduction
In

the

previous

chapter

we

saw

how

the

figure

of

Odysseus acted as a sort of anti-type, an example of inauthentic human agency.

In this chapter we turn to the character

of Neoptolemus as a fine example of excellent human agency.
It is in the character of Neoptolemus that we can see that
many of the themes of Sophocles' and Aristotle's anthropology
come together and are brought to fruition in the profound
choice which the son of Achilles makes.

Thus, through the

figure of Neoptolemus, we witness excellent deliberation that
is directed toward a good end; a mature individual who assumes
personal responsibility for his acts; and the integration of
reason and emotion that results in excellent choice.

Thus,

Neoptolemus achieves the harmonious integration of the various
elements of his psyche that we have
essential

been arguing is an

ingredient to the attainment of authentic human

agency.
Once again,

the use of examples as a mode of moral

education would be viewed by someone working in the Kantian
tradition

as

of

dubious

worth.
161

This

is

because

of

the
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abstract nature of the Kantian conception of moral philosophy
in which nothing empirical can contribute to an understanding
of what our duty is.

The demand for the sort of standard that

admits of no exceptions is, it would seem to me, an unreasonable one and does not take into account, as the ancient view
clearly

does,

the

contingent

character

of

ethics.

The

ancients had a healthy sense that things in the human realm
held only "for the most part" and that, in this way, it would
be entirely appropriate to appeal to a particular individual
as a standard for living the moral life.
In addition, the Kantian conception of the moral agent
would not see that the profound psychological integration that
Neoptolemus achieves (and that is represented by Aristotle's
prohairesis) would be of any significance with respect to his
excellence as a moral agent.

Kant shows his indifference to

the moral significance of such integration in the way that he
tends to accept the notion that reason and inclination are
in conflict and that the latter will have to be overcome by
the former in order that one's duty may be carried out.

This

is in marked contrast to the ideal of the well-integrated
individual

that we

see

in the

ancient model.

Thus,

the

ancient anthropology does more justice to the whole person by
seeing such

integration

into an unconflicted whole

as

an

excellence and understanding that the one who acts from this
state has made a greater moral achievement than the one who
must overcome himself.
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As a corollary to this anthropology I have employed the
poet to furnish us with the affective and immediate aspects
of human experience, while the philosopher will provide us
with a logos which will serve to explain and unify the various
phenomena that the dramatist furnishes.

Let us take a closer

look at this before proceeding to our formal analysis.
Sophocles situates the son of Achilles in the interesting

position

at

the

mid-point

between

the

character

of

Odysseus, who consistently uses the verb of external necessity, dei, and the character of Philoctetes, who consistently
employs the verb of

internal

influence of Odysseus,

necessity,

chre.

Under the

Neoptolemus at first shuns personal

responsibility and employs some of the very same language
which Odysseus does throughout the play (dei, verbal adjectives of necessity), but, unlike Odysseus, he becomes painfully aware of the incongruity that exists between this irresponsibility and his own sense of personal integrity and justice.
The great skill of the dramatist is revealed as Neoptolemus'
moral awakening is signaled not only by how his actions change
but also by the way that he rejects the characteristically
Odyssean practice of hiding behind such vague abstractions as
"necessity" and "expediency" or by denying personal responsibility through a lame appeal to one's superiors.
powerfully

depicts

the

way

in

which

Sophocles

Neoptolemus'

moral

bewilderment forces him into a long and wrenching silence in
which he painfully deliberates about what he is to do.

This
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deliberation results in a profound decision to undo the wrong
which he now knows and feels that he did by obtaining Philoctetes' bow by deception.

His decision sets him at odds with

his former "teacher" Odysseus, but he boldly opposes him armed
with a new conception of what is just, wise and good (Phil.
1244-1251).

Neoptolemus will no longer countenance Odysseus'

justice of expediency and irresponsibility but acts now with
a tremendous sense of moral responsibility and in accordance
with a conception of justice which respects the integrity of
Philoctetes.

Sophocles shows us furthermore that the son of

Achilles achieves a new and powerful sense of his own moral
identity through the making of his decision.
hesitation

and

uncertainty

are

gone

and

refreshing sense of urgency and boldness.

he

His
acts

former
with

a

Whereas formerly

he was in emotional turmoil, we see that now he has become
reconciled to himself and is no longer a victim of his own
remorse.

We witness a young man who is now self-assured and

no longer bullied by the force of Odysseus' personality or
rhetorical finesse.

He has literally grown up on stage.

It will be my contention in this chapter that Aristotle's concept of choice or deliberate decision (prohairesis)
bears many resemblances to what Sophocles depicts through the
character of Neoptolemus in his play.

His searching analysis

of the nature of prohairesis and its relationship to moral
virtue will aid us in coming to a philosophical understanding
of the choice which the character Neoptolemus makes.

Most
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notably in this connection we shall appreciate the role of
deliberation, the moral maturity and responsibility that true
decisions involve as well as how right decisions are motivated
by emotion which is in harmony with reason
This latter is,

(EN 1139a25f.).

for Aristotle and Sophocles,

complete and

authentic human agency. Neoptolemus struggles throughout much
of the play to make a choice and to claim responsibility for
both his choice and his moral identity.

This is reflected in

the emotional pain and shame that he feels for Philoctetes
(Phil. 902-3) as well as in his struggle to employ the term
chre,

which,

as we have argued above,

is indicative of a

person's choosing a certain course of action and identifying
one's purposes with it as opposed to seeing a course of action
as imposed upon one.

By the close of the play Neoptolemus'

earlier hesitancy is gone and Sophocles shows us that Neoptolemus'

deliberate decision enables him to act boldly on

behalf of justice and friendship in opposition to Odysseus'
scheme of ethical expediency.
5.2 Claiming Responsibility And The Pain Of Deliberation
Sophocles graphically illustrates Neoptolemus' struggle
to throw off the nefarious influence of Odysseus and to claim
responsibility for his actions in the scene shortly after
Philoctetes regains consciousness from his attack.

It is here

that he says that his usual way or manner (ethos) will "set
him straight."

Neoptolemus cries out in pain, "papai" and for

the first time in the play uses chre, "I don't know which way
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I should turn my faltering words" (ouk oid' hopoi chre taporon
trepein epos, Phil. 897).

He is on the verge of disclosing

to Philoctetes the real story with regard to their destination
and so is about to put an end to the use of deceit (dolos) in
favor

of

employing persuasion

(peitho).

In short,

he

is

attempting to take some measure of responsibility for what he
intends to do with Philoctetes.

But he is in terrible pain

(tout' aniomai palai, Phil. 906, 913), is utterly ashamed of
himself (aischros phanoumai, Phil. 906) and cannot determine
which course of action to take (oh Zeu ti draso;, Phil. 908).
At last he determines that he will no longer hide the truth
from Philoctetes (ouden se krupso, Phil. 915) but he couches
the entire revelation in characteristically Odyssean terms of
external necessity: Philoctetes must sail to Troy (dei gar es
Troian se plein, Phil. 915); a Great Necessity ordains that
these things happen (polle kratei/ touton ananke, Phil. 92122).

When Philoctetes demands his bow back from Neoptolemus

with whom he has entrusted it,

he is met with these harsh

words:
It is not possible to do so, for justice and expediency
make me listen to those who are in power (all' ouch hoion
te ton gar en telei kluein/ to t' endikon me kai to
sumpheron poei, Phil. 925-6) . 1
1

It is interesting to see Neoptolemus using the language
of Thrasymachus in Republic I in order to justify his actions.
According to Thrasymachus, justice is whatever is expedient
(to sumpheron) for the stronger. But Neoptolemus is clearly
no Thrasymachus in character.
Whatever he may say at this
point is not at all in accord with what he is feeling.
It
seems to me that he is employing this kind of language as a
kind of shield against the persistent feelings that he is
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These appeals to necessity are as we have seen, characteristic
of Odysseus and his way of describing moral situations.
The present passage is interesting in the way that it
echoes 385-388.

We argued that the earlier passage represent-

ed Neoptolemus'

covert attempt to excuse not Odysseus but

himself from culpability in what he was doing.

He says that

he does not lay the blame so much upon Odysseus as those in
power (hos taus en telei, Phil. 385)

inasmuch as the entire

polis is under their jurisdiction and thus, he concludes, the
unruly (hoi akosmountes, Phil. 387) are wicked because of the
instruction of their teachers.

In this way Neoptolemus, under

the guise of exonerating Odysseus, frees himself from responsibility.

Presently, we see Neoptolemus doing practically the

same thing with the significant difference of being all but
incapable of maintaining the lie.

We can tell that this is

so inasmuch as in the former passage Sophocles has Neoptolemus
precede blithely from his lying tale to a covert justification
of

his

action

by means

of

exculpating Odysseus.

present passage Sophocles precedes Neoptolemus'

In the

appeals to

these Odyssean abstractions of necessity with a declaration
of disgust at himself for having abandoned his nature in order
to become engaged in a scheme which does violence to his moral
identity (hapanta duschereia ten hautou phusin/hotan lipon tis
having for Philoctetes which are interfering with his ability
to carry out Odysseus' scheme.
He is trying to maintain
Odyssean "objectivity" even as his desire to maintain this
position is faltering and will (eventually) prove to be
untenable.
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_gi:a ta me proseikota,

Phil.

902-903) .

In this way,

the

tragedian shows us that the son of Achilles is at the breaking
point and his appeals to such Odyssean standards as necessity
and expediency are a last ditch effort to avoid facing himself
and, ultimately, the broken man whom he has betrayed (Phil.
923-924).
It is during Neoptolemus' painful silences that he is
deliberating upon the fundamental change of purpose which he
will make at the close of the play.

Sophocles indicates this

effectively through the way in which Neoptolemus' silences are
punctuated with sudden exclamations of bewilderment as to what
he should do (Phil. 908, 969,974).

Neoptolemus is pondering

over his course of action in a very complex situation and
Sophocles shows us that this sort of soul searching evokes
pain,

confusion

and

silence.

When

Philoctetes

begs

Neoptolemus not to take away the bow which sustains him, he
groans in despair because the son of Achilles will no longer
speak to him but looks away as if the young man will never
give it up
mepoth'

(all' oude prosphonei m' eti/ all' hos metheson

hod'

hora

palin,

fillil.

934-5,

cf.

also

950-1).

Philoctetes imploringly commands Neoptolemus to become himself
again (alla nun et' en sautou genou, Phil. 950) but, receiving
no answer

(ti phes; siopas, Phil.

951),

(ouden eim' ho dusmoros, Phil. 951).

sinks into despair

The Chorus, too, is in

a state of confusion (aporia) and asserts that everything, its
sailing

off

or

acceding

to

Philoctetes'

pleas,

is

up

to
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Neoptolemus (en soi, Phil. 963).

Neoptolemus is beginning to

see that he can no longer continue to make empty appeals to
Necessity (Phil. 921-922) or expediency (Phil. 926) in order
to excuse himself from making a responsible decision.

The

simplistic, non-commital, amoral stance of the son of Laertes
has become untenable.
play,

Neoptolemus

In one of the most moving lines of the

cries

out

( in

the

grammatical

form

of

unattainable wish) that he is so distressed with the situation
he is in that he wishes he had never left his home in Scyros
(oimoi ti draso; me pot' ophelon lipein/ ten Skuron houto tois
parousin achthomai,

Phil.

969-70} .

In this way Sophocles

points to the fact that Neoptolemus knows that he must make
a

fundamental

decision

and

in

his

confusion and

pain he

expresses the nostalgic wish that he had never left Scyros,
had morally speaking never been confronted with the need to
make the sort of painful, adult decision that is part of being
morally responsible. 2

Regarding the decision which he knows

he must make very seriously, Neoptolemus utters the painful
question, "What do we do men?" (ti dromen andres;, Phil. 974},
and then falls into silence for the next one hundred lines of
the play, one of the most anguished and significant silences
in all of Greek tragedy. 3
2

3

see Blundell, "The Phusis of Neoptolemus," 141.

see Kitto, Form and Meaning, pp. 123-124. Kitto makes
the excellent suggestion that Neoptolemus should be placed at
center stage with the bow in his hand for the hundred lines
in which he is silent. By being placed strategically between
Odysseus and Philoctetes like this, the pain of Neoptolemus'
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The response of Philoctetes at this point in the play
is interesting and instructive with regard to the issues of
choice, responsibility and moral virtue.

It may be the last

thing that Neoptolemus should hear now

(inasmuch as he is

struggling to take personal responsibility for his actions),
but Philoctetes does not blame the young man for what he has
done, but blames Odysseus.

Because of Neoptolemus' hesitancy

and pain Philoctetes knows that the son of Achilles has not
acted wickedly from a settled disposition.

He is sensitive

to the fact that the young man is still, as it were, in the
process of formation and so retains faith in his fundamental
goodness of character.

He says to Neoptolemus:

You are not wicked, but you seem to have come [here)
having learned disgraceful things at the hands of wicked
men.
But now, having given shameful things to others to
whom it belongs, sail away. (ouk ei kakos su pros kakon
d' andron mathon/ eoikas hekein aischra. nun d' alloisi
deus/ hoi' eikos ekplei, Phil. 971-973.)
Though Philoctetes knows that Neoptolemus has done shameful
things, he still affirms that the young man is unworthy of the
likes of Odysseus (anaxion men sou, Phil. 1009).

Similarly,

he hesitates to curse the young man with destruction (oloio
me po,

.Phil- 961), as he does continually of Odysseus and the

Atreidae, because he still retains the hope that Neoptolemus
will change his mind and repent (gnomen metoiseis, Phil. 962,
both notions are contained in this expression).
By having Philoctetes distinguish a particular action
deliberations, the urgency of making a choice and the pathos
of his situation will be most effectively brought forth.
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which an agent may perform from his general moral make-up
Sophocles demonstrates a profound understanding of the nature
of moral virtue.

What he is pointing to here is the notion

that the virtues are certain qualitative dispositions which
cannot be destroyed (or even fully disclosed) through a single
action but are developed and revealed through the kinds of
choices, actions and commitments that an individual characteristically

makes.

In

this

way,

Philoctetes

not

only

understands and legitimately excuses Neoptolemus' behavior,
he

focuses

upon

the

significant choice which the

son

of

Achilles has yet to make inasmuch as he points to the promise
that

has

not

yet

been

extinguished

in

the

character

Neoptolemus by the wicked actions he has committed. 4

of
He

understands that those actions have not yet taken up permanent
residence in the soul of Neoptolemus.

It is to that choice

that we shall now turn.

4

Philoctetes, who has an adamantine sense of self, is
completely in character by calling attention to the choice
which the son of Achilles has yet to make. If Odysseus seeks
to hide from himself and Neoptolemus is seeking to define
himself, Philoctetes boldly asserts himself and the direction
of his will, even when there are no options left to him. In
complete opposition to Odysseus he almost always (excepting
those times when it is not grammatically feasible) employs
chre over dei.
When he realizes that he has been duped by
Neoptolemus and that the son of Achilles will not return his
bow, he cries out, "What should I do?" (ti chre me dran;,
Phil. 949) as if he still retained some sort of say in the
matter. The most striking instance of his use of chre comes
in his response to Odysseus at line 999.
Odysseus has just
told Philoctetes that he must (dei) capture Troy and raze it
to the ground by force, and Philoctetes responds that he will
never do so not even if he must (chre) suffer death (oudepote
g' oud' en chre me pan pathein kakon).
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5.3

Neoptolemus' Choice
Although Sophocles never actually portrays Neoptolemus

making his decision it is clear that he has made a profound
choice when he returns to the stage with Odysseus.

Odysseus

refers to Neoptolemus deliberating about something new (mon
ti bouleue neon;, Phil. 1229), but it is quite apparent that
whatever deliberating there has been has already taken place.
Neoptolemus has made a fundamental choice and this has come
as a result of the lonely and agonizing deliberation which
preceded his decision (Phil. 897, 906, 908, 913}.

We sense,

too, that something has happened to Neoptolemus.

He is much

more assured of himself.
hesitancy has vanished.

He knows his mind and his earlier
Somehow, through the prior struggle

and the deliberate decision which has issued forth from that
struggle, the son of Achilles has achieved a certain coherence
of character which he formerly lacked.

In this final scene

of the Philoctetes we witness both how Neoptolemus' decision
has shaped who he is, or perhaps better, who he has become and
we see how this very decision has put an end to the confusion
and inner division that has plagued him ever since he encountered Philoctetes.

Neoptolemus is no longer victimized

by his own inner discord (Phil. 897, 902-903, 969-970, 10111012} ,

but has,

resolved

upon,

through the purposeful choice that he has
brought

about

an

inner

reconciliation

and

concord where formerly, there was only strife and discord.
The profundity and moral maturity of the choice that has
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been made are brilliantly depicted by Sophocles through the
evident reversal of role that has taken place between Odysseus
and Neoptolemus. 5

It was formerly Odysseus who initiated

action and utterly dominated the young man (Phil. 50-57, 7785,

96-99,

111),

but now Neoptolemus holds the reins and

Odysseus breathlessly tries to keep pace with him wondering
anxiously what the son of Achilles will do next (Phil. 12221223, 1229).

Neoptolemus asserts that by returning the bow

he will undo (luson, Phil. 1224) the unjust and disgraceful
harm (Phil. 1234) that he has committed against Philoctetes
(Phil. 1232).

Odysseus, who is morally incapable of under-

standing Neoptolemus' motives, asks whether the young man is
mocking him by saying these things (Phil. 1235).
elegantly responds,

Neoptolemus

"Yes, if to speak the truth is mockery"

(ei kertomesis esti talethe legein, Phil. 1236).

Nowhere is

the complete moral turn around 6 of Neoptolemus more finely
5

see Kamerbeek, The Plays of Sophocles, p. 166. Kamerbeek's comments on this passage (Phil. 1225-28, 1230-33) are
relevant in showing how Sophocles heightens the sense of haste
and moral urgency by his use of stichomythia: "Instance of
syntactically closely knit stichomythia.
Again 12 3 0-12 3 3 .
Hamartia picks up exemarton, hen picks up hamartia and is
internal accusative with pithomenos, here the omitted main
verb in the first person is replaced by the second person in
Odysseus' line 1227 with its object ergon poion, and in
Neoptolemus' 1228 helon is predicative adjunct with either
<exemarton> or (better) <epraxa ergon hon ou moi prepon>."
6Note the powerful metaphorical resonance of Odysseus
calling Neoptolemus' return to Philoctetes a "back-turning
path" (palintropos keleuthon, Phil. 1222-1223). In this way
Sophocles indicates that the path that the son of Achilles is
taking is one in which he will attempt to undo the harm and
error that he has committed by getting himself involved in
Odysseus' scheme ( luson hos' exemarton en to prin chrono,
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depicted than
response.

in the sureness and finesse

of this simple

Neoptolemus asserts that the truth has been spoken

and the real story has finally come out (Phil. 1240). 7

The

son of Achilles is now a man of bold words as well as bold
action.

When Odysseus threatens to prevent him with the force

of the entire Achaean army,

he taunts the son of Laertes

(renowned, of course, for his cleverness) for the foolishness
of

his

words

(Phil.

1244) .

Through

the

newly

achieved

discovery of his moral identity and the fundamental choice
concomitant with that discovery Neoptolemus clearly sees that
the claims of justice are more powerful than the clever and
manipulative schemes of Odysseus (all' ei dikaia ton sophon
kreisso tade,

Phil.

1246).

The kind of justice that Neop-

tolemus is appealing to here is clearly quite different from
the sort of expediency which Odysseus earlier urged Neoptolemus to pursue by grasping for a "sweet portion of victory"
(Phil. 81).

With true justice on his side, that is, with a

conception of justice which respects the dignity of persons,
Neoptolemus proclaims that he does not fear Odysseus and the
Greek army but is prepared for whatever the future may bring

fhil.

1224).
7

Whereas formerly each time the "whole story" was said
to be told or heard it was preface to a lie about to be said
or one which had already been spoken (241, 389,620), now the
real "whole story" comes out and it is the logos of Neoptolemus' discovery of his moral identity, his making reparation to Philoctetes for his hamartia and his restoration to
the latter's friendship.
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The wisdom and justice that Neoptolemus has achieved
through his suffering and fundamental decision

is further

shown by Sophocles in the way that Neoptolemus completely
rejects the former use of deceit (dolos) and force (bia) and
turns now to persuasion (peitho) in order to get Philoctetes
to leave Lemnos and come to Troy. 9

When Neoptolemus seeks

out Philoctetes to return his bow to him he goes bearing words
which he demands that Philoctetes hear (logous d' akouson hous
heko pheron,

Phil.

1267).

become wild and intractable

He claims that Philoctetes has
(egriosai,

Phil.

1321)

and so

rejects and treats as an enemy anyone who may admonish him
with even his own best interests in mind (ean te nouthete tis
eunoia legon/stugeis polemion dusmene th' hehoumenos, Phil.
1322-1323).
Neoptolemus

proceeds

to

explain

to

Philoctetes

the

substance of Helenos' prophecy including the crucial element
8Neoptolemus' remark here, at 1254, esto to mellon, "Let
come what may!" is a verbal clue to the moral discovery that
has come in and through his struggle and subsequent choice.
This phrase seems to be a kind of response to his earlier ito
(Eb.il. 120) which he utters right at the crucial juncture of
determining that he would, in fact, give himself over to
Odysseus (Phil. 84) and get involved in his scheme to capture
Philoctetes' bow through deceit.
9

The only time that Neoptolemus uses force with Philoctetes is when he physically prevents the latter from killing
Odysseus with one of his deadly arrows. Neoptolemus' profound
sense of justice is illustrated in this scene when he tells
Philoctetes that he prevented him from killing his mortal
enemy (Phil. 1302-1303) because it would not be noble for
either of them (all' out' emoi tout' estin oute soi kalon,
Phil. 1304).
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that has up till now been left out, namely, that Philoctetes
is not only to win renown on the battlefields of Troy but is
to be healed of his terrible illness (nosou bareias, Phil.
1320)

by the sons of Asclepius

(Phil.

1333-1335).

These

prophecies were uttered by Helenos, Neoptolemus says, under
pain of death (didos' hekon/kteinein heauton en tade pseusthe
legon, Phil. 1341-1342).
the

same

time

Philoctetes is clearly moved and at

distressed

by Neoptolemus'

sincere

appeal.

Sophocles indicates that Neoptolemus' discourse, informed by
both wisdom and a sense of justice may in fact have won the
suffering Philoctetes over if it had been employed from the
very beginning.

He cries out, "What shall I do?" in exactly

the same way that Neoptolemus did earlier when he was
anguish and confusion (Phil. 1350).

in

He wonders how he will

be able to refuse to comply with the words of someone who has
clearly offered his good will and friendship
1351).

(Phil.

1350-

Sophocles portrays the suffering hero on the very

brink of yielding (all' eikatho det';, Phil. 1352) to Neoptolemus' arguments and then putting up an adamantine resistance which Neoptolemus will be

incapable of penetrating.

Philoctetes asserts that Neoptolemus is trying to hand him
over

to

arguments

his

enemies

(fhil.

(Phil.

1388).

1386)

and

kill

him with

his

The son of Achilles knows now that

arguments are futile and that Philoctetes must simply be left
to live without the salvation (soteria, Phil. 1396) that could
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be his. 10

Ph:i. loctetes appeals to Neoptolemus to fulfill the

oath he made
oeta.

to him earlier and to take him to his home at

Neoptolemus consents with the simple words, "If that

is what you have decided,

let us go"

(ei dokei steichomen,

It is at this moment that Heracles appears.

Phil. 1402) .

Neopto 1 emus

shows himself

in the end as willing to

sacrifice personal martial glory (time)

in order to remain

true to himself and his suppliant-friend, Philoctetes (Phil.
1397-1402}.

Although he begins as a naive and impressionable

youth who is
(Phil.

ready to please even the unscrupulous Odysseus

93-94) ,

Neoptolemus

violated conscience

(Phil.

goes

through

902-903)

the

agony

of

a

and achieves his moral

identity thro1Ugh a profound decision which reorients his moral
horizons.

Tht= son of Achilles has literally grown up on stage

during the course of the play.
5.4 Choice And Responsibility In Aristotle

In this

section I shall set forth a general account of

Aristotle's conception of choice (prohairesis) in its relation
to

moral

virtue

in

order

to

demonstrate

the

fundamental

similarity between what the Stagirite calls prohairesis and
the decision
10

which Neoptolemus makes in the play.

I shall

Again,
Sophocles points to the disastrous effects of
having used
deceit instead of persuasion from the very
beginning when we see that Neoptolemus is betrayed by the very
lie which he told to Philoctetes earlier. Philoctetes asserts
that he cannot understand how Neoptolemus could ask that he
fight on behalf of those who robbed him of his father's
ancestral g i f t of honor (hemas t' apeirgein hoi ge sou
k.athubrisan/p.atros qeras sulontes, Phil. 1364-1365}.
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focus upon choice,

with a

briefer discussion of responsi-

bility, because the former concept is more important within
the scheme of Aristotle's moral thought and because Aristotle
seems to view responsibility as a necessary corollary to his
notion of choice.

Furnishing a general account of Aristotle's

conception of choice is something of a piece-meal undertaking
inasmuch

as

Aristotle

scatters

his

comments

about

choice

throughout the Nicomachean Ethics (with one brief mention of
choice in the Poetics).

I shall attempt to bring the dis-

parate pieces of his theory together and show how they will
furnish us with a philosophical understanding of the choice
which the son of Achilles makes near the close of the play.
In close connection with the concept of choice is the
emotional and intellectual integration that Aristotle perceives to be operative in the individual who deliberates,
chooses and acts well.

Thus I

shall also discuss in this

section the role that Aristotle assigns to practical wisdom
in the achievement of this integration of the emotional with
the rational half of the psyche.

Again it is my contention

that tragedian and philosopher are in fundamental agreement
that such integration is necessary to excellent choice and the
excellent employment of practical intelligence.
The first thing to note about choice is that Aristotle
views it as intimately connected with moral virtue.

11

He tells

us in Nicomachean Ethics II.5 that the virtues are some kind
11

see Sherman, The Fabric of Character, pp. 106-117.
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of choice or do

not exist without choice

proaireseis tines e ouk aneu proaireseos,
also mi llllb5-6).

(hai

d'

aretai

EN 1106a3-4,

cf.

In his comprehensive definition of arete

in Book II.6 (EN 1106b36, cf. also EN 1139a22-23), he defines
virtue as a hexis prohairetike, a determinate disposition to
make deliberate choices or decisions.

The ability to make

informed and deliberate choices is then, for Aristotle, a sign
of maturity and moral virtue.

Making choices is an adult

affair; it is not for children (EN llllbS-10).

But this is

predicated upon the prior admission that virtue or excellence
as well as vice depend upon ourselves and that we are responsible for the kind of persons that we are becoming through our
actions. 12

Aristotle puts the matter this way:

Virtue is in our power ( eph' hemin, EN 1113b6) and
likewise vice.
For where it is in our power to act, it
is also in our power not to act, and where we can say
"no," we can also say "yes." Therefore, if we have the
power to act where it is noble to act, we also have the
power not to act where not to act is base; and conversely,
if we have the power not to act where inaction is noble,
we also have the power to act where action is base. But
if we have the power to act nobly or basely, and likewise
the power not to act, and if such action or inaction
constitutes our being good and evil, we must conclude that
it depends on us whether we are decent or worthless
individuals • .
If we do not accept that, we must
contradict the conclusions at which we have just arrived,
and must deny that man is the source and begetter of his
actions as a father is of his children. (EN 1113b6-19.) 13
The person who chooses is fully aware that he is responsible

12

As we have already seen, this is precisely what the
character of Odysseus implicitly denies, namely, that he is
a responsible agent.
13

Ostwald, p. 65.
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for the characteristics (hexeis) which he is developing within
himself as a result of his actions.

He knows that he is, as

Aristotle puts it, the source and begetter of his actions (cf.
also EE 1223a2-19).
The issue of personal responsibility is closely linked
to another central aspect of making a choice for Aristotle and
that

is

personally

chosen. 14

identifying oneself with what one has

Aristotle mentions this twice in his discussion of

the nature of moral virtue at EN II.4 and VI.12.

In both

places he states that it is a critical part of what it means
to be morally virtuous that we choose to act the way that we
do and choose that course of action for its own intrinsic
nobility

(houtos hos

eoiken esti

to pos

echonta prattein

hekasta host' einai agathon lego d' hoion dia proairesin kai
auton heneka ton prattomenon, EN 1144a17-20) . 15

Thus choice,

for Aristotle, involves the presence of moral virtue inasmuch
as it implies centrally a morally responsible agent who claims
responsibility for who she is becoming through the actions
which she performs as well as someone who personally identifies

herself

chooses.

with

the

actions

or

endeavors

which

she

In this way then character, as Aristotle tells us,

14

This is especially important with respect to understanding what an agent's real motive or intention is.
It is
because of this personal identification of the agent with the
the action chosen that Aristotle says that choice is a more
reliable criterion for judging character than actions are (fili
llllb6).
15

see Stewart, Notes, 2:224-225.
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is revealed by the choices we make

(estin de ethos men to

toiouton ho deloi ten proairesin, Poetics, 1450b8-9) and is,
in turn, formed and further articulated by those very choices
(EN 1112al-3).
Since choice entails determining the course of action
which

will

best

promote

one's

own

(and

the

community's)

flourishing as well as taking full responsibility for that
which has been chosen it involves some form of reflective
deliberation antecedent to the making of such a decision.
Hence Aristotle states that choice is the result of preceding
deliberation (to probebouleumenon, EN 1112al5, literally, "the
having been deliberated upon beforehand"
passive participle).

from the perfect

While choice is the result of preceding

deliberation, deliberation is not the only factor,
EN 1113a9) . 16

desire ( orexis bouleutike,
the

borderline

between

the

partaking of both natures:

but also

As such it "is on

intellectual

and

passional,

it can be described as either

desiderative deliberation or deliberative desire.

1117

Aristotle

states this again in a different form in Nicomachean Ethics
VI.2 where he states that choice is either desiring intellect
or intellectual desire (dio e orektikos nous he proairesis e
orexis dianoetike, EN 1139b4-5).

In choices that are good,

reason must be true and desire correct (dei dia tauta men ton

16

see H. H. Joachim, The Nicomachean
Oxford University Press, 1951), p. 101.
17

Ethics

(Oxford,

see Nussbaum, Fragility of Goodness, pp. 307-308.
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te logon alethe einai kai ten orexin orthen eiper he proairesis spoudaia, EN 1139a23-25); that is, reason must affirm and
desire pursue the same things. 18
within the

person of whom the

Good choices then arise
emotional

and desiderati ve

elements are in harmony with the rational part of his psyche.
This is,
stated

in effect,

what Aristotle was getting at when he

in Nicomachean

Ethics

I. 13

that,

for

the virtuous

person, all things speak with the same voice as that of reason
(panta gar homophonei to logo, EN 1102b28).

Let us take a

more detailed look at Aristotle's conception of the role of
reason in the achievement of virtue in order that we may come
to a better understanding of the kind of integration of the
emotional and desiderative elements with the rational that are
part

of

choosing,

feeling

and

acting

in

accordance

with

virtue.
5.5 Practical Reason, Emotion And Action In Aristotle
When Aristotle takes up the definition of virtue in its
genus at Nicomachean Ethics II.5, he proposes three different
things present in the soul as possible candidates: emotions
(pathe), capacities (dunameis) and characteristics (hexeis).
By emotions he means such things as anger, fear, confidence,
envy,

joy and

so on

(EN

1105b22).

A capacity Aristotle

defines as that by which we are said to be affected by such
emotions as listed above, i.e., the potentiality to feel anger

18

see Stewart, Notes, 2:24-25.
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or fear

or

joy

(EN 1105b23-24).

Characteristics are the

condition, either good or bad, in which we are in relation to
our emotions (kath' has pros ta pathe echomen eu e kakos, EN
1105b25-26).

Aristotle rejects the raw emotion as a candidate

for virtue because a person is neither praised nor blamed, he
says, for expressing fear or anger pure and simple (ho haplos
orgizomenos, EN 1105b33-1106al), but only for expressing such
emotions in a certain way (all' ho pos, EN 1106al).

Further-

more, he says, in the case of the emotions we are said to be
moved (kata men ta pathe kineisthai legometha, EN 1106a4-5),
but with respect to our virtues and vices we are not said to
be moved but to be disposed in a certain way (ou kineisthai
alla diakeisthai pos, EN 1106a6).

Aristotle also rejects the

capacity to feel emotions as a candidate for virtue because
he asserts again that we are neither praised nor blamed for
our capacity to feel certain emotions but only for a certain
developed disposition with respect to our emotional life (EN
1106a6-9).

He states, furthermore, that our capacities have

been given to us by nature and that we do not develop by
nature into good or bad people but only through moral education.
a

In this way then Aristotle is left with virtue being

characteristic

(hexis),

namely,

a

certain

determinate

disposition with respect to one's emotional life. 19
he

has

defined

disposition
19

virtue

with

in

respect

Ibid., 1: 187-188.

general
to

our

terms

as

emotions

a

Now that

qualitative

(and

actions),
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Aristotle proceeds to specify what sort of characteristic this
is.

It is here that we shall see more clearly how reason

conditions and directs emotional response.
When Aristotle stated earlier that we are praised and
blamed for expressing emotion in a certain way (EN 1106al) and
that virtues and vices are being disposed in a certain way
with respect to our emotions

(EN 1106a6),

he provided an

important clue as to the specific kind of characteristic a
virtue is.

We are disposed poorly toward the emotion of anger

if we express this feeling either too violently or too timidly
in accordance with the situation (ei men sphodros e aneimenos
kakos echomen, EN 1105b27).

We are disposed well with respect

to anger if we respond with appropriate intensity given both
the context of the situation and our own temperamental makeup
(EN 1105b27-28).

The latter point is what it means to achieve

the relative mean with respect to emotion (to de meson zetei
kai touth haireitai meson de ou to tou pragmatos alla to pros
hemas, EN 1106b6-7).

Thus Aristotle says that it is possible

to experience fear, confidence, anger and many other kinds of
emotions in an inappropriate fashion given both the context
and our temperament, but to experience all this:
. at the right time, toward the right objects, toward
the right people, for the right reason, and in the right
manner--that is the median and the best course, the course
that is a mark of virtue. (EN 1106b21-24.) 20
Thus virtue, according to Aristotle, is a determinate disposi-

20

Ostwald, p. 43.
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tion to feel (and to act) in such a way as is fitting to the
situation given both the context and our own temperament
(hitting

the

relative

mean,

EN

1107al).

This

excellent

expression of feeling and action is determined by reason or
in whatever way the practically wise person would determine
it

(horismene

1107al-2).
intimate

logo kai

ho

an ho

phronimos

horiseien,

EN

In this way then we can see that there is an
connection

between

the

role

of

reason

and

the

achieving of the relative mean in feeling and action.
Thus, Aristotle holds that the emotional and desiderative part of the soul requires the assistance and guidance of
reason in order that feelings and desires may be expressed
appropriately and the good carried out excellently in the
ever-varying situations of human life. 21

It is the role of

practical wisdom (phronesis or orthos logos) to perceive the
salient features of a given situation and to determine the
appropriate emotional response as well as the most fitting
action given the context and the individual's temperamental

21

see Yves Simon, The Definition of Moral Virtue (New
York, Fordham University Press, 1986), pp. 96-98. Simon sees
that it is the special capacity of practical wisdom to
determine the appropriate course of action no matter how
unprecedented the circumstances or unique the situation.
Neoptolemus' deliberate decision to oppose Odysseus and
return Philoctetes' bow and his election to persuade Philoctetes to come to Troy (having finally rejected the use of
deceit and violence) can be seen as an excellent exercising
of his practical intelligence inasmuch as he is acting and
feeling in accordance with virtue in what is surely for him
a unique and unprecedented circumstance.
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makeup. 22
Aristotle further emphasizes the centrality of the role
of practical wisdom in the attainment of moral virtue
Nicomachean Ethics VI.13.

in

In the previous chapter he shows

that without moral virtue practical wisdom would be nothing
more than a "certain cunning capacity for linking means to any
end rather than to those ends which are genuine goods for
man."B

In this chapter he shows what would happen to moral

virtue if it lacked the assistance of this "eye of the soul,"
practical wisdom (EN 1144a29-30).

And just as in the previous

chapter he compared practical wisdom to the "cunning capacity"
of

cleverness

(deinotes,

EN

1144a24-25),

so also

chapter he compares natural virtue to virtue
sense. 24

in this

in the full

Aristotle states that various kinds of character

inhere in all of us in a certain way by nature (huparchein
phusei pos, EN 1144b4-5).

Thus, we have a certain tendency

to be just, temperate and courageous from birth (euthus ek
genetes,

EN 1144b6).

Still he insists,

we seek something

more, that is, the good in a more authoritative sense and the

22

see Nussbaum, Fragility of Goodness, pp. 290-317.

~acintyre, After Virtue, p. 154.
24

The overall scheme of both chapters is to show the
interdependence of the two, namely, how practical wisdom
requires the virtues in order to be itself and not the
counterfeit form of practical wisdom which Aristotle names
cleverness. Similarly, virtue in the full and authoritative
(kurios) sense requires practical wisdom in order to be itself
and not the mere unanchored proclivity toward appropriate
action and passion which he terms natural virtue.
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possession of these character traits in another way

(all'

homos zetoumen heteron ti to kurios agathon kai ta toiauta
allon tropon huparchein, EN 1144b6-8).

Aristotle notes that

children and beasts have these natural qualities but without
intelligence they can be harmful
phainontai ousai, EN 1144b9).

(all'

aneu nou

blaberai

Thus natural virtue without the

assistance of practical wisdom is like a powerful body which
because it moves without sight is bound to be tripped up and
to come down with a mighty fall because of its lack of vision
(hosper

somati

sphallesthai
entautha,

ischuro

ischuros

aneu

dia

EN 1144b10-12) . 25

to

opseos
me

kinoumeno

echein

opsin

The presence of

sumbainei
houto

kai

intelligence,

however, makes all the difference with respect to action and
transforms the natural characteristic into that virtue in the
full and authoritative sense which it formerly only resembled
( EN

114 4 b 13 -14 ) .

26

In this way then Aristotle argues most

25

It is interesting to note here Aristotle's use of the
verb sphallo, a term regularly used of wrestlers who attempt
to throw each other down by tripping. Anyone who has wrestled
knows that success is not only a matter of innate strength but
requires excellent judgment as to when and how to pursue and
avoid (to put it in Aristotelian terms).
Failure to develop
and exercise this kind of perception will inevitably end in
a serious fall.
26

see MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 154: "As we transform
our initial naturally given dispositions into virtues of
character, we do so by gradually coming to exercise those
dispositions kata ton orthon logon. The exercise of intelligence is what makes the crucial difference between a natural
disposition of a certain kind and the corresponding virtue."
My position with regard to the relationship of practical
wisdom to moral virtue is in agreement with MacIntyre (cited
above), Richard Sorabji, "Aristotle on the Role of Intellect
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explicitly that complete virtue is not possible without the
assistance of practical wisdom (houto kai epi tau ethikou duo
esti to men arete phusike to d' he kuria kai touton he kuria
ou ginetai aneu phroneseos, EN 1144b15-17).

Practical wisdom

is thus a kind of practical seeing or sight without which we
cannot hit the median in feelings and action in any consistent
or reliable sort of way.

It is only in cooperation with this

"eye of the soul" that the moral virtues will be exercised in
an effective way.
5.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we have seen that the figure of Neop-

in Virtue" in Essays On Aristotle's Ethics, ed. Amelie
Oksenberg Rorty (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, University of
California Press, 1980) pp. 210-218 and Stewart, Notes, 2:107110 who are all in agreement that moral virtue in the complete
sense cannot be achieved without the assistance of practical
wisdom.
The position here defended is in opposition to the
view of Fortenbaugh, Aristotle on Emotion, pp. 70-75, who
holds that certain virtues (in the full sense) can be attained
without the vision which practical wisdom provides.
Fortenbaugh rests his case (too heavily it seems to me) upon the
consideration of a peculiar case with respect to the virtue
of courage.
He argues that it is Aristotle's position that
excellent (i.e. courageous) response to sudden dangers does
not require deliberation but can be referred wholly to the
"stochastic perfection" of the "alogical half of the soul."
It seems to me that Fortenbaugh underestimates the interdependence of practical wisdom and moral virtue which Aristotle
sees as ultimately enmeshed or co-implicated in each other
(cf. especially filf VI.12 and 13).
Furthermore, it seems to
me that it is possible to deny that every action needs to be
immediately preceded by deliberation without asserting that
such an action stems wholly from the excellence of the
alogical half of the soul. MacIntyre suggests that rational
action (e.g., courageous response to sudden dangers) may be
based upon "long previous deliberation." See MacIntyre, Whose
Justice, p. 135.

189

tolemus

achieves

authentic

human

agency

through

assuming

mature responsibility for his own actions and making a choice
which

gives

evidence

of

excellent

attainment of psychic harmony.

deliberation

and

the

In this way, it has been my

contention that the character of Neoptolemus is an excellent
expression of the ancient anthropology which we have been
exploring.

We not only see operative all of the various

elements of the human psyche which the ancients saw as part
of the moral agent but we see how they can constitute a
harmonious whole as they are exercised by the virtuous person.
I have also noted the way in which modern moral philosophy in
the Kantian tradition disparages the employment of examples
as a

form of moral education and devalues the moral sig-

nificance of the achievement of such psychological integration
in action.

Again, this I would say is due to its wrongheaded

predeliction

for

the

abstract

over

the

concrete

and

its

truncated conception of the moral agent in which the significance of the other elements of the psyche (besides reason)
to the formation of the moral agent are ignored.
Though the poet and the philosopher are in fundamental
agreement with respect to their conception of the moral person
each employs his own particular medium for exploring this
issue in a way that enriches the other's insights.

This is

a corollary of the thesis that I have been developing.

They

see the same truths but as refracted through two different
lenses, the one through poetry and the other through philo-
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sophy.

The

philosopher

furnishes

us

with

a

technical

vocabulary through which he describes the process and the
components of decision-making.

In addition, he furnishes us

(in his discussion of choice) with a nuanced and subtle moral
psychology in which excellent choice is seen as grounded in
the complete integration of the emotional and desiderative
elements of the soul with the rational part.

This uncon-

flicted and integrated psyche is, for Aristotle, characteristic of moral virtue in general.

It is this person whose

emotions and desires are most in accord with the dictates of
reason.

While Aristotle, as a philosopher, furnishes us with

an analysis of these topics,

Sophocles, the poet,

through the medium of character what making a

shows us

choice and

taking responsibility for that decision might look and feel
like.

In this way the poet does not give us analysis but a

moving portrayal of the phenomena.

One of the things which

the poet makes very clear is that the process of deliberation
and the actual making of a choice is (or at least can be) a
very painful process.

This is something which Aristotle does

not sufficiently emphasize and which may be the peculiar part
of a tragic poet to reveal.

Sophocles' powerful portrayal of

the character of Neoptolemus shows us a young man who is in
the throes of agony as a result of trying to discern what to
do and to embrace his decision.

Both philosopher and traged-

ian are in close agreement that the emotions and reason are
not fundamentally at odds with each other but are capable of
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working together in harmony with a view to achieving the good.
But the poet is peculiarly suited to show the power of this
thesis inasmuch he portrays a character who suffers internal
discord and

then achieves

a

remarkable

through the choice that he makes.

resolution

in and

In this way we witness both

the confusion and paralysis of Neoptolemus' psychic civil war
and the boldness and wisdom of words and deeds that stem from
a

man who has now become profoundly at one with himself.

Sophocles shows us what excellent and mature human agency is
all about through the depiction of his character Neoptolemus.
When we look to the character of Neoptolemus we can fully
understand why Aristotle asserts that the making of a choice
is not for children but is an adult affair.

CHAPTER 6
FRIENDSHIP AND THE MORAL LIFE IN SOPHOCLES AND ARISTOTLE

6.1 Introduction
In

this

chapter

I

shall

argue

that

Sophocles

and

Aristotle share a fundamental sense that the moral life is not
something

that

can

be

achieved

alone.

Both

poet

and

philosopher show us that the life of virtue is not a solitary
enterprise but involves the presence of friendships that are
based upon shared values and a mutual sympathy and care for
the friend for his own sake.

The ancients viewed friendship

as an essential part of ethics because they were fundamentally
pre-occupied with the issue of character and understood that
the sort of person one would become is closely connected with
those with whom one associated.

They clearly appreciated the

way in which friends are both an expression of one's character
and have a formative influence upon one's character.

Since

the question of character was viewed as intimately connected
with the issue of happiness, the ancients rightly understood
friends

to

be an

important

element

in whether

one

led a

fulfilled or frustrated life.
Modern moral philosophy stemming from Kant, on the other
hand, shows scant appreciation of the social character of an
individual's growth into personhood.
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This is so because of
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Kant's pre-occupation with establishing the moral autonomy of
the person and the illegitimacy of being governed by any other
principle in the fulfillment of one's duty.

Given this focus

upon autonomy as the only viable mode of acting morally it is
no wonder that Kant has so little room for the vital role of
the other in his conception of moral philosophy.

It would

seem to me that the ancients would have viewed this as a
peculiarly abstract and untenable position that simply ignores
the very real way in which friends have a formative influence
upon who we are and the quality of the lives that we lead.
Sophocles will present his case for the centrality of
what I shall call friendship of character in his presentation
of

the

perilous and uncertain

course of

between Neoptolemus and Philoctetes.

the relationship

In this regard, the poet

employs Philoctetes' bow as the central symbol which mirrors
the state of their relationship.

At the very beginning of the

play, Sophocles shows us the shallow nature of Neoptolemus'
stance toward the suffering hero when the young man's interest
in Philoctetes is nothing more than a means to the end of
getting his bow.

He is, of course, at this time under the

guidance and tutelage of the wily Odysseus.
deceit,

the son of Achilles enters into a

By means of

friendship with

Philoctetes and is even entrusted with the sacred bow which
he received from Heracles.
It is evident, however, that the basis of their friendship is a sham and is doomed to be exposed and break apart.
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The basis of this relationship must be changed and placed upon
a

foundation of mutual trust if it is ever to bear fruit.

This is precisely what Sophocles shows us in the course of the
play.

Through his compassion and friendship for Philoctetes

the son of Achilles determines, heroically, to return the bow
which he stole from his friend.

As a result, he earns for

himself the opposition of Odysseus and the potential wrath of
the entire Greek army.

By having the son of Achilles return

the bow to its rightful owner Sophocles now makes it possible
for a true and genuine friendship to be established between
Philoctetes and Neoptolemus.

Neoptolemus' use of persuasion

instead of deceit in his attempts to convince Philoctetes to
go to Troy and fight on behalf of the Greeks signifies that
the son of Achilles is attempting to initiate a different kind
of relationship with Philoctetes, one that will be based upon
openness and mutual respect.

But Philoctetes' suspicions and

(most especially) his hatred of the Greeks has not subsided
and thus Sophocles appeals to a friend whose words the broken
hero will find irresistable: that friend is none other than
Heracles.
Through the epiphany of Heracles, Sophocles ratifies the
friendship between Philoctetes and Neoptolemus by showing that
they are to share a common destiny.

In Heracles the relation-

ship between the bow as the symbol of the friendship between
Philoctetes and Neoptolemus comes full circle and is referred
back to its origin in the act of friendship for which Philoc-
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tetes first received the bow from the hero.
theophany

of

Heracles

that

Sophocles

It is through the

shows

us

that

true

friendship must be based upon mutual trust and understanding
and that such a friendship, alone, can serve as the basis of
the heroic destiny which Neoptolemus and Philoctetes will
share.

Thus, the openness and friendship that was begun by

Neoptolemus is sanctioned by the god-friend Heracles.

And it

is in this way that the tragedian indicates that true friendship is that which is based upon a love of and a concern for
the character of the beloved.

This kind of friendship can

have nothing to do with the deceit,

secrecy and treachery

which Neoptolemus practiced upon Philoctetes.

The god comes

to show that it is only in friendship that is founded upon
fidelity to and a genuine concern for the other that great
things can be accomplished.
Aristotle, also, deeply shares a sense of the centrality
of friendship in living the good life.

He holds that friend-

ship is most necessary to life and that no one could bear to
live without friends even if she had all other external goods.
Of the three different kinds of friendship discussed (based
on use,

pleasure or good character),

Aristotle repeatedly

stresses the importance of friendship based upon love of the
other's character as critical to a flourishing life.

It is

this form of friendship that Aristotle understands to be the
central case or instance of what it means to be a

friend.
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Here, friendship becomes a "moral enterprise 111 inasmuch as it
is only in this kind of relationship that the character of the
other is the ground of the friendship and continuous activity
in accordance with virtue is the fruit and sustenance of the
friends' love for each other.

Aristotle holds, in fact, that

we cannot become good without these kinds of friendships in
our lives and that we cannot hope to achieve any adequate
understanding of ourselves without this highest and best kind
of relationship.
Once again, we shall see that it is the great strength
and peculiar contribution of the poet to furnish a dramatic
presentation of the theme which is under discussion.

He shows

us characters who are in a particular relationship with each
other and how that relationship is shattered by the revelation
of Neoptolemus' deceit and then re-established upon foundations where authentic friendship may truly flourish.

Sopho-

cles shows us how Neoptolemus originally treats Philoctetes
as a mere means to another end, but then, when his friendship
with the son of Poeas has become authentic, how he is willing
to sacrifice everything for the sake of his friend.

Sophocles

further exalts friendship when Philoctetes' intransigence to
the appeals of his human friend, Neoptolemus, gives way to the
words of his divine friend, Heracles.
In this way, Sophocles furnishes us with the phenomena,
1

see Paul J. Wadell, C.P. Friendship and the Moral Life
(Notre Dame, Indiana, University of Notre Dame Press, 1989),
p. 62.
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that is, what friendship may look like and feel like in the
concrete.

Aristotle, on the other hand, furnishes us with a

detailed, analytical discussion of the nature and character
of friendship.

It is precisely for this kind of analysis,

this furnishing of a logos for the phenomena, that we turn to
the words of a philosopher.

Hence, Aristotle discusses the

various kinds of friendship and their different bases.

He

states explicitly why the friendship of character is superior
and enumerates the various contributions to human flourishing
which this kind of friendship, alone, can furnish.

Both poet

and philosopher illuminate the reality of friendship in their
respective

ways

and

so

they

each

have

a

claim

upon

our

attention.

Let us turn then to a consideration of Sophocles'

treatment of friendship.
6.2 Neoptolemus. Philoctetes and Friendship
In one of the opening scenes of the play,
shows us how,

under the tutelage of Odysseus,

Sophocles

the son of

Achilles is led to focus on the bow of Heracles and to ignore
its owner:
OD: It's not right to have scruples about something when
you do it for profit (kerdos)
NE: But what profit (kerdos) is it to me that Philoctetes
come to Troy?
OD: The bow alone (mona) will take Troy.
NE: Wasn't I the one who was to sack the city, as it was
said?
OD: Neither you without the bow nor the bow without you.
NE: Well then, if that's the case, it must be hunted down
(therate', Phil. 111-116.)
In this brief exchange we can see that Odysseus leads Neop-
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tolemus to believe that it is the possession of the bow alone
which will be sufficient to capture Troy.

Odysseus instructs

the son of Achilles to focus on the thing to be captured and
to disregard how it is captured and the person to whom it
belongs.

Implicit in this instruction is the message that

Neoptolemus is not to enter into any real relationship with
Philoctetes but is simply to treat him as a means of obtaining
that alone without which the fall of Troy cannot take place.
Odysseus' obsession with the bow to the exclusion of the man
is,

of course,

Helenos.

in direct opposition with the prophecy of

This is,

with his character)

indeed,

strange (though not out of line

inasmuch as he claims to be the servant

of Zeus and to be doing nothing but carrying out his will
(Phil. 989-990) .
The prophecy of Helenos,
enigmatic.

in this drama,

is somewhat

Correct discernment of its import comes gradually

and is only revealed in its fullness with the theophany of
Heracles. 2
2

One thing, however, that comes forth clearly from

This is the case, I would argue, not only because of
the enigmatic nature of the prophecy itself but because of
Odysseus' misguided focus on the bow to the exclusion of the
man. It is precisely this focus on the object to be obtained
and its concomitant denial of the personhood of Philoctetes
that, at the very beginning of the play, leads him to argue
in favor of the use of deceit (Phil. 100-109).
If the only
important thing is the bow then the man who owns it must be
treated as a means to it and manipulated in such a way that
it is yielded up.
It seems to me, furthermore, that Odysseus' pre-occupation with an object to the exclusion of the personal is a part
of his general moral and personal make-up in the play.
We
have already seen this to be the case in the way that he shuns
personal responsibility for his own actions and defers to
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the prophecy is that the bow alone is not sufficient to bring
about the fall of Troy.

The bow and the man, alone, will be

sufficient and the latter must come willingly, by persuasion.
In both passages of the play where the prophecy is related at
any length Philoctetes, not the bow, is the focus of attention.

According to the merchant,

Helenos prophesied that

unless Philoctetes were persuaded by argument

(ei me tonde

peisantes logo, Phil. 612) to leave Lemnos and come to Troy
that the citadel of that great city would never fall to the
Greeks.

Neoptolemus confirms (and expands) the account of the

merchant when he states that Philoctetes will never receive
relief from his terrible illness until he willingly (hekon,
Phil. 1332) goes to the plains of Troy and meets up with the
sons of Asclepius.

There he will receive healing and will go

on, with his bow, to win martial glory on the battlefield in
the eyes of all the Greeks (Phil. 1334-1335).
Under the guidance of Odysseus, Neoptolemus, at first,
initiates a friendship with the son of Poeas that is nothing
but a sham inasmuch as it is based upon lies and deception
motivated by the "profit" which he mentions above
Phil. 112).

(kerdos,

The elaborate deceit which the son of Achilles

practices upon Philoctetes

is solely aimed at getting the

latter's bow and ignores the relational aspect of the prophecy
of Helenos.

The prophecy mentioned the necessity of Philoc-

certain vague and impersonal necessities to which he must
submit without thought or question (see above, 4.2).
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tetes' willing compliance which, in turn,

implies some kind

of friendly relationship that is based upon openness, respect
and trust.

Deceit and then force will both be tried and found

wanting during the course of the drama.

It is only the son

of Achilles' use of persuasion that will be seen to be in line
with the sort of respect for Philoctetes which the prophecy
implies.

Neoptolemus will only gradually come to understand

the real import of Helenos' prophecy and the grounds of an
authentic friendship.

Sophocles traces this development by

means of the central symbol of the bow,

which mirrors the

relationship of Philoctetes and Neoptolemus. 3
At the mid-point of the play Sophocles

focuses

our

attention on the bow as that which represents the character
of the friendship between Philoctetes and Neoptolemus.
this

section

the

tragedian

shows

us

that

the

In

friendship

between the two is, as it were, ratified by the son of Poeas
who

allows

Neoptolemus

first

to

touch

the

bow

and

then

actually entrusts the young man with it as the broken hero
suffers one of his attacks of excruciating pain.
never tires of showing us,

Sophocles

in this section, the incongruity

of what is said about their friendship and the actual state
of affairs that exists between these two men.
When Neoptolemus asks

if it is permissible

(themis,

Phil. 661) for him to touch Philoctetes' bow the son of Poeas
generously responds:
3

see Blundell, Helping Friends, pp. 204-205.
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You speak holy things. It is permissible for you, child.
For you alone have given me the chance to see this light
of the sun, my homeland at Oeta, my old father, my
friends.
You alone, though I was in the power of my
enemies, stood me up over them.
Be confident!
You may
touch it and give it back, boasting that you alone of
mortals touched it because of your virtue.
For even I
myself acquired it by helping someone (Phil. 662-670.)
Neoptolemus answers:
I am not distressed that I have met you and taken you as
my friend. For whoever knows how to do a good turn after
receiving one (eu dran eu pathon epistatai) would become
a friend better than any possession (Phil. 671-673.)
In this scene Sophocles shows us that Philoctetes formally
confirms Neoptolemus as his friend through the outward ritual
of permitting the son of Achilles to handle his bow.

He

grants this friendship to Neoptolemus because of the latter's
promise to deliver Philoctetes from his fate on Lemnos and on
account of a shared sense of the importance of virtue and
friendship

which

the

bow

itself

symbolizes.

Philoctetes

refers to the way that friendship and virtuous action come
together, symbolically, in the bow when he says that he, too,
acquired the bow by doing a good deed.

He is, of course,

referring to lighting the funeral pyre of Heracles when the
hero was suffering on his death bed.

At the time no one who

was present was willing to step forward and perform such an
awesome deed.
to

oblige

Philoctetes, alone, mustered sufficient courage

Heracles

and

end

his

sufferings.

By

calling

attention to Heracles in this instance Philoctetes is drawing
a parallel between the friendship that exists between him and
Heracles and the friendship that he

is now enjoying with
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Neoptolemus.

Both

sets of

friendships

arose out

of

the

performance of a noble deed.
Once again, Sophocles shows himself to be a master of
irony in Neoptolemus' response to the ritual sealing of his
friendship with Philoctetes.

The son of Achilles states that

he has no cause to regret (ouk achthomai, Phil. 671) having
met up with Philoctetes and taking him as a friend when barely
one hundred and fifty lines later he will say that he has been
greatly distressed and has been suffering over Philoctetes'
terrible fate for a long time (Phil. 806).
ly,

however,

More significant-

we see that Sophocles has Neoptolemus accept

Philoctetes' offer of friendship with an accompanying moral
maxim that he is in the very process of violating. 4

It is in

this way that the tragedian reminds us, within this scene of
apparent

trust

and

friendship,

that

the

relationship

of

Neoptolemus and Philoctetes has, in reality, been established
upon the shaky ground of deception and distrust.

Neoptolemus'

little maxim expresses praise for Philoctetes as a
inasmuch as he "knows how to do a good turn"
tolemus to handle his bow)
promise of Neoptolemus'

friend

(allow Neop-

after he has received one

help in getting home).

(the

As such a

friend Neoptolemus asserts that Philoctetes is "worth more
than any possession."

Again, the devastating irony here is

that even as he praises Philoctetes as a friend who is worth
more than any possession,
4

it is precisely

see Blundell, Helping Friends, p. 204

( and only)

what
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Philoctetes possesses that is the real ground at that moment
of Neoptolemus' interest in Philoctetes as a friend. 5

In this

way, Sophocles shows how the bow operates as a complex symbol
which mirrors the state of the relationship of Philoctetes and
Neoptolemus.
friendship

In

this

case,

it

is

a

sign

of

reciprocal

and trust that conceals the betrayal which

festering at the heart of their relationship.

is

Sophocles will

show us that it is this betrayal and deceit that must be
revealed and removed in order that the friendship of Neoptolemus and Philoctetes may be placed on the firm footing of
genuine trust and concern for the other, the only basis upon
which their friendship will be capable of bearing any fruit.
Sophocles again points to the ambiguity of the relationship between Philoctetes and Neoptolemus

in the scene

where Philoctetes entrusts Neoptolemus with his bow while he
is overcome with sleep.

As Philoctetes is handing the bow

over to the son of Achilles he utters the ominous words:
Here it is, child, take it! But avert the envy of the gods
(ton phthonon de proskuson) lest you, too, have great
sufferings as both I and the one who acquired it before
me have had. (Phil. 776-778.)
Neoptolemus is in a most unhappy situation here.

As in the

previous scene, he is being allowed by Philoctetes to handle
the bow.
5

The significant difference here is that its owner

If I am not going too far with the irony, there even
appears to be a kind of ironic play upon Philoctetes' name in
this passage.
Neoptolemus says that Philoctetes (the roots
of whose name are philos and ktaomai or ktema, literally,
"love of possessing") will be a friend better than any
possession (ktematos kreisson philos, Phil. 673).
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is going to be unconscious and so this act on the part of
Philoctetes demonstrates even greater trust in Neoptolemus.
Philoctetes' words, however, can only make Neoptolemus uneasy
because he knows that he is only being permitted to handle the
bow on the grounds of his supposed friendship for Philoctetes.
And

yet

it

is

under

the

very

inauspicious

conditions

of

receiving the bow through deceit that Philoctetes utters his
prayer that misfortune not come to Neoptolemus because of the
gods' envy.

Sophocles is, thus, showing us the true status

of the friendship between Philoctetes and Neoptolemus through
the symbol of the bow.

Through the prophecy of Helenos we

know that the war at Troy cannot be won without Philoctetes
and his bow.

We know, furthermore, that the bow was given to

the son of Poeas by Heracles as a token of appreciation and
friendship for Philoctetes' act of kindness when the great
hero lay vulnerable and on his death bed.

This time it is

Philoctetes

unconscious

who

is

about

to

be

vulnerable from his terrible wound.

rendered

and

He, like Heracles, will

entrust another with the bow which was originally given out
of love and need.

By drawing an implicit parallel between

these two scenes Sophocles points both to the way in which the
bow symbolizes one friend's need of another as well as the
authenticity of the first friendship in poignant contrast with
the second.

The tragedian, thus, shows that the bow signifies

the two men's need of each other as well as the necessity that
their friendship be based upon a genuine foundation if it is
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ever

to

lead

to

the

heroic

destiny

about

which

Helenos

prophesied. 6
Sophocles shows us that the false basis of the relationship between Neoptolemus and Philoctetes must be revealed in
order that their friendship may come to be established upon
a more genuine foundation.

Thus we witness the breakdown of

their relationship when Neoptolemus confesses that Philoctetes
is to set sail for Troy and not Oeta (Phil.

915).

In this

scene Philoctetes tellingly addresses Neoptolemus with the icy
word, "stranger" (oh xene, Phil. 923). 7

Betrayed by the only

friend he thought he had, Philoctetes turns to "dialogue" with
the landscape (Phil. 936-940) during which time he addresses
the bow that has been forced from his hands as his only true
friend (oh toxon philon oh philon/cheiron ekbebiasmenon, Phil.
1128-1129).

There

is

a

touch

of

irony here

inasmuch as

Philoctetes addresses as his only friend the very thing which
has made of Neoptolemus a faux ami.
The son of Achilles is utterly anguished and confused
by the pain which he has caused Philoctetes and falls into a
long silence
dramatic

(fhil. 974-1074).

silence

of

It is through this powerfully

Neoptolemus

that

Sophocles

marks

the

crucial transition that the son of Achilles makes from being
a liar to a truth-teller,

6
7

from practicing deceit (dolos) to

see Blundell, Helping Friends, p. 205.

see P. E. Easterling, "Character in Sophocles," Greece
and Rome, 24 (1977) 129.
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the employment of persuasion

(peitho). 8

When he reappears

with Odysseus at line 1222 Sophocles shows us that he has not
only chosen a new course of action (as I have argued above in
section 5.3) but that he has also made a fundamental decision
with respect to whom he will befriend.

Neoptolemus rejects

the tutelage and friendship of Odysseus and now seeks to
establish a friendship with Philoctetes upon a more genuine
foundation. 9
Neoptolemus does everything in his power to communicate
his willingness to repair the damage that he has done and to
be a true friend to Philoctetes.

He begins by asking for

forgiveness from the son of Poeas

(Phil.

straightway,

1270).

He then,

shows his good will by bidding Philoctetes to

stretch forth his right hand and be master of his bow (Phil.
1292}.

Deceit and violence have been tried and found wanting.

Persuasion, the only mode of approach actually in line with
the prophecy of Helenos
Persuasion is,

(Phil.

furthermore,

612)

is,

at last, employed.

the only way that is in accord

with the openness and care for Philoctetes as a person that

8

see R. G. A. Buxton, Persuasion in Greek Tragedy: A
Study of Peitho (Cambridge, New York, Cambridge University
Press, 1982), pp. 122-123.
9

The tragedian is,
furthermore,
indicating that a
significant moral discovery about oneself is often attended
by a re-evaluation of the kind of person that one is capable
of befriending or, as in this case, of continuing to call
one's friend.
We are shown that Neoptolemus' choice of a
radically different conception of justice from that of
Odysseus' expediency involves also a new conception of whom
he can call his friend.

207
is

the

mark

of

genuine

friendship.

Sophocles

indicates

Philoctetes' acceptance of Neoptolemus' overtures of friendship when

he

resumes

calling the young man

"friend"

and

"child" {Phil. 1290, 1295, 1301, 1310), but it remains to be
seen whether Neoptolemus' friendly employment of persuasion
will bring Philoctetes to Troy.
What, in fact, Sophocles presents to us is something of
a reversal of our expectations.

Neoptolemus tries mightily

to persuade Philoctetes to go to Troy but,

in the end,

is

persuaded by Philoctetes to take him to his home at Oeta
{Phil. 1402).

Philoctetes' persuasion of Neoptolemus has come

as a result of each hearing the other out in a spirit of
mutual respect and concern for the genuine good of the other. 10
Neoptolemus'

sympathetic response to and persuasion by the

words of his friend,

in a sense, prefigure Philoctetes' own

sympathetic response to the persuasive words of his divine
friend, Heracles.
Sophocles makes it known from the outset that Heracles
intervenes

not only as

a

god

but also as

a

friend.

He

addresses Philoctetes with the endearing epithet of "child"
(pai

Poiantos,

Phil.

1410)

which

Philoctetes

employed throughout the play with Neoptolemus.

10

himself

has

Through this

see Buxton, Persuasion in Greek Tragedy, p. 124.
The
author rightly points out the contrasting parallel between
Neoptolemus' use of the hortatory subjunctive when inviting
Philoctetes to leave Lemnos under false pretences {Phil. 526,
645) and his use of the same verbal formula when he acquiesces
to Philoctetes' wishes through truthful and friendly exchange.
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same

address

the

tragedian

makes

explicit

the

parallel

between the friendship of Philoctetes and Neoptolemus and that
of Heracles and Philoctetes.
parallel,
778).

implicitly,

In

addition,

heavenly seat for

Philoctetes had referred to this

in two previous passages
Heracles

Philoctetes'

says

that

own sake

he

(Phil.

has

left

(ten sen d'

charin ouranias hedras prolipon, Phil. 1413-1414).

670,
his
heko

He informs

Philoctetes that his sufferings have not been in vain but will
earn for

him a

glorious

thesthai

bion,

resulted

in the possession of

Phil.

life

1422)

(ek ton ponon tond'

just

as

his

own

euklea

labors

immortal excellence

have

(hosous

ponesas kai diexelthon ponous/athanaton areten eschon, Phil.
1420}.

The condition upon which such a reknowned life rests,

however,
1423) .

is his friendship with the son of Achilles (Phil.

Heracles makes the interwoven destinies of Philoctetes

and Neoptolemus explicit in the following lines:
For neither will you, Philoctetes, be strong enough to
take the plains of Troy without this young man here nor
will he be strong enough without you.
But you are to
watch over each other as two grazing lions (Phil. 1434143 7.)
These lines are striking not only for the way in which they
speak of the new friends' common destiny but also for the way
in which they parallel and respond to Odysseus' earlier words
regarding the importance of the bow.
said

to

Neoptolemus

that

the

bow

and

Odysseus had earlier
the

bow

alone

was

necessary to take Troy (out' an su keinon choris out' ekeina
sou, Phil. 115).

His emphasis, as we stated, was solely upon
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the object to be obtained in complete disregard for the person
who owned the bow and how he might be related (as the prophecy
of Helenos indicated) to the destiny of the Greeks fighting
at Troy.
of

Heracles corrects Odysseus 11 by replacing the pursuit

some object to

be obtained with a

relationship to

be

sustained, that is, the friendship of Philoctetes and Neoptolemus.

It is no longer to be an object, the bow, that will

be the basis of heroic action but a friendship founded upon
mutual trust, openness and understanding. 12
theophany of the god-friend,
explicit

that

heroic

and

Heracles,

virtuous

Thus, through the

Sophocles makes

activity

requires

it
the

existence of deep and lasting friendships that are based upon
openness and fidelity to the person of the beloved.
perhaps,

This is,

the ultimate meaning of the prophecy of Helenos. 13

Neoptolemus is slow to understand this, but Sophocles shows
us that as he grows in moral maturity in the course of the
play he comes to understand the meaning of the bow in its
connection to genuine friendship and the divine friend who
gave it to Philoctetes.

This is confirmed and fully revealed

by the intervention of Heracles who shows that it is in and
through philia that salvation lies (Phil. 1396).
Having discussed the position of the tragedian on this
11

Note the striking, exact parallel of both oute .
oute clauses at Phil. 115 and 1434-1435.
12

see Christopher Gill, "Bow, Oracle, and Epiphany in
Sophocles' Philoctetes," Greece and Rome, 27 (1980) 144.
13

Ibid., 143-144.
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topic

it

is

now time to turn

to

the

reflections

of

the

philosopher.
6.3 Aristotle on Friendship and the Moral Life
Just as the tragedian argues that heroic activity is
based upon the sort of friendship that is founded upon love
and care for the person of the beloved, so also the philosopher holds that friendships of character are a necessary
part of a flourishing human life.

Aristotle does not furnish

us with the sort of dramatic development of a particular relationship as the tragedian presents.

What he,

as a philo-

sopher, furnishes is a logos of the phenomena of friendship.
In

the

previous

section

I

argued

that

the

character

of

Neoptolemus makes a certain transition in his relationship
with Philoctetes.

He goes from pursuing a relationship with

the son of Poeas for the sake of what he can get from him to
befriending Philoctetes for who he is.
of relationship,

I

argued,

It is the latter sort

that Sophocles is proposing as

normative with respect to the true meaning of friendship as
well as the necessary prerequisite to heroic virtue.

In his

logos of friendship Aristotle also furnishes us with several
different manifestations of friendship (one of which is based
upon something that one wants from one's friend) and he, too,
holds that the central case of friendship is precisely this
love of the other for the sake of who he is rather than for
what one can get from him.

It is only in the experience of

this kind of friendship, according to Aristotle, that human
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life may be said to be complete.

Let us turn to a closer

analysis of Aristotle's discussion of friendship.
According to Aristotle friendship is some kind of virtue
or involves virtue (arete tis e met' aretes, EN 1155a2) . 14

It

is, furthermore, most necessary to human life (anankaiotaton
eis ton bion, EN 1155a2-3) inasmuch as no one, he says, would
choose to live without friends even if he had all other good
things in life (EN 1155a5-6).

This, as we shall see, is most

especially true with respect to friendships that are based
upon the character of the beloved.
According to Aristotle, there are three different kinds
of friendship that are differentiated by the motive upon which
their affection is based (hoi de philountes allelous boulontai
tagatha allelois taute he philousin, EN 1156a9-10).
Aristotle says,

Friends,

can have affection for each other that is

based upon mutual usefulness,

pleasure or good character.

Friends motivated by utility or pleasure do not love each
other for themselves (ou kath' hautous philousin, EN 1156all)
but for some other good.

(all'

he givetai ti autois par'

allelon agathon, EN 1156all-12).

Aristotle states that these

two kinds are friendships only incidentally (kata sumbebekos
te de hai philiai hautai eisin,

14

EN 1156a16-17)

because the

A friendship that is based upon virtue must, by
definition, involve choice (fil! 1106a3-4, 1106b36, llllb5-6,
1139a22-23). But as we shall see, Aristotle will reserve the
element of choice to only the central case of friendship,
namely, that which is based upon character. We shall discuss
this later in the section.
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ground of the relationship is not the friend himself but some
use or pleasure which the other may provide

(fili 1156a 17 _ 18 ).

These sorts of friendships, according to Aristotle, are most
easily dissolved (eudialutoi, EN 1156a19) when the partners
do not maintain the same stance toward each other.

For, as

soon as they are no longer useful or pleasant to each other,
they cease to be friends (EN 1156a20-21).
incidental

nature

of

the

friendships

By recognizing the

that

are

based upon

usefulness or pleasure Aristotle by no means seeks to denigrate them.

They are both in line with Aristotle's broad

definition of friendship as a reciprocal stance of good will
of which both parties are aware (dei ara eunoein allelois kai
boulesthai tagatha me

lanthanontas,

EN

1156a3-4) .

It

is

simply that these kinds of relationships are not representative of all that friendship can be. 15

In order to know the

full reality of friendship in all of its possibilities we need
to look to the friendship of character.
Aristotle states that this form of friendship is perfect
or the most fully realized (teleia, EN 1156b7) inasmuch as it
is the sort of friendship which exists between those who are

15

Aristotle does, at one point, demean the value of usebased friendship when he says that it is "characteristic of
petty traffickers" (he de dia to chresimon agoraion, EN
1158a21). Given the context of this particular discussion of
the three types of friendship it appears that Aristotle is
directing his derisive remarks not at the nature of this sort
of friendship itself (though it is, admittedly, limited) but
toward those who are incapable of forming a relationship with
another except with something useful to be obtained as its
basis (cf. also EN 1157a19-20).
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good and alike in virtue.

Friends in this kind of relation-

ship wish for each other's good inasmuch as they are good
(ekeinou heneka, EN 1156b10) and their goodness is something
intrinsic not incidental to their character (agathoi d'eisi
kath' hautous, EN 1156b9) . 16

In other words, the foundation

upon which the friendship exists is not something external to
who the beloved is (such as usefulness or pleasure) but is the
beloved herself inasmuch as she is the instantiation of moral

16

see John M. Cooper, "Aristotle on Friendship," in Essays
on Aristotle's Ethics, ed. Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (Berkeley,
California, University of California Press, 1980), pp. 3033 08.
I agree with Cooper's interpretation that friendship
based upon character is said to be perfect inasmuch as it
takes place between those who are good without this implying
that only those who are perfectly good or "moral heroes" are
capable of having such friendships. While I find this to be
true it seems to me that this is understood as part of
Aristotle's general conception of friendship (and happiness)
and goes without saying. Aristotle maintains that friendship
is a characteristic or lasting disposition (hexis) that must,
like any other virtue, be continually brought into actualization in order to be maintained and to flourish.
Thus,
Aristotle asserts that if distance or absence of greeting
(aprosegoria) interrupts the activity of friendship for too
long, the friendship will be dissolved ( EN 1157b5-13) . Again,
friendship, like courage or justice, must be continually
practiced in order to remain in existence and grow.
The
Stagirite states, repeatedly, that happiness, too, is an
activity (EH 1169b31-32).
The point here is that since
friendship must repeatedly be brought into actualization it
is not to be understood as static and hence it does not
preclude the notion of development even within the friendship
that Aristotle characterizes as perfect (that which is based
upon character or the good). In this way Cooper's point, while
valid, becomes superfluous inasmuch as Aristotle's dynamic and
developmental conception of friendship already implies that
those who have this kind of friendship with each other are
not, in fact, moral paragons.
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goodness.

17

is the most

According to Aristotle, this sort of friendship
lasting

(EN 1156bll}

precisely because it is

founded upon the beloved herself rather than upon incidental
considerations.

17

In addition, it is only this kind of friend-

see Paul J. Wadell, C.P., Friendship and the Moral Life
(Notre Dame, Indiana, University of Notre Dame Press, 1989)
p. 63. Wadell correctly emphasizes that, for Aristotle, the
focus in friendship of character is the person of the beloved
not solely her qualities, "The bond in character friendship
is a love for virtue, but this is no impersonal, abstract
good; rather, it is an embodied good, a good friends see taken
to heart and enfleshed in the life of another. What attracts
us to our friends is exactly how the good has taken root in
them."
Cf. Ferdinand Schoeman, "Aristotle on the Good of
Friendship," Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 63, (1985)
273-274. Schoeman considers Aristotle's treatment of when and
whether friendships should be dissolved. He accuses Aristotle
of typically conflating persons with their moral qualities
when the Stagirite maintains that we cannot have affection for
a friend who has become wicked because only the good and never
evil can be an object of affection.
Thus, Schoeman asserts
that Aristotle's discussion of friendship is inadequate
because it "mischaracterises loyalty to a person as involving
a commitment to that person's motivating principles."
I do not think, first of all, that the term, "character"
can be used interchangeably (as Schoeman employs it) with the
term, "motivating principles." When Aristotle talks about
character it seems to me that he means, pretty much, what we
mean when we talk about an individual's personality or
personality traits.
This would include the individual's
motivating principles but is a more inclusive notion than the
other, more abstract, term.
In this way, when Aristotle
advises us to break off a friendship on the ground that our
friend has become wicked it is not because of something as
impersonal as their motivating principles (although this would
be part of it) but because of who our friend has become as a
person.
In fact, Aristotle's position is more tolerant than
this. If our friend has fallen into wicked ways he says that
we ought to come to his aid and try to straighten him out (EN
1165bl9} but that if he becomes incurably wicked (aniatois,
.filf 1165bl8}, and it is evident that it is impossible to save
him, then and only then is it necessary to sever our ties with
him.
Thus, loyalty to a friend or the severing of ties is,
for Aristotle, grounded in who the person is and not in
qualities considered in abstraction from the one in whom they
may inhere.
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ship that is proof against slander (kai mone de he ton agathon
philia adiabletos estin, EN 1157a20-21).

Here, friends have

tried and tested each other over a long period of time (EN
1157a22).

They know and trust each other and hence are not

likely to believe the words of simply anyone who attempts to
undermine their friend's character.
is,

furthermore,

Friendship of character

the most complete in that it includes or

takes up into itself the other two kinds of friendship.
every such friend will also,

according to Aristotle,

useful and pleasurable companion.
tains

that

it

is

only

the

Thus,
be a

Finally, Aristotle main-

friendship

of

character

that

transcends the (often) petty, contractual nature of the other
two types of relationships.
Friendships based upon pleasure and (most especially)
usefulness tend to be quid pro quo arrangements in which what
is

given

and

received

is

clearly

defined

and

scrutinized by both parties (EN 1162b26-28).

carefully

The material

advantage that accrues to the recipient serves as the measure
of what is given in these kinds of relationships (EN 1163a1617).

Friendship of character, however, is not founded upon

such fixed conditions
material

advantage

(EN 1162b31)

to

the

and thus it is not the

recipient

which

serves

as

the

measure of what is given but the moral purpose or choice of
the giver (metro d' eoiken he tou drasantos proairesis, EN
1163a22).

This

is

so,

as

Aristotle

states,

because the

governing factor for virtue and character lies in moral choice
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(tes aretes gar kai tou ethous en te proairesei to kurion, EN
1163a22-23).

It is important to note, then, that Aristotle

holds that it is friendship of character alone which has
within it the element of choice so crucial to the definition
of moral virtue.
result

of

Here, friendship arises not so much as a

external

circumstances

but

from

the

choice

of

friends who love each other for their character and "how the
good has taken root in them.

1118

Thus far we have discussed

the three different kinds of friendship and the superiority
of the friendship of character to relationships that are only
pleasurable or useful.
reasons

why

Aristotle

We have also explored a number of
accords

central place in his schema.
consideration

of

friendship

of

character

a

It is now time to turn to a

Aristotle's

position

with

respect

to

friendship and happiness in order to see that the philosopher
fundamentally understands human flourishing to be a community
affair.
Aristotle addresses the question of whether a
person will need friends at EN IX.9.

happy

He asserts that it is

said that the happy or blessed person

(tois makariois,

EN

1169b4-5) will not need friends since she already has all the
good

things

1169b5).

of

life

(huparchein

gar

autois

tagatha,

EN

Those who are happy, it is argued, are self-suffi-

cient and have no need of anyone or anything else (autarkeis
oun ontas oudenos prosdeisthai, EN 1169b5-6).
1

In this view

8wadell, Friendship and the Moral Life, p. 63.
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we only need a friend, who is another self (heteron auton, EN
1169b6-7) ,

to provide those things which we are unable to

furnish for ourselves and it is for this reason, Aristotle
states, that there is the verse, "When fortune gives favorably, what need is there of friends?"

On the other hand, it

would be strange (atopos, EN 1169b8), the Stagirite argues,
to accord all good things to a happy person while excluding
friends, who are thought to be the greatest of external goods
(EN 1169b9-10).

It would,

furthermore,

be strange (atopon,

EN 1169b16) to make a happy person live his life as a loner
and in isolation, for Aristotle asserts that a human being is,
by nature, political and social (literally, "naturally lives
with others," suzen pephukos, EN 1169b18-19).

This passage

echoes Aristotle's earlier discussion of self-sufficiency and
happiness in Nicomachean Ethics I where he states:
The perfect and most complete good seems to be selfsufficient. But by self-sufficient we do not mean for an
individual who is living a solitary existence by himself
but for someone who lives with his parents, children, wife
and, in general, with friends and fellow citizens since
a human being is, by nature, a political being (EN 1097b8ll.) 19

In this way it is quite clear that Aristotle does not understand the self-sufficiency that is part of human happiness as
a non-relational sort of autonomy but as one implying life
within a community. 20
Aristotle asserts that those who argue that the happy
19

Ostwald, p. 15.

20

see Sherman, The Fabric of Character, p. 128.
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person will

not

require

friends

speak

the

truth

after

a

fashion (pe aletheuousin, EN 1169b23) inasmuch as most people
(hoi polloi, EN 1169b23) understand by friends those who are
useful.

It is certainly true that a happy person will not

need friends of this sort since he already has the good things
of life.

Nor, according to Aristotle, will he need a friend

for the pleasantness of his companionship since his own life
is already quite complete with respect to pleasure.

It is in

this way that those who think that a happy person does not
require useful or pleasant friends argue that he does not need
any friends at all.
While it is true that a happy person does not need the
sort of friendships that are based upon usefulness or pleasure,21 it is not at all true that he will not need any friends
whatsoever.

Aristotle affirms that a happy person will need

friends of character and he links this,

directly, with the

happy person's very ability to achieve

(and maintain)

his

happiness.

First of all, Aristotle recapitulates his previous

discussion

and

1169b29, cf.

states

that

also 1098a8,

happiness

16,

is

an

1098b31-1099a7)

activity

(EN

and that the

activity of a good person is in itself both good and pleasant

21 When I say that a happy person does not need friendships
based upon utility or pleasure I mean that they are not
sufficient for happiness. These sorts of friendships are, most
certainly, necessary to the happy person's life (in terms of
the goods of pleasure and use) but they will never be sufficient for happiness. The only kind of friendship, according
to Aristotle, that is both necessary and sufficient to a
flourishing life is the friendship of character.
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(tou d'agathou he energeia spoudaia kai hedeia kath' hauten,

.fil! 1169b31-32, cf. also 1099al4-15, 21).

This implies that

a happy person's life ought to be both active and pleasant.
Aristotle asserts, therefore, that a happy person will need
friends because a solitary existence is difficult (chalepos,
EN 1170a5) and it will not be easy for him to be continuously
active outside of the company of friends (ou gar radion kath'
hauton energein sunechos meth'heteron de kai pros allous raon,
EN ll 70a5-6).

Furthermore, because such friends delight in

virtuous activity and are displeased with vice they can be
said to

form a

kind of school

together (EN 1170all-12).

of virtue

from their

life

Each friend is able to encourage

and give pleasure to the other through the excellence of his
own actions.

For, according to Aristotle, it is part of the

moral purpose or choice (prohaireitai, EN 1170a2-3) of a happy
person to contemplate (theorein, EN 1170a2) actions which are
good and are the sort of actions that he may want to call his
own.

Thus,

friends will delight in observing each other's

excellent actions (~ ll 70a2-4) . 22

Paul Wadell puts the matter

very well:
This is where the connection between friendship and
eudaimonia is made.
Eudaimonia is life lived according
to virtue, but to live according to virtue is to live in
the company of friends.
Friendship is a practical
implication of what the moral life requires.
Aristotle
22

Aristotle further supports his position with regard to
the pleasant and educative function of contemplating our
friends' actions with the psychologically acute statement that
we are better able to observe our neighbors than ourselves and
their actions better than our own (EN 1169b33-35).
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has already told us that eudaimonia describes the complete
and fulsome life, and he has identified eudaimonia as the
life of virtue, the ongoing growth of a person in goodness. Now Aristotle inquires into what training in virtue
involves, and sees it centered in friendship.
He bases
this conclusion on his earlier argument that 'happiness
is some kind of activity,' specifically the activity of
virtue, and now suggests that since the 'activity of a
good man' is the doing of good with and for others, 'it
follows that a supremely happy man will need friends of
this kind.'
In other words, eudaimonia is life constituted by virtue friendships. 23
Aristotle

emphasizes

the

intimacy

of

the

bond

that

exists in friendships based on character when he asserts that
the stance or attitude of a friend in this sort of relationship is the same toward his friend as toward himself
1170b5-6).

This is so inasmuch as Aristotle is so bold as to

say that the friend is another self
philos estin, EN 1170b6-7).
to

be

(EN

another

self,

(heteros gar autos ho

Because the friend is understood

Aristotle

claims

that

the

friend's

existence and flourishing is affirmed to be just as choiceworthy (or nearly so)~ as one's own existence and flourishing
(kathaper oun to auton einai haireton estin hekasto houto kai
to ton philon e paraplesios, EN 1170b7-8).

Consequently, a

fFiend in this kind of relationship must make his friend's
existence a part of his own consciousness (sunaisthanesthai
ara dei kai tou philou hoti esti,

EN ll 70b10-11) .

This,

2

3wadell, Friendship and the Moral Life, p. 64.

24

The quibble, I suspect, is due to Aristotle's position
that self-love is the basis and condition of love of another.
Thus, he qualifies somewhat his simple assertion that the
friend's existence is just as choiceworthy as one's own
existence.
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Aristotle asserts, can only come about by living together with
one's friend and by sharing each other's words and thoughts
(touto de ginoit'
dianoias,

an en to suzen kai koinonein logon kai

1170bll-12) . 25

EN

Because a

character

friend's

existence and flourishing is almost as desirable to a happy
person as his own fulsome life,

it follows that the happy

individual will need morally good friends

(EN 1170b18-19).

In this way, Aristotle affirms the indispensability of life
with

others

as

a

condition

of

the

ongoing

pursuit

of

a

virtuous and flourishing existence.
6.4 Conclusion
We have seen, in this chapter, that both tragedian and
philosopher hold the view that friendship is an indispensable
part

of

living

well.

I

have

argued,

furthermore,

that

Sophocles and Aristotle do not uphold simply any kind of
association or relationship (e.g. an alliance of expediency)
as a necessary element in living the good life but only the
sort of relationship in which one's friend is loved for who
he is and one wishes his good for his own sake.

This is the

case for the ancients because we have seen that they understand that the issue of personal character is intimately bound
up with the kinds of people with whom one shares one's life.

25

see Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, p. 358 for an
interesting discussion of how "living together" is not meant
to be interpreted as merely "regular social visiting" but a
more robust life of daily, shared activity in the spheres of
work and play.
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Friends are,

then,

closely connected with one's happiness

precisely because they are instrumental in the formation of
one's character.

It is in this way that the ancients fully

appreciated the social character of growth in the moral life.
Modern moral philosophy in the Kantian tradition, on the other
hand, has proved deficient in its lack of appreciation for the
social nature of becoming a moral person.
this

is

the

case

because

of

its

I have argued that

pre-occupation

with

establishing the autonomy of the willing subject in such a way
that eclipses the possibility of others' having a vital role
to play in the formation of the moral person.
the

ancients

fully

appreciated

the

way

in

By contrast,
which

lasting

friendships based upon love of a friend's character can play
a decisive role in the formation of one's character and in
living the good life.
Sophocles shows us this in dramatic form in the way that
Neoptolemus moves beyond his former relationship with Philoctetes where the
obtaining

the

latter was

bow.

The

simply a means to the end of

tragedian

reveals,

both

through

Neoptolemus' own insights and the final revelation of Heracles, that true friendship must be based upon mutual trust,
openness and care for the other.
friendship,

Sophocles is saying,

It is only this kind of
that can be the basis of

heroic action.
Aristotle, for his part, furnishes a logos of that which
is presented dramatically by the tragedian.

The philosopher,
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also, presents to us inferior kinds of friendships (such as
those of pleasure and of utility)
sorts of

relationships are

and shows us that these

inferior because they are not

grounded upon love of the person for who he is but upon some
kind

of

incidental

consideration.

The

central

case

of

friendship for the philosopher is that in which the person is
loved for who he is and the good is wished for him for his
own sake.

Aristotle argues that it is only in this sort of

friendship that we find a stable and reliable ground for the
pursuit of the virtuous life.
friendships

This is so since it is only in

founded upon character that we

seek the good

together and make each other good. 26
In this way both philosopher and tragedian affirm, each
in his own way, that the life of virtue (or heroic action) is
not a solitary affair but is founded upon and mediated by the
sort of friends who help us to sustain virtuous activity and
who guide us in the living of the best life because they
exemplify, as our "other selves," the kind of life that we
ourselves would want to live.

26

see Wadell, Friendship and the Moral Life, p.66.

CONCLUSION
Our study in the moral anthropology of Sophocles and
Aristotle has proved to be richly rewarding.

It has been my

position that the poet and the philosopher hold a fundamentally similar conception of the nature of the moral person and
the good life and that this understanding of ethics is,

in

many respects, superior to more recent developments in moral
philosophy, especially those in the Kantian tradition.

First,

we have seen how the ancients show a great appreciation of the
concrete character of ethics.

They fully understand that the

point of ethics is not to construct a moral theory or to
formulate a decision-procedure (as is characteristic of the
abstractions

of modern moral

philosophy)

but to become a

particular kind of person and to live a particular kind of
life.

In this way we see that they are fundamentally pre-

occupied with the question of character and what constitutes
its excellence.
The question of character is, as they see it, related
to the prior question of human nature and the relationship
that such a nature has to the development of the virtues.
once again we can see that they begin with the concrete and
develop their understanding of what constitutes the moral
person from their consideration of the phenomena.
224

Sophocles
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and Aristotle understand that a human being is a complex of
reason,

emotions and desires and that these three stand in

need of some kind of organization and integration if psychic
health, virtue and human fulfillment is to be achieved.

It

is their position that such an integration of these elements
of the psyche is not given to us by nature and that education
is necessary in order that excellent organization of these
elements can be realized.
Once again,

it has been my position that this ancient

anthropology is superior to more recent developments in the
Kantian tradition because of its taking into account the whole
person:

the rational,

emotional and desiderative elements.

Moral philosophy after Kant shows little interest in the role
that the emotions and desires play or in the significance that
their integration with reason may have in the formation of the
moral agent.

In the ancient conception of the person the

emotions are not hopelessly irrational drives that must be
suppressed

or

overcome

by

reason

(as

in

Kant)

but

are,

instead, highly educable, semi-rational impulses capable of
b~ing aligned with

the

rational

excellent moral agency results.

part

in such a

way that

In this way the ancients not

only realize the important place that the emotions have in the
moral development of the person but they also appreciate the
central role that achieving psychological harmony plays with
respect to authentic human agency.

Moral philosophy in the

Kantian tradition not only does not take the emotions serious-
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ly as having a part to play in the constitution of the moral
person but it is positively hostile to them.

We can see this

in the way that Kant tends to view reason and inclination as
opposed and how reason needs to overcome inclination in order
that one's duty may be carried out.

In this way, too, we can

see that this model for moral agency is consonant with the
notion of inner conflict as an unavoidable condition of human
agency as opposed to the possibility of integration which we
find in the ancient model.

It has been my contention that the

ancient model is preferable because of the way in which the
entire person is taken into account and because inner harmony
among

the

various

parts

psychological civil war.

of

the

psyche

is

preferable

to

We have, in fact, seen in the play

that Neoptolemus is incapable of acting authentically so long
as he is in this conflicted state and achieves excellent moral
agency when the strife that has been raging within him has
been resolved.

The recognition of nature's insufficiency for

virtue and the need for a teacher points to the ancients'
recognition of the social character of growth in the moral
life.

This is demonstrated, too, in the privileged place that

they accord friendship.

Sophocles and Aristotle both show a

profound appreciation of the role that others play in our
becoming moral persons.
a

moral person is a

They fully understand that becoming

process that

is mediated through our

relationship with friends and teachers who act as moral guides
or examples throughout our lives.

The social character of
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moral education is not sufficiently appreciated at all by
moral philosophy in the tradition of Kant and this is so , as
we have suggested, because of its pre-occupation with securing
the rational autonomy of the agent.

In this conception of

morals there is an unfortunate disparagement of the role that
moral examples play because they tend to viewed as a sort of
illegitimate form of heteronomy in which the ground for the
determination of the agent's will is no longer the moral law
alone.

This is unfortunate since it seeks for too rigid a

standard and hence rejects the very real role that others can
play in our lives as moral guides and exemplars.

The legiti-

macy of the use of moral examples, both good and bad, in the
formation of the moral agent was the basis of our consideration of the characters of Odysseus and Neoptolemus as both
anti-type and authentic agent, respectively.
As a corollary and secondary theme of this thesis I have
maintained that the employment of philosophy and literature
is appropriate to this fuller anthropology which realizes the
importance of both the emotional and rational aspects of moral
personhood.
an

As we have seen, the ancients viewed ethics as

eminently practical

and

concrete affair

and they also

appreciated the central role that the emotions play in the
formation of the moral agent.

Correlative to this,

I have

employed the poetry of Sophocles' drama because poetry excels
in the presentation of the concrete and particular situation
as well as for its emotionally evocative power.

Through the
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medium

of

the

poet

we

are

presented

with

a

particular,

emotionally-charged situation in which we, too, as viewers are
summoned to feel with and for the characters on the stage.
We have especially witnessed this in the moving and dramatic
way that Sophocles portrays Neoptolemus going through the
agonies of deliberation in which he attempts to resolve his
moral dilemma.

Because of poetry's peculiar powers to portray

the particular and to evoke the emotions it seems to me to be
entirely appropriate to employ it as representative of one
side of the ancient anthropology that we are attempting to
flesh out.
We have employed the philosopher, on the other hand, as
representative of the rational element of our anthropology
not, of course, because he does not recognize the role of the
emotions,

but

because

the

strengths

that

are

especially

peculiar to philosophy are those of analysis and explanation.
We have, in addition, turned to the philosopher in order to
furnish

us

with a

more

unified

picture

phenomena that are given by the poet.

of

the disparate

In this way we have

looked to the philosopher for a logos that both explains and
provides a more synthetic whole.

We have seen this analytic

rigor operative in the way that Aristotle has furnished us
with certain moral concepts or terms which help to give a
rational account of the phenomena which the tragedian has
presented in his drama.
nature

of

panourgia

Thus, Aristotle's discussion of the

( in conjunction with his

analysis

of
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cleverness and practical wisdom) has furnished us with a logos
of

the

character

of

Odysseus.

By

means

of

Aristotle's

analysis we have come to understand that Odysseus' potentially
admirable

ability

(deinotes)

is

of

vitiated

efficiently
by his

linking

wicked

means

character

to

ends

into

the

willingness to do or say anything to achieve any end that is
characteristic of criminality (panourgia).

In this way we

gain insight into the nature of Odysseus' wickedness because
we now understand that his viciousness distorts his perception
of the fundamental principles of action such that his admirable ability is skewed and directed to ends of dubious
moral rectitude.
Aristotle's term prohairesis has also proved to be of
enormous benefit in both helping us to understand the nature
of the choice which Neoptolemus makes in the play and furnishing a unified account of the disparate phenomena that are a
part

of

this

complex

moral

act.

Through

the

notion

of

prohairesis we are capable of understanding Neoptolemus' act
as constituted by four things:

(1) deliberation (2) maturity

(3) responsibility (4) integration of the emotional with the
rational.

Thus, we see that Neoptolemus first goes through

the agonies of deliberation, after which he comes to a mature
decision in which he ceases to eschew personal responsibility
for his actions.

It is through this very decision, further-

more, that he achieves an integration of his emotions with his
reason as is evidenced by the fact that his hesitation and
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self-doubt

is gone and he now acts with bold resolution.

Again, we can see here that Aristotle's term helps to unify
and explain the phenomena which is presented by the dramatist.
We have seen the excellence of philosophy operative in
the way in which Aristotle furnishes an account of the nature
of emotional response.

Sophocles furnishes us a phenomenal

account of the emotions through the characters of his drama.
It is here that we see that Neoptolemus' emotions lead him to
question the justice of his actions.
provides us with an explanation,

Aristotle, for his part,

a rational account of the

nature of emotional response that helps us to see why Neoptolemus' emotions are able to do what they do in the play.
Thus,

through Aristotle's analysis of the relationship of

reason and emotional response in terms of efficient causality,
we come to understand the cognitive character of the emotions.
Through his analysis of the emotions of shame, compassion and
righteous indignation we are able,

furthermore,

to see that

this very cognitive component of emotional response is capable
of orienting the individual to the good that is to be done for
himself or for another.

In this way, we are enabled better

to understand how the emotions operate in the character of
Neoptolemus as he attempts to understand what he is to do.

APPENDIX

THE EDUCATIVE ROLE OF THE EMOTIONS
AND THE EXPERIENCE OF TRAGIC CATHARSIS
We have already seen how compassion, shame and various
other emotions played a central role in the moral education of
the character of Neoptolemus.

We saw also the various ways in

which the Sophoclean and Aristotelian conceptions of the role
of

the

emotions

in

moral

discernment

are

in

fundamental

Both philosopher and tragedian do not see the

agreement.

emotions and reason as at odds with each other but as capable
of successful integration and able to supplement each other's
vision of the good.

In this section I wish simply to amplify

the

Aristotle

way

Sophoclean

in

which

position

regarding

supports
the

and

cognitive

develops
role

of

the
the

emotions in moral judgment by a consideration of the role of
the emotions

in relation to katharsis

in the Poetics and

Politics.
In his Poetics Aristotle states that there are two things
responsible for (aitiai, Poetics 1448b4) the origin of poetry
as a whole and that both of these things are natural causes
(phusikai, Poetics 1448b5).

The first cause is that represen-

tation is connatural to human beings from childhood inasmuch
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as human beings are the most prone towards representation of
all other animals
Poetics 1448b7).

(ton allon zoon hoti mimetikotaton esti,
It is in this way, Aristotle says, that we

learn our first lessons.

The second thing responsible for the

origin of poetry is that everyone not only engages in representation

but

delights

pantas, Poetics 1448b9).

in

it

(to

chairein

tois

mimemasi

Aristotle says the reason we delight

in representation is that it is pleasurable to discern the
likeness (eikonas, Poetics 1448bll) that exists between the
thing

itself

and

the

thing

represented

(manthanein

kai

sullogizesthai ti hekaston hoion hoti houtos ekeinos, Poetics
1448b16-17).

An indication of this is that things which we

would normally view in themselves with pain, we delight in
when they have been represented with the greatest exactitude
and care (ha gar auta luperos horomen touton tas eikonas tas
malista ekribomenas chairomen theorountes, Poetics 1448bl011).

We delight in representations,

then,

because we take

pleasure in learning (manthanein ou monon tois philosophois
hediston alla kai tois allois homoios, Poetics 1448b13-14 ) .
Thus, viewing representations (whether they be through drama
or music, through painting or sculpture)

is an intellectual

process and entails some kind of sensitive judgment on the
part of the viewer because it involves an apprehension of the
connection between reality and representation.

This under-

standing of representational art as an intellectual process
that involves judgment is built right into Aristotle's notion
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of plot.
According to Aristotle, plot or plot-structure (muthos)
is

the

soul

of

tragedy

(Poetics

1450a39-bl) .

It

is

the

business of the poet whose field of representation is human
agents and actions (Poetics 1448al, 1448a27-28) to compose a
plot

where

events

happen

from

necessity

or

probability,

because of each other rather than merely after one another
(Poetics 1452a5, 1452a20-21).

In this way, then, it is up to

the

events

poet

so to

arrange

the

of

his

plot

that

the

intelligible structure of the story is made manifest to the
audience.

This is why, for Aristotle, poetry is more serious

and more philosophical than history (Poetics 1451b5ff.).
historian relates only the things that have happened.
not

necessarily concerned to persuade an

audience

The
He is

of

the

intelligibility of the events that have occurred as simply to
present those events.

The poet, on the other hand, must show

the intelligible nexus of the events that make up his story
(according to probability or necessity)
sympathetic response from his audience.

if he is to evoke a
The poet, then,

is

not concerned so much with what happens (ta genomena, Poetics
as with what could happen (hoia an genoito, Poetics 1451b5).
In this way, unlike the historian who deals with particulars,
the poet is dealing with types of events or types of characters that are universal to human experience.

As Aristotle

puts it, poetry speaks of universals, history of particulars
(Poetics 1451b7-8).
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Poetry, then, speaks in terms of "literary universals"'
wherein the nature of human experience is revealed (through
action

and

character)

by

means

of

representation.

The

excellence of these literary universals, however, is precisely
their ability to arouse the peculiarly tragic emotions of
compassion and terror (Poetics 1449b27-28, 1452bl).

It is the

feeling of these two emotions that comprises the particular
pleasure that is characteristic of the experience of tragedy
(Poetics 1453b10-12).

Other kinds of painful emotions can be

evoked but these are not peculiar to tragedy and will not
elicit catharsis,

the central element to the experience of

tragedy for Aristotle (Poetics 1449b29). (Aristotle appears,
in fact, to link the experience of catharsis with the feeling
of

these

two

1342a7ff.) .

peculiarly
For

example,

tragic
it

is

emotions,
possible

cf.
for

Politics,
a

poet

to

represent on stage the change from good to bad fortune of good
and decent men (tous epieikeis andras, Poetics 1452b34), but
this, Aristotle says, will not elicit terror and compassion
because it is revolting (miaron, Poetics 1452b36) . 2
It is the job of the poet, then, to construct the sort

1
See Norman Gulley, "Aristotle on the Purposes of Literature," in Articles on Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes, (New
York, st. Martin's Press, 1978), p. 171.

2Richard

Janko (Aristotle on Comedy, London, Duckworth,
1984, 142) perceptively points out the relevant opposition of
this
word,
miaron
(which
literally means
"polluted,"
"unclean"), to the word that signifies one of the central
experiences
of
excellent
tragedy
(for
Aristotle)
as
"cleansing" or "purifying," namely, catharsis.
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of plot which elicits these peculiarly tragic emotions.
evocation of
catharsis)

compassion and terror

(leading,

in turn,

The
to

is the test case of whether the tragic poet has

successfully composed an excellent tragedy.

These particular

emotions can be predictably aroused by the excellent tragic
poet because of Aristotle's implicit belief in the inherent
connection of emotional response to the cognitive process of
understanding the

play. 3

If

the

poet has

composed well,

according to Aristotle, compassion and terror will be appropriate responses to the events depicted on the stage.

In this

way we see that Aristotle's poetic theory supports his ethical
theory because in both we see him acknowledging the interconnection between the rational and emotional spheres.
excellent

and

lectually and

successful
(perhaps

poet will

especially)

engage us

both

The

intel-

emotionally by calling

forth from us terror and compassion toward the events depicted
on stage, emotions which will inevitably lead to the emotional
and psychological release that is catharsis.

These emotions

are not irrational or unpredictable impulses but are an intelligent

response

to

a

well-structured

plot

(according

to

probability or necessity) in which events are so arranged and
characters so depicted as intelligibly to evince terror and
compassion:
To feel an emotion consequent on the representation of an
action that contains the object of that emotion, the
3Aristotle

is not talking about the understanding of a
literary critic but that of the audience.
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fearful and pitiable for instance, is not to feel it
simply, but to see, at the same time, those objects in
their causes, to see how they follow, in all likelihood or
of necessity, from certain actions that precede them. It
is also, and this is important, to feel the emotion about
the causes.
In the case of tragedy, for instance, the
causes of things pitiable and fearful are themselves made
to appear pitiable and fearful, for what makes the tragic
action, when constructed best, so pitiable and fearful, is
that the fearful and pitiable things are shown arising out
of something unexpected and apparently harmless, and to
someone who is like us, neither extremely bad nor
extremely good.
The fearfulness of the consequences is
thrown back onto the cause, so that that too becomes
fearful, and all the more so the more vividly this is
done. 4
In this

way then we can see how Aristotle maintains the

centrality

of

tragic drama.
the

emotional

response

in the

understanding

of

It is time now to turn to a consideration of

educational

role that the emotions

of

compassion and

terror have (those emotions which Aristotle sees as peculiar
to tragedy) with respect to the experience of catharsis.
It is not my purpose in this discussion to give anything
on the order of a history of the interpretation of Aristotle's
intentions

in his use of the term catharsis.

require a book unto itself.
particular

That would

Suffice it to say that this

interpretation of the term and

its meaning

is

controversial and is so of necessity because of the scantiness
and inconclusiveness of the evidence.

It does, however, seem

to me that this interpretation does the most justice to what
Aristotle was getting at in his discussion of the meaning and
function of catharsis in the experience of tragedy.
4

Peter Simpson, "Aristotle
Hermes, 116 (1988) 289.

on

Poetry

and

Imitation,"
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Former interpretations (mostly in the nineteenth century)
of the meaning of catharsis focused on the medical aspects of
the term and favored a conception of catharsis as a kind of
physiological and psychological purgation. 5
of recent commentators, however,

A growing number

have been challenging the

purgation model of catharsis as inconsistent with Aristotle's
conception

of

the

necessary

and

emotions in living the good life. 6

beneficial

role

of

the

Catharsis is, surely, some

kind of purgation or relieving of an excess but it is not the
total sort of evacuation that former commentators have made it
out to be.

These more recent commentators argue that the

educative function of catharsis has largely been neglected in
a consideration of the meaning of this term.
As we have already seen, Aristotle maintains that moral
virtue is comprised as much by what we feel when we act as by
our action itself.

The pleasure or pain that we we feel in

accompaniment with our actions is a sign (semeion, EN 1104b4)
5

See Stephen Halliwell, Aristotle's Poetics (London,
Duckworth, 1986), pp. 184-201; Richard Janko, Aristotle on
Comedy (London, Duckworth, 1984), pp. 136-51.
6

See Humphrey House, Aristotle's Poetics (Westport,
Connecticut, Greenwood Press, Publishers 1956), pp. 108-11;
Carnes Lord, Education and Culture in the Political Thought of
Aristotle (Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, 1982),
pp. 135-38, 152, 159, 164; Kathy Eden, Poetic and Legal
Fiction in the Aristotelian Tradition (Princeton, New Jersey,
Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 25-61; Richard Janke,
Poetics I with Tractatus Coislinianus (Indianapolis and
Cambridge, Hackett Publishing Company, 1987), pp. 141-42;
Norman Gulley, "Aristotle on the Purposes of Literature," in
Articles on Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes, (New York, St.
Martin's Press, 1978), p. 171, pp. 175-76.
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of the state of our character-disposition; correct education
(orthe paideia, EN 1104bl3) is delighting in and being pained
at those things which we ought to be; a person is not good or
just if he does not take delight in noble or just actions (EN
1099al7-20).

In addition to his assertions on the importance

of feeling correctly with respect to good character, Aristotle
explicitly repudiates the notion that virtue consists in some
kind of "exorcism" of the emotions.
In a

very significant passage

(for our purposes)

in

Nicomachean Ethics II.3 Aristotle says that some define the
virtues

as

a

kind

of

absence

(apatheias tinas kai eremias,

of

feeling

and

quietude

EN 1104b24-25), 7 because many

people become morally worthless

(phauloi,

EN 1104b21)

result of dealing poorly with pleasure and pain.

as a

But this is

an incorrect definition of virtue (ouk eu de [horizontai], EN
1104b25), Aristotle says, because those who define it in this
way

speak without making the due qualifications

of

time,

place, manner and all the other modes and manners in which
feeling will be appropriately expressed.

Virtue does not

consist in exorcism of the emotions but in the proper integration of emotional response to the various circumstances and
situations that we find ourselves in.

In this way, then, it

would be utterly unlike Aristotle to argue that the purpose of
the experience of tragic catharsis is the complete purgation

7

The second term, eremias, has its etymological roots in
the Greek word for 'desert,' eremos.
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of

the

emotions. 8

In

what

follows

I

shall

explain

how

catharsis is both a partial purgation and the vehicle by which
the audience appreciates tragedy emotionally (through compassion and terror) and is educated in and through the experience
of those emotions.
We have already seen that, for Aristotle, the experience
of tragedy is both a cognitive and an emotional one.

The

origins of poetry are our natural propensity to learn in and
through representation as well as the delight we take
understanding

that

"this

is

that"

(hoti

Poetics 1448bl 7) by means of representations.

houtos

in

ekeinos,

But the purpose

of tragic representation is the arousal of compassion and
terror

as

an

appropriate

witnessed on the stage.
tragic poet to
8

emotional

response

to

what

is

It is the particular task of the

furnish the audience the pleasure that

is

See Lord, Education and Culture, pp. 136-37.
Lord
quotes the testimony of both Seneca and Cicero on the Aristotelian position with respect to the emotions. Seneca writes:
"Aristotle stands as a defender of anger and forbids it to be
cut out of us" (stat Aristoteles defensor irae et vetat illam
nobis exsecari); "Aristotle says that certain passions can
serve as arms if one uses them well" (Aristoteles ai t affectus
guosdam si guis illis bene utatur pro armis esse) (On Anger
III. 3. 1, I. 17 .1) .
Cicero says, "the Peripatetics say that
those perturbations which we think should be eliminated are
not only natural but provided by nature to be useful, and they
say that the other sorts of passions are useful as well. Pity
is useful for getting us to render assistance and alleviate
the misfortunes that men suffer undeservedly; if one were to
remove fear, all carefulness in life, which is greatest among
those who fear the laws, the magistrates, poverty, ignominy,
death, or pain, would be eliminated.
In arguing thus they
admit that these passions need to be pruned back, but assert
that they neither can nor need be uprooted entirely, and
suppose that in almost all things a mean is best" (Tusculan
Disputations IV. 19-20).
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peculiar
terror

to

tragedy,

namely,

catharsis

of

compassion

and

(ten apo eleou kai phobou dia mimeseos dei hedonen

paraskeuazein ton poieten, Poetics 1453b12-3).

This is done,

however, by an appeal to the emotions as cognitive because, as
we have seen, the experience of the downfall of the good man
is rejected as inappropriate to the arousal of compassion and
terror because it will only stir up feelings of revulsion (to
miaron, Poetics 1452b36).
The experience of tragedy, we shall argue then, brings
about

the

alignment

of

our

emotions

with

the

moral

and

aesthetic judgments that we make about the world because the
experience of catharsis validates the tragic poet's plot as
worthily and properly eliciting the experience of catharsis
through the emotions of compassion and terror.

The successful

tragic poet will then evoke both a cognitive and emotional
response from his audience by representing through his plotstructure the sorts of generalizations universal to the human
condition that call for a response of compassion and terror. 9
This
tragic

confirmation

catharsis will

of

feeling

educate

appropriately

the viewer

of

the

through
play

to

understand what it means to feel and act appropriately in
actual life situations.
Politics 1340a23f.

Aristotle states this explicitly at

In this passage,

Aristotle holds that

those who have been habituated to feel pain and delight with

9

See Peter Simpson, "Aristotle on Poetry and Imitation,"
Hermes, 116 (1988) 289-290.
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respect to things that are like the true or actual case are
close to being in the same state with regard to the actual
case itself (ho d'en tois homoiois ethismos tou lupeisthai kai
chairein eggus esti to pros ten aletheian ton auton echein
tropon,

Politics

1340a23-25).

He

says

that

if

a

person

delights in looking upon (theomenos, from theaomai, used often
of the spectator in a theatre)

the image

(eikona,

Politics

1340a26} of someone for no other reason than the form itself
(ten morphen auten, Politics 1340a27} of the one represented,
then that person will, of necessity, experience pleasure at
the actual sight of the person whose image he took delight in
(anankaion touto kai auten ekeinen ten theorian hou ten eikona
theorei hedeian einai,

Poli tics 1340a27-9) .

In this way,

then, we see how the experience of tragedy is a form of moral
education.

When we become habituated to feeling emotions

appropriately with regard to representations (and again it is
the task of the poet to confirm the intelligibility of our
emotional

response through the evocation of that pleasure

which is peculiar to tragedy), then we are well on our way to
feeling emotions appropriately in real life situations.

It

is, as Aristotle says, precisely this feeling delight and pain
at what we ought which constitutes correct education (orthe
paideia, fili 1104b14).
Through the experience of catharsis our feelings are not
only "worked through and made comprehensible,
10

see Janko, Poetics I, p. 142.

1110

they are also
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regulated.

The experience of catharsis is, after all, some

kind of release or relieving of the emotions.
it

a

"lightening"

of

the

emotions

Aristotle calls

(perhaps

from

pent-up

emotional tensions that have no place for release?) that is
accompanied by pleasure (kouphizesthai meth' hedones, Poli tics
1342a15).

Tragedy provides the place for the release of

emotional tensions which will regulate our emotions in such a
way that we are more apt to achieve the mean in the expression
of our feelings in actual life situations.

In a fascinating

passage of his Tractatus Coislinianus 11 (section III, cf. also
section IX), Aristotle says that tragedy takes away some of
the terrifying emotions of the soul

(huphairei ta phobera

pathemata tes psuches) through compassion and terror and that
it aims to have a due proportion of terror (surnmetrian thelei
echein tou phobou).
proportion
Aristotle's

of

This conception of the due measure or

emotional

conception

of

expression
virtue

as

accords
lying

well
in

a

with
mean

disposition (mesotes) of emotion (and action) in Nicomachean
Ethics II and IV.

In this way, then, we can see that Aris-

totle sees the emotions as intimately involved in the process
of understanding tragedy as well as being, in turn, educated
by it.

The emotions (as we have been arguing is the case for

both Aristotle and Sophocles) are not at odds with reason but
confirm (and even assist) reason in its moral judgments about

11

Argued by Janko to be a kind of summary of Aristotle's
lost treatise on comedy.
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the world.

The tragic poet, if he is to be successful, must

structure his plot and develop his characters in such a way
that compassion and terror are intelligible responses to the
events depicted on stage.

These emotions, if appropriately

aroused will lead to what Aristotle argues is the peculiar
pleasure of tragedy,
catharsis

is

both

namely,

an

catharsis.

aligning

of

the

The experience of
emotions

with

the

judgments of reason as well as a release of emotional tension
that will make us better able to hit the mean in the expression of our feelings in real life situations.

Thus, Aristotle

and Sophocles confirm one another in their assessment of the
central role that the emotions play in living the good life.
our emotions are not in opposition to reason but are capable
of being integrated with reason because of their cognitive
component.
reason

and

This

excellent dove-tailing of the powers

emotion with

respect

correct education (orthe paideia).

to

moral

discernment

of
is
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